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Abstract
This thesis comprises three chapters. Each considers a particular maimer in which policy choice and 
labour market structure interact to determine macroeconomic performance.
The first chapter argues that employment protection legislation can significantly reduce equilibrium 
employment. It considers the impact of firing costs on the pricing behaviour of intermediate-good firms 
facing idiosyncratic productivity shocks. It is shown that, since they might work against existing market 
distortions, such costs can lead to either more or less efficient labour allocations. Simulations indicate that 
the magnitude of their effects is potentially much greater than is found in standard, representative-firm 
models, particularly when they act to reduce employment.
The second chapter links the decentralisation of wage-bargaining in industrialised countries over the 
last twenty years to the more anti-inflationary macroeconomic regimes also in evidence. It presents a 
monetary policy game in which, prior to the central bank choosing inflation, wages are set by coalitions 
of unions. Unions are assumed to anticipate central bank behaviour when forming these coalitions. Using 
both cooperative and non-cooperative theories of coalition stability and formation, it is shown that highly 
conservative central banks are associated with decentralised patterns of wage-setting.
The third chapter considers the effect of spatial unemployment dispersion on inflationary pressure in 
the aggregate. It reviews the theoretical rationales for any such effect, and argues that some previous 
studies have been overly restrictive in their assumption of homogeneous disaggregate Phillips curves. A 
theoretical rationale for disaggregate heterogeneity is provided and aggregate and regional Phillips curves 
estimated. Statistics on the spatial unemployment distribution are found to explain a significant part of 
the variation of the GB NAIRU over time.
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1 Introduction
Macroeconomics may be thought of as the investigation of relationships between economic variables at 
a fairly aggregated level. While there has been, in the last thirty years or so, increasing emphasis on 
the provision of adequate microfoundations for macroeconomic models, the assumptions typically made 
to render a model tractable often rule out the sort of heterogeneity that is empirically observed. For 
example, restrictive homogeneity conditions may be imposed whereby aggregate behaviour is equivalent 
to that of a representative individual. This ‘representative agent’ paradigm has been at the core of 
modern macroeconomics; it has proved invaluable in the construction of explicitly dynamic economic 
models such as those associated with Real Business Cycle theorists. If one thinks of macroeconomic 
models as low-dimensional reductions of an extremely high-dimensional system, this simplification is 
intuitive and may be seen as the sacrifice of one dimension (heterogeneity) in order to understand more 
fully the implications of another (time, for example). However, given that such modelling choices must 
be made, the choice of the dimension upon which to focus should be dictated by the problem at hand1. 
The dominance of the representative agent in macroeconomics has been the cause of some disquiet2, and 
the rehabilitation of heterogeneity has been at the heart of much recent research3. The models contained 
in the three main chapters of this thesis may be seen as complementary to such efforts. Each incorporates 
into a macroeconomic model a particular institutional feature of the ‘real world’ - namely, the existence 
of firing costs in a world with heterogeneous firms, of coalition formation amongst wage-setters and of 
heterogeneous regional Phillips curves.
That the labour market is the source of heterogeneity in each case is not accidental. While em­
ployment and unemployment are obviously among the economic variables with which macroeconomics
is concerned, labour economics as a subdiscipline has arguably become increasingly microeconomic4.
1 And perhaps by the talent of the modeller.
2See for example Gallegati and Kirman (1999).
3 An example is the literature on interacting agents, in which individuals and firms are assumed to  interact in ways other
than through the mediation of the price system. See Aoki (1996) and Brock and Durlauf (1995).
4See the comments of Steven Nickell in Ibanez (1999), p .198. An obvious exception to this trend is the incorporation of
search theory into the standard neoclassical growth model - see Pissarides (1990).
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However, insights developed by labour economists may be profitably used in macroeconomic models. 
Moreover, the beauty of macroeconomics as a study of systems is that phenomena which remain unex­
plained at a microeconomic level may (sometimes) be shown to be intuitive at the system level. The first 
model in this thesis provides an example. While many economic commentators believe it is a prime cause 
of Europe’s sclerotic labour market, the impact of costly dismissal on employment remains controversial, 
both theoretically and empirically. Most research has examined the impact of employment protection 
on a single firm in isolation, and concluded that its effects are likely to be insignificant. Chapter 2, in 
contrast, introduces such protection into a fully-articulated macroeconomic model and shows how it can 
reduce employment significantly. More specifically, it introduces firing costs into an economy where firms 
produce heterogeneous intermediate goods and productivity shocks are firm-specific, and examines the 
consequences for the price of the composite input portfolio used in the final-good sector. It is shown 
that, since they might work against existing market distortions, firing costs can lead to either more or 
less efficient labour allocations. Simulations show that the magnitude of their effects is potentially much 
greater than is found in standard, representative-firm models, particularly when they act to reduce em­
ployment. The model is then extended to endogenise firm entry, which exacerbates the negative effects of 
costly dismissal by reducing the variety of intermediate goods available. Further extensions consider the 
impact of international trade in intermediates on (i) the incentives for national governments to reform 
their labour markets, and (ii) the interpretation of extant empirical work on the effect of employment 
protection. Finally, it is shown how the model is easily reconciled with the cross-country labour turnover 
pattern.
Most models that do incorporate heterogeneity of some sort simply assume it. This is consistent with
almost all macroeconomics, in that institutional features of an economy are supposed invariant in the
face of changes in policy5. Chapter 3 shows how policy can in fact engender heterogeneity; it examines
the interaction between monetary policy stance and institutional structure in the labour market, and
argues that the observed decentralisation of wage-bargaining in industrialised countries over the last
5 W hile the Lucas Critique is inevitably invoked should a modeller assume unvarying agent behaviour when there are 
shifts in the policy regime, attention is rarely paid to any possible evolution of the basic structure of the economy.
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twenty years is a result of the concurrent shift towards more anti-inflationary macroeconomic regimes. 
It presents a monetary policy game in which, prior to the central bank choosing inflation, wages are set 
by (non-atomistic) coalitions of unions. Unions are assumed to anticipate central bank behaviour when 
forming these coalitions, a process modelled using the coalition formation game proposed by Bloch (1996). 
It is shown that highly conservative central banks, i.e. those that attach little weight to real variables 
as opposed to inflation, are associated with highly decentralised patterns of wage-setting. This is also 
found to be true under the cooperative concept of coalitional stability. Appreciation of the endogeneity 
of labour market structure proves crucial for the relationship between employment and central bank 
conservatism. Given the structure of the labour market, employment is strictly increasing in the degree 
of conservatism. However, once the effect on labour market structure is taken into account, a central 
bank that attaches some weight to real variables will in fact maximise employment. The model is used 
to analyse the likely impact of the single currency on Europe’s labour markets; it is argued, in contrast 
to recent predictions that the advent of the euro will lead to consolidation among labour unions, that 
the effect is a priori ambiguous, and that monetary union may even accelerate the fragmentation of 
European wage-bargaining.
The final chapter considers the implications of labour market heterogeneity for the appropriate con­
duct of macroeconomic policy; specifically, the effect of unemployment dispersion at regional and subre­
gional levels on the aggregate NAIRU, or Non-Accelerating-Inflation-Rate-of-Unemployment. The idea 
that the distribution of unemployment rates across space (or across industries, for that matter) should 
affect inflationary pressure in the aggregate dates back at least to Lipsey (1960). However, most em­
pirical investigations of the hypothesis are, it is argued here, overly restrictive in their assumption of 
homogeneous, nonlinear disaggregate Phillips curves. It is shown how such nonlinearity is not a necessary 
condition for the existence of a dispersion effect; in contrast, disaggregate heterogeneity is a sufficient 
condition for the presence of such an effect, and a simple model is developed to provide a theoretical 
rationale for such heterogeneity. The Shapiro-Stiglitz shirking framework is generalised to allow for en­
dogenous monitoring intensity, and it is shown how variations in monitoring technology are likely to affect 
the slope of the unemployment-inflation locus in each region. These predictions are taken to the data,
and are bome out by the experience of the GB labour market from 1966-1996. The slopes of regional 
wage curves are investigated, and considerable heterogeneity is found. Aggregate Phillips curves axe also 
estimated, and statistics on the spatial unemployment distribution are found to explain a significant part 
of the variation of the GB NAIRU over time.
The three chapters, therefore, investigate in a macroeconomic framework three different ways in which 
policy and labour market structure interact. Different patterns of disaggregate heterogeneity may alter 
the optimal policy choice at an aggregate level; the theoretical implications of a particular labour market 
policy may differ, depending on whether or not the macroeconomic implications of that policy are taken 
into account; and, since any labour market structure is presumably the result of the actions of (possibly 
self-interested) individual agents, variations in policy stance may in turn lead the institutional structure 
itself to evolve. As with any macroeconomic m odelling strategy, the elaboration of the institutional 
features of the labour market no doubt entailed some costs. However, it is hoped that the models 
contained in this thesis are not only instructive as exercises in methodology, but useful in understanding 
the problems at hand.
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2 Employment Protection, Pricing and Cross-Sectional Efficiency
2.1 Introduction
It has long been maintained, by assorted policymakers and economic commentators, that onerous reg­
ulation is at the heart of Europe’s ‘sclerotic’ labour market performance, with employment protection 
legislation (EPL) a chief culprit6. In this view the comparative dynamism of the US economy, with its 
admirable record on job creation, is due to the absence there of such nannyish interference7. A solid 
case for the prosecution has proved hard to build, however. In 1999 the OECD released a report on 
the labour market implications of employment protection regulations8. To the organisation’s evident 
discomfort, conclusions contained therein - that EPL had ‘little or no effect’ on overall unemployment, 
and that there was only ‘very weak’ evidence for any deleterious effects on employment levels - sparked 
a heated debate, and drew ‘protests from governments, congratulations from trade unions, and uproar 
from the OECD’s economics department’9.
The furore surrounding the OECD publication neatly illustrates both the level of feeling surrounding 
the topic of employment protection and the lack of a consensus as to its effects. A substantial body 
of empirical work, surveyed below, has failed conclusively to establish EPL as a root cause of Europe’s 
dismal employment record. This is, in fact, consistent with the standard theoretical treatment, which 
concludes that the relationship between firing costs and employment is ambiguous in sign and likely to 
be insignificant in magnitude; employment protection induces a representative firm to fire less in bad 
times and hire less in good times, with the net impact on average employment small. Furthermore, even 
if employment protection were associated with inferior labour market outcomes, one would then have to 
explain why governments do not repeal the offending legislation.
The current chapter argues that the effects of firing costs on employment can in fact be substantial. It
6See Siebert (1997) and Brittan (1999) for examples.
7In 1996 the employment-population ratio in the US was nearly 75%; in Europe it was a full fifth lower, at 60%.
8 OECD (1999). See this for an international comparison of employment protection regimes.
9The report had been drawn up by the O ECD’s education, employment, labour and social affairs directorate, not by 
its economics department. The OECD subsequently retreated a little from its findings, saying the report was only ‘a first 
step in an ongoing study that requires further evidence’. See Taylor (1999a,1999b).
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provides a theoretical model which emphasises not their ‘direct’ effect on an individual firm’s employment, 
but the aggregate labour market consequences of the disaggregate pricing distortions they imply. Now, 
while this has not been the focus of theoretical work in this area10, the issue of cross-sectional labour 
reallocation is one which many economists would raise when asked about the possible drawbacks of firing 
costs. A quote from the OECD report is illustrative:
“...EPL may result in a more sclerotic labour market, unable to achieve quickly the volume of 
workforce adjustment that is required in response to rapid changes in technologies...Any such 
diminished ability to reallocate labour in a flexible manner would tend to lower aggregate 
productivity levels and growth prospects.”11
In the model here, firing costs are introduced into an economy where monopolistic firms use labour 
to produce intermediate goods, and where these firms face idiosyncratic shocks to their productivity. 
The result is that the rate at which labour is dynamically reallocated across firms, from unproductive 
to productive, is reduced. This has implications for firms’ pricing policies, and thus for the productivity 
of the final-good sector, as measured by the cost of the portfolio of intermediate inputs. The effect 
on output and employment of the relative price distortions introduced is shown to be of indeterminate 
sign; depending on the size of productivity shocks and the substitutability of intermediates, the price 
of the composite intermediate good may rise or fall. This raises the possibility that firing costs can 
actually ‘improve’ the labour allocation and increase final-sector productivity and output, as well as 
intermediate-sector employment. This rather surprising result is explained by the theory of the second- 
best - firing costs actually work against an existing market failure in the intermediate goods sector. 
However, simulations are used to show that, in practice, employment protection is more likely to reduce 
aggregate productivity. The associated falls in intermediate employment are potentially an order of 
magnitude greater than any in standard, representative-firm models. Indeed, they can be arbitrarily
large, depending on the elasticity of final good output to the price of the composite intermediate good.
10Hopenhayn and Rogerson (1993), Bertola (1994) and Bertola and Caballero (1994) are exceptions, and will be discussed
below.
11OECD (1999), p.69.
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The entry decision of a firm is also considered, and it is shown that employment protection restricts 
the variety of intermediate goods on offer. Further extensions show how the model can account for the 
empirical failure to identify any significant labour market effects of employment protection. It is shown, 
for example, how the introduction of labour into the final good sector as a complementary input can 
reconcile the model with cross-country labour turnover patterns. Some implications of international 
trade in intermediate goods are also drawn. It is argued that the presence of such trade can explain why 
cross-country regressions of employment against the level of employment protection may fail to identify 
any robust relation. Moreover, simulations show how trade in intermediates can reduce the incentives for 
national policymakers to reduce the level of employment protection, suggesting that fundamental reform 
of Europe’s labour markets may have to be the result of coordinated action on the part of national 
governments, or else be initiated by a supra-national authority.
Section 2.2 reviews existing research into the effects of EPL, both empirical and theoretical. Section
2.3 introduces the baseline model, while Section 2.4 presents the extensions. Section 2.5 concludes.
2.2 Survey of existing research
2.2.1 Empirical
While much effort has been expended in the attempt to identify the effects of firing costs empirically, 
the results are mixed. Lazear (1990) remains the classic study. He examines a panel of 22 developed 
countries across 29 years, and finds that EPL significantly increases unemployment rates and reduces 
employment. His work has been criticised, however, for its reliance on severance pay alone as a proxy for 
EPL in any given country12, as well as for the absence of controls for various other factors that would 
affect structural rates of employment and unemployment13.
Subsequent studies have addressed these shortcomings, and employed both more comprehensive mea­
sures of employment protection and a broader selection of controls. Unfortunately, these studies have
12 One could additionally include (at least) provisions regarding unfair dismissals, and regulations governing the amount
of notice an employee must receive.
13 See Addison, Teixeira and Grosso (2000) for a fuller discussion of the lim itations of Lazear’s paper.
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varied markedly in their conclusions. Scarpetta (1996) considers a mix of time-averaged and time-varying 
data on 17 countries, from 1983 to 1993, and concludes that employment protection increases unemploy­
ment, in particular among youths. Nickell (1997) examines averaged data for two sub-periods, 1983-1988 
and 1989-1994, and finds the effects of EPL on employment and unemployment to be statistically in­
significant, by and large. He argues that there is a spurious correlation between low female participation 
in the labour force and EPL, both of which are common in southern European countries; this could bias 
any studies which link firing costs to low employment. In support of this thesis, Nickell points out that 
firing costs seem to have no effect on the employment of prime-age men. A slew of further studies has 
failed to settle the matter conclusively. For example, Di Telia and MacCulloch (1999) find that EPL 
reduces employment, as do Garibaldi and Mauro (1999); this is in contrast to the controversial OECD 
(1999) report which largely exculpates EPL from responsibility for low employment rates.
Other empirical work has considered the effects of employment protection, not on structural rates 
of employment and unemployment, but on their respective dynamics. While some authors have found 
EPL to be associated with longer durations of unemployment (see for example Nickell (1997), Table 
6), there seems to be little correlation between rates of job creation and destruction and the strictness 
of EPL across countries. Bertola and Rogerson (1997) note the similarity of job turnover rates across 
the Atlantic. Given that the US labour market is considerably less regulated than those in Europe, 
this is inconsistent with the standard theory14. The authors argue, though, that it is due to the more 
compressed wage distributions in European countries. Indeed, they suggest that Europe’s high-EPL, 
low-wage inequality combination may be ascribed to political economy considerations; workers unable 
to perfectly insure against idiosyncratic labour income shocks may lobby for a package of stricter EPL 
and wage-compression legislation15. The Bertola and Rogerson paper is instructive; the endogeneity of 
policy choices is ignored by most empirical work. This is one reason why it is difficult to obtain robust
14 Even if the net effect of firing costs on the level of employment is minuscule, theory suggests that rates of job creation 
and destruction should be affected. For opposing evidence on employment protection and job turnover, see Blanchard and 
Portugal (1998).
15 EPL without wage-compression would lead to variability in labour income via low wages in bad times; wage-compression 
without EPL would lead to the same thing, this time via no employment in bad times.
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correlations between EPL and labour market performance, given that, ceteris paribus, the economies 
most likely to have strict employment protection regulations imposed are those with least to lose.
Overall, the empirical case against employment protection is not proven. The inadequacy of measures 
of EPL used, the need to control for other labour market factors, the interaction between employment 
protection and other institutional features and the endogeneity of policy choices all militate against the 
identification of EPL’s effects on labour market performance. In particular, the effect on employment 
rates remains ambiguous, and even any impact on job turnover has yet to be established.
2.2.2 Theoretical
Optimal hiring and firing: the firm’s problem  The modern treatment of a firm’s hiring and 
firing decisions in the presence of firing costs stems from Bentolila and Bertola (1990), who consider the 
dynamic optimisation problem of a firm facing demand shocks and linear labour adjustment costs. The 
following, somewhat simplified analysis follows Bertola (1990) and will serve also as an introduction to 
the theoretical model in Section 2.3. Ignoring any costs associated with hiring workers, consider a firm 
choosing employment at time t  in order to maximise the present value of its expected cash flows when 
the discount rate is r :
Max{iT}Et ( g ( r b ) ‘ (R  [at+i, lt+i] — wt+ik+i — C [lt+i — h+i-1 ])j  • (i)
The stochastic process {aT} indexes the firm’s business conditions, while R[a,l] is the revenue gen­
erated by I homogeneous workers in a period where business conditions are described by a. All other 
firm decisions, such as pricing and use of other factors of production, are assumed to be taken optimally. 
R  [a,.] is assumed to be increasing and concave in I, with R  [a, 0] =  0. The process for the nominal wage,
{wT}, is assumed exogenous. The firm must pay firing costs according to the piecewise function C[.]:
C [lT — It - l] =  f  [It ~  W - 1] if  W >  L--l> (2)
0 otherwise. (3)
The dismissal cost per worker, / ,  is constant and exogenous, and it is assumed for simplicity that 
there is no source of job separation save dismissals.
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The stochastic environment that will be assumed in this paper will be the most simple available, a 
symmetric two-state Markov chain where ag denotes good times and a& bad times, and where the current 
value of a is observed before the level of employment is chosen. Let ag > ab, dR/da  > 0, d2R/dlda > 0, 
and wg = Wb = w for simplicity. It is implicit that desired employment is higher in good times than bad. 
The probability of a transition from the good state to the bad state, or vice versa, is 0.5.
Define M[a,l] =  dR[a, l]/dl, i.e. the marginal revenue product of labour (MRPL) function. The 
dynamic shadow value of labour at time t  is then:
SVL(t)  = Bt j f )  (1^7) ’ M k-H, h+i] - 1»|, (4)
and the following first order conditions are necessary and sufficient for the firm’s hiring policy to be 
optimal:
—f  <  S V L ( t ) < 0 always; (5)
SVL{t) = 0 if L t > L t - i \  (6)
SVL(t)  = - F  if L t < L t- i .  (7)
Intuitively, should the firing cost /  be prohibitively large, then the firm may choose not to respond 
to changes in the state; employment is then historically determined and will remain at the initial level, 
assumed to satisfy (5). If on the other hand /  is small (or the variance in a large) enough, then optimal 
labour demand also follows a two-state Markov process; the firm hires when conditions improve, and 
fires when they deteriorate.
Focusing on the case where the firm follows an active hiring and firing policy, one may use (6), (7) 
and the law of iterated expectations to obtain the following indirect conditions on lg and h:
M \a g,l9] =  “> + 2 7 f+ r )  ®
M M  =  0 )
Given the concavity of R[a,l], we thus have the well-known result that the introduction of dismissal 
costs reduces not only firing in bad times, but also hiring in good times. In the latter case forward-looking
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firms behave as if the wage is higher by //2 (1  +r), the discounted expected loss on the marginal worker, 
who may have to be dismissed next period. It is worth noting that the effect on the MRPL is greater in 
magnitude when a = a&; this is because, when business conditions deteriorate and workers are laid off, 
firing costs are incurred with probability one rather than in some uncertain future. While this implies 
that the average long-run MRPL of an individual such firm is lowered by firing costs, the net effect on 
average employment is less clear-cut. For this, the precise functional form of M  [a, I] is crucial. As shown 
in Bertola (1990), if the marginal revenue function is steeper (more shallow) in bad times than good, 
then there is likely to be a net reduction (increase) in employment. Either way, one would expect the 
magnitude of any such effect to be rather small, unless rather tortuous assumptions regarding revenue 
functions and interest rates were made, as shown by the calibrations in Bentolila and Bertola.
E m ploym ent p ro tec tio n  an d  w age-setting  Given the failure of the above analysis to generate 
significant consequences for employment of dismissal costs, theorists have relaxed the assumption of 
an exogenous wage structure. Groenewold (1999) introduces employment protection into a model of 
efficiency wages, and finds the effect on unemployment to be ambiguous. Risager and Sorensen (1999) 
consider how firing costs affect employment and investment in an open economy, and find the result 
depends on the wage-setting behaviour of trade unions. Lindbeck and Snower (2001), in their survey of 
insider-outsider theory, argue that labour turnover costs are likely to afford employed workers greater 
bargaining power than their potential replacements, the unemployed; as a result, wages are likely to be 
bid up and employment to fall. This indirect effect on employment, the authors argue, is unambiguous in 
sign and ‘could well be large’. However, it is not necessarily clear why EPL should render the unemployed 
less able to compete for jobs. In a dynamic model, one could argue that outsiders could bid down not 
just a single-period wage, but the entire present value of the wage process. For example, they could 
post a bond and ‘buy’ themselves a job. Of course, in realistic dynamic settings, the imperfect nature of
contracts could make such schemes infeasible16.
16 On a related note, Pissarides (2001) examines the role played by employment protection in the absence of perfect
insurance markets.
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The model to be set out below retains an exogenous wage structure. This is not to say that firing 
costs have no effects on the process of wage formation, nor that any such relationship is likely to be 
quantitatively unimportant. Rather, insider-outsider theories could be seen as complementary to the 
pricing mechanism outlined here.
2.2.3 Idiosyncratic shocks and aggregate productivity
Hopenhayn and Rogerson (1993), Bertola and Caballero (1994) and Bertola (1994) have a somewhat 
different perspective. They introduce dismissal costs into a environment with many firms, where uncer­
tainty is firm-specific, and analyse the aggregate efficiency consequences. Bertola and Caballero consider 
the distortionary effects of dismissal costs in a matching model. They show that such costs unambigu­
ously reduce what they call the ‘cross-sectional efficiency’ of the labour market, since they lead to the 
employment of a greater proportion of workers in relatively unproductive jobs. However, they also re­
duce unemployment, for reasons similar to the standard analysis of Section 2.2.2, and the net effect on 
output may be positive. The authors show that, once resources allocated to costly search and firing are 
taken into account, employment protection reduces welfare. Bertola considers the effect of employment 
protection on capital accumulation in a full-employment model of growth, where monopoly firms supply 
imperfectly substitutable varieties of good, and each unit of capital is used to enlarge the measure of 
existing firms. Again, firing costs are found to reduce both cross-sectional efficiency17 and the rate at 
which new firms appear, reducing the welfare of the representative individual. Hopenhayn and Rogerson 
also focus on the creation of new firms. They extend the analysis of Bentolila and Bertola (1990) to 
endogenise the entry decision of a firm, and find that EPL reduces both average productivity and firm 
entry, which in their model leads to a fall in employment.
It should be emphasised that these three papers all conclude that employment protection worsens the
allocation of labour across firms. Also, the consideration of the firm entry decision apart, they have little
to add with regard to the employment implications of firing costs, beyond the insights already implicit
in the model of Bentolila and Bertola. The baseline model to be described next is perhaps closest to
17 In the same sense as in the paper by Bertola and Caballero.
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the full employment model of Bertola (1994), in that it assumes firms axe monopolistic producers of 
individual varieties of good. However, the model here focuses on the employment effects of firing costs. 
Moreover, the implications of costly dismissal for the pricing of intermediate goods are drawn, and it is 
shown that the result is not necessarily an inferior labour allocation. Productivity in fact increases for 
certain parameter values. Finally, it is shown how the indirect employment implications of any changes 
in productivity can be an order of magnitude larger than the direct effect usually considered.
2.3 The model
The baseline model of the chapter will now be introduced. The following section lays out the basic 
structure and solves the model; subsequent sections examine more closely the effect of costly dismissal 
on pricing and employment respectively.
2.3.1 Firing costs and interm ediate goods
Consider an economy with a measure n  of firms, with each firm i the monopoly producer of a single
variety of intermediate good x*, with labour U the sole input:
X i = a . i l i .  ( 10)
Each firm is subject to labour productivity shocks, indexed by a* E {a^a*,} where ag >  a&. As 
in Section 2.2.2, the stochastic process for a is the most simple possible, with symmetric transition 
probabilities from each state of 0.5. The final-good sector uses these intermediate goods as inputs, and
produces the final good Y  with technology
Y  = X a , (11)
where a  <  1 and
. (12)
The parameter a  indexes the substitutability of the intermediate varieties; the higher is er, the more
readily substitutable they are. The final-good sector is assumed perfectly competitive, and the represen-
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tative firm there takes both the input prices pi and the final good price py  as given. It is straightforward 
to obtain the relative input demand functions:
©  ■ ( f t ) " '  «“ >
where
Un \ 1/(1-<t)P i ~ a d i j  (14)
is the price of the composite intermediate good X .  Finally, it is assumed that a monetary authority 
sets p y  as a nominal anchor, and for simplicity the normalisation p y  = 1 is made. Total final good 
output may then be written as a decreasing function of the price of the portfolio of intermediate inputs:
X  = a P x 1/(1~a), (15)
where 5  =
Each firm in the intermediate sector is infinitesimally small, and ignores the impact of its own price- 
setting behaviour on Px- The revenue function of each is simply
flloj.ij] =  X ' ^ P x  (16)
=  (17)
with resulting marginal revenue function
M [aiJi] = P lx 1/a{1~a\  (18)
where <x =  (cr/ (cr — 1)). Each firm pays a wage w, exogenous to the model, and must incur a cost /
per unit of labour dismissed. This may take the form of direct payments to the worker, but could also
represent administrative costs associated with firing18. Using (17), (8) and (9), the pricing decisions of 
firms in good and bad states are obtained:
,«1(«’+2(lir)p g =  a a g ( w +  ^  ) (19)
)  . (20)
~ _i I /(I + 2r )
Pb =  crab I w  - 2(1 + r)
18 W hether or not /  represents payments to the worker is of little  import in this model, since the wage profile is assumed 
exogenous.
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Firing costs increase the price of input varieties produced at high-productivity firms and reduce the 
price of those at low-productivity firms. Again, the firms are infinitesimally small; all idiosyncratic 
uncertainty thus washes out in the aggregate, and the price of the composite intermediate good is
_ / r i \  i/C1-*7) ~
P x = S  ( 2 )  p ,  (21)
where
P  =
Disaggregate employment levels are
lg = 5ajVj,’-Pr1/(1"“) (23)
k  = aar1pr‘’-Pr1/(I' “). (24)
allowing us to express total employment as a function of the dismissal cost / :
L  =  (lg +  k ) ^  (25)
=  a ar'/W -0) ^ a/(,-o)<"-1 )£ ,p »-» /< i-« )j (26)
where
Li == a r 1 ( w + 2a T 7 ) )  + < ' 1 ( w - | r S f )  • (27)
Figure 1 shows how firing costs affect disaggregate prices and employment levels, for some arbitrary 
parameter values. Note that when firing costs are so large as to eliminate labour reallocation completely, 
so that lg = lb, the price charged by highly productive firms is still lower than that charged by relatively 
unproductive firms.
2.3.2 Firing costs and Px
Before considering directly the effect of dismissal costs on employment, it is instructive to examine their 
effect on Px- This is of interest in itself, given that final output is a decreasing function of the price of 
the composite intermediate good.
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P ro d u c tiv ity  shocks, a  an d  th e  in p u t portfo lio  Since in the baseline model the measure of firms 
is fixed at n, attention may be restricted to the sign of 6 P / 6 f .
P ro p o sitio n  1 The relationship between P  and firing costs depends, inter aha, on the size of productivity 
shocks (ag/ab) and the substitutability of intermediate inputs cr. In particular, it is straightforward to 
shouP that
ywp"-
So, if productivity shocks, as measured by ag/ab, are small, the introduction of firing costs can 
actually reduce the price of the composite intermediate good. The reason is simply that costly dismissal 
reduces the prices charged by ‘bad’ firms by more than it raises those charged by ‘good’ ones, as can 
be seen from (19) and (20). Again, this is because in bad times firing costs are incurred with certainty 
rather than in some hypothetical future.
However, should productivity shocks be large this result is reversed. This is because, if ‘good’ firms 
are very much more productive than ‘bad’, then in the absence of firing costs the price of their varieties 
will be correspondingly lower. As a result, the portfolio of inputs used by the final-good sector will be 
heavily weighted towards such goods, and the impact of any increase in their price will be exacerbated. 
Note also that the right-hand-side of (28) is decreasing in cr, the substitutability of the intermediate 
varieties; the higher is cr, the more likely are firing costs to increase Px- The reasoning behind this is 
analagous. Should the varieties be highly substitutable, then the original portfolio of inputs will be more 
heavily biased towards those from the high-productivity firms, and increases in their price will be felt 
more keenly20.
19 All propositions are proven in the chapter appendix.
20 One might have thought that, if intermediate inputs are close substitutes, the final sector would be more able to  
take advantage of the falls in price of those from low-productivity firms, by reweighting the input portfolio appropriately. 
However, as long as p g <  Pb, inputs from high-productivity firms will make up more than half of the input portfolio X .  The  
higher is a ,  the greater the bias towards these inputs, and the more significant any rise in their price. This ‘com position’ 
effect outweighs the ‘reweighting’ effect.
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Finally, the right-hand-side is also increasing in / ,  for similar reasons. As firing costs increase, so 
does the price charged by high-productivity firms, resulting in a diminution of their role in the input 
portfolio. Subsequent increases in /  thus have a smaller effect. The chapter appendix confirms that 
6 2 P / 6 f 2 < 0 globally, and shows that if ag/a,b < (1 +  2r)1^ a~l\  then 6 P / 6 f  <  0 for all positive / .  If 
agjab > (1 +  2 t hen P  is increasing in / ,  a t least initially.
A natom y of coordination failure That firing costs can theoretically reduce the price of the portfolio 
of inputs used by the final-good sector is perhaps surprising. There is no direct welfare metric in this 
model, so some caution is appropriate when making general efficiency claims. However, should their 
introduction in fact reduce P x, then it should be clear that firing costs can increase profits in the 
intermediate sector as well as final-good output21. To understand this we must turn to the theory of the 
second-best. The distortionary effect of costly dismissal can in fact work against existing distortions in 
the model, the most obvious of which is the monopolistic status of the intermediate-good firms. Both 
market failure and the potential countervailing effect of firing costs persist, though, even absent the 
monopoly price mark-up cr. The source of the remaining market failure is the lack of coordination on 
the part of firms in the intermediate sector, manifest in two distinct aspects of their behaviour.
For one, being infinitesimally small, each ignores the direct effect of changes in its price on P x , holding 
constant the prices of other varieties. It fails to internalise the implications for final-good output, and 
thus for demand for intermediate goods as a whole. In the aggregate, this leads to intermediate-good 
prices being set too high. Since firing costs act to reduce the average price of intermediate varieties, 
p = l / n  Jq pidi, they work against this particular distortion.
There is a second consequence of its price-setting behaviour that an individual intermediate firm fails
to consider, though, and that is the effect on the behaviour of other firms. Since any firm j  ignores
the effect of pj on P x, it ignores the effect on the demand for other varieties, via (13). Changes in pj
lead to changes in the pricing policy of other firms, which affect the optimal pricing policy of firm j  in
21 This must be true, given that the elasticity of X  with respect to P x ,  namely rjx  — —1/  (1 — a ) , can be of arbitrary 
magnitude.
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return. Again, the resulting implications for Px and X  are ignored. Put another way, were a central 
planner to choose all input prices, she would have as her choice variable not only the average price 
across varieties, but also the price distribution. In a decentralised setting, the ignorance on the part of 
individual firms of cross-elasticities of demand may result in a price distribution that fails to minimise 
P x, even conditional on a particular average input price p. To see this, ignore firing costs for a moment 
and consider a mean-preserving spread in the price distribution, and its effect on Px-
where c is a positive constant and p° < p% axe intermediate-good prices as before (with /  set equal 
to 0). It is easy to confirm that the result of the spread is to reduce Px- In other words, atomistic 
intermediate firms may tend to set prices too close together; cross-sectional efficiency would be increased 
were productive firms to lower their prices even further, and unproductive firms to raise theirs by the same 
amount22. It is similarly straightforward to show that a mean-preserving contraction increases P x 23- 
In this instance firing costs therefore work in the same direction as an existing distortion, in that they 
increase the prices charged by high-productivity firms and decrease those charged by low-productivity 
firms, compressing the price distribution and increasing Px-
The above suggests a ready measure of the cross-sectional efficiency of the intermediate sector, the 
ratio of the average input price p  to Px ; this captures the effect of the shape of the distribution of 
input prices pi, holding constant the average such price. It is perhaps a slightly more nuanced idea of 
cross-sectional efficiency than that usually considered.
P roposition  2 Define cross-sectional efficiency as X e f f  —pj P.  X e f f  is decreasing in f .
Firing costs therefore have two opposing effects on the price of the input portfolio. On the one hand
they reduce the average input price p\ on the other they lead to a contraction in the price distribution,
22 Again, for high enough r)x  this would increase profits at all firms, in addition to increasing final output X a .
23This is true as long as pb remains above p g; this is always true in the model here, thanks to the implied restriction that
i, > lb-
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a deleterious result from the point of view of the final-good sector. Which of these effects dominates 
depends, as shown in the previous section, on (ag/a i)  and a. In the terms of the current analysis, 
increased substitutability of intermediates means that Px  will be relatively more sensitive to shifts in 
the price distribution than to changes in the average input price. Consider for example a situation where 
the intermediate goods were not substitutes at all, and had to be used in equal, unvarying proportions 
no matter their price24. In that case, all that would m atter for Px  would be p. If they were perfectly 
substitutable, then the average price would be irrelevant, and only the lowest price would matter.
The implications of a more volatile stochastic process for Px  are more subtle. It would increase the 
size of the average price effect relative to the distributional effect, since
ff  { a g / a b )  (1 + 2r) -  1
flE-gEii ( a g / a b) (1 + 2r) + 1 }
is increasing in (ag/ai,). However, it would also increase the sensitivity of Px  to distributional shifts. 
Again, the greater the initial productivity (and therefore price) differences between the two sets of 
intermediate varieties, the more increases in pg matter relative to falls in pb- This latter effect turns out 
to dominate in the model, as was shown by (28) above.
It is worth emphasising that the potential for dismissal costs to improve the allocation of resources in 
this model stems from a lack of coordination on the part of the intermediate-good firms. A market for
corporate control is thus assumed missing, for if one existed a single firm would produce all varieties, fully
internalising the effects of individual price changes on P x  and X .  A possible justification for this missing 
market could be based on informational imperfections. The model here is highly stylised, and does not 
fully capture the complexity inherent in the real-world production process of any final consumption good.
S im ulations The foregoing analysis showed that increases in firing costs could either increase or reduce 
the price of the input portfolio. The respective magnitudes of these potential effects are now explored 
using simulations. In each simulation the nominal wage w is normalised to one, as is the labour produc­
tivity of a low-productivity firm at. In addition, the discount rate r  is set at 0.08. Assuming productivity
shocks arrive every couple of years, this corresponds to an annual real interest rate of around 0.04. The
24 Not possible in this model, strictly speaking.
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elasticity of substitution of intermediate varieties, cr, is allowed to vary between 2.1  and 6 , while ag ranges 
from 1.25 to 1.7525.
First, Figure 2 graphs the relationship between the elasticity of substitution of intermediates, the 
size of productivity shocks and fm a x . Recall the implicit restriction that lg > lb; fm a x  is merely the 
highest level of firing costs for which this is the case. Any further increases would have no effect on 
labour allocation or input prices. We see that, for cr =  6  and (agJab) =  1.75, fm a x  can reach about
0.45. Assum ing again that each period in the model lasts roughly two years, this corresponds to nearly 
one year’s wages. The magnitudes seem to be about right. Hopenhayn and Rogerson (1990) argue that 
a year’s wages are ‘a reasonable description of the magnitude of legislated severance payments in several 
countries’. However, one has to bear in m ind that the impact of such severance payments is diluted 
by natural attrition of the labour force - voluntary quits and the like - and that the effective severance 
payment, per unit reduction in workforce, is likely to be lower than that which is legislated26.
Figures 3.1 and 3.2 show how the effect of firing costs on P x  varies with productivity shocks and 
substitutability of inputs, holding constant the other parameter; Figure 3.3 displays slices through the 
respective hills, graphing Px  against /  for fixed a  and ag. In each case P x  has been normalised with 
respect to P£ , its level when /  =  0. First, for the range of parameters chosen, we can see that Px  
is hump-shaped, initially increasing in / 27. The higher are a  and ag, the more likely firing costs are 
to increase the price of the input portfolio, in accordance with the analysis above. For cr =  2.1 and 
ag = 1.25, firing costs eventually reduce P x  below P£. However, in percentage terms any such reduction 
is minuscule, below 0.1%. In contrast, the increase in Px  when ag = 1.75 is potentially large, exceeding 
10% with a = 6 . The asymmetry in the potential effects stems partly from in the fact that, when
substitutability and productivity shocks are small, the same is true of fm ax\ labour reallocation across
25 An implied maximal (afl/aj,) ratio of 1.75 is not an outlandish figure by the standards of the literature. Bertola (1994) 
chooses an equivalent ratio of 5. He cites as justification the importance of idiosyncratic uncertainty noted by Davis and 
Haltiwanger (1990).
26Risager and Sorensen (1999) consider firing costs ranging from 0% to  26.3% of a year’s wages.
27 Obviously a lower starting point for ag could have been chosen. However, simulations with a g below 1.25 showed 
a corresponding fall in fm a x .  This was both unrealistic, given the level of dismissal costs observed empirically, and 
uninteresting, since low firing costs had little effect on P x -
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firms ceases a t relatively low levels of / ,  and as a result the aggregate impact is muted.
Figure 3.4 shows how the interaction of productivity shocks and substitutability is crucial for there 
to be large effects on the composite input price. It graphs P x  against cr and ag, at /  =  fm a x  and 
/  =  fm a x  12 respectively. It can be seen that neither volatility of productivity nor highly substitutable 
intermediates is alone sufficient.
Finally, Figures 4.1 to 4.4 proceed similarly for cross-sectional efficiency X e f f ,  again normalised with 
respect to its value when /  =  0. Once more, significant reductions in efficiency are found when ag and 
a  axe high, with the interaction between the two crucial.
2.3.3 Firing costs and employm ent
Using the insights of the previous section, the implications of dismissal costs for employment are now 
considered.
L\,  L 2 and L.  It is pedagogically useful to break down the effect of firing costs on employment, 
described in (26) above, into three parts:
1. = j j  {agp j a +  CLfrP^*7}. This can be thought of as measuring the impact of firing costs if they
were incurred by a single firm only, with no effect on the aggregate price and output levels; L\ 
would proxy the average employment of this firm over time, and 8 L \ / 8 f  thus corresponds to the 
‘direct’ employment effect considered in the standard, single-firm analysis of Bentolila and Bertola 
(1990). It is shown in the chapter Appendix that
f  *  0 <=> £  a + * ) > /< - . )  ( (' +1)/(' - I) . (32)
It is also confirmed that 8 2 L \ / 8 f 2 > 0. The intuition behind the shape of L\ is as outlined in 
Section 2.2.2: should ag/ab > (1 +  2r)1/(tT_1), then the marginal revenue function (18) is steeper in 
bad times than good and low levels of firing costs reduce employment28. Figure 5.1 shows how L\  
varies with (ag/ab) and cr. The interaction of productivity shocks and input substitutability is once
! Again, holding constant P x  and X .
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again crucial in obtaining substantial reductions in Iq 29. Indeed, reductions of up to 40% were 
implied by certain parameter values, much larger than those obtained elsewhere in the literature. 
However, such a comparison is perhaps unhelpful. The marginal revenue function (18) is not 
directly comparable to those considered in other work, ignoring as it does any aggregate effects of 
individual price-setting behaviour.
2. where L 2 = L \P ff. This takes into account the implications of dismissal costs for the ag­
gregate price level, but ignores the effect on final output. It can be thought of as representing a 
situation where output is perfectly inelastic with respect to Px- It is shown in the chapter appendix 
that >  0; for a given output, firing costs unambiguously raise employment. The intuition is 
straightforward. Since firing costs tend to redistribute labour from productive to unproductive 
firms, more labour is needed to produce the same amount of the composite intermediate good X.  
This effect dominates the one above. The effects of increased a  and (ag/ab) on the size of 6 1 ,2 / 8 /  
are a priori unclear. For a given reweighting of X  towards goods from low productivity firms, a 
higher productivity differential implies a larger increase in employment. However, higher (ag/ab) 
also means that the shift towards low productivity varieties is smaller, while an increase in a  has an 
ambiguous effect on the size of this shift30. It can be seen from Figure 5.2 that, in practice, the rise 
in I /2 tends to be greater, the higher are a and (ag/a5). Quite significant increases in employment, 
of up to 12%, are obtained.
3. | j .  Finally, the output implications of input price changes may be taken into account. The chapter 
appendix shows that a necessary, but not sufficient, condition for < 0 is that > 0. If this
29As before, simulations were performed assuming a g/ a 5 <  (1 +  2r)1/ ( <T— the increases in L \  and the implied f m a x  
were so small that the results are not reported. Even if a g/ab >  (1 +  2r )1/ ( <r-1), it is possible, thanks to the curvature of 
the marginal revenue function, that at high levels of firing costs Iq  begins to  increase. Any such increases were tiny in the
sim ulations reported. 
30Note that
* (s )
where the price ratio <  1 is decreasing in the productivity differential.
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is the case, firing costs have two opposing effects. On the one hand they reduce final output, and 
thus demand for the composite intermediate good X .  On the other they mean that more labour is 
required to produce any given amount of X , as seen just above. The implications for employment 
are thus ambiguous, and depend in particular on rjx  = —1/  (1 — a), the elasticity of final output 
to the input portfolio price. Should for example a — —rjx , then we can see from (26) that any 
aggregate price effects disappear, and we are left with only the ‘direct’ effect of 6 L\ / b f .
The elasticity of substitution of intermediates, cr, and the volatility of productivity, (ag/ab) ,  thus play 
an interesting role in determining the sign of 6 L / 6 f .  It was shown in the previous section that increased 
cr or {ag/ab) meant that firing costs were more likely to increase Px , reducing final output and, ceteris 
paribus, employment. However, it was just shown that, given the demand for the composite intermediate 
good X ,  higher a  and {ag/ab)  are likely to lead to firing costs increasing employment. The next section 
explores the relative sizes of these effects.
L  and r]x : sim ulations Figures 5.3 and 5.4 show how the effect of firing costs on total employment 
varies with a  and {ag/ab) ,  for an arbitrary value of a  = 0 .0 1 ; this implies an elasticity of final output 
with respect to Px  of r]x  ~  1 , the lowest possible given the model structure. Figure 5.5 again provides 
slices through the respective hills. We see that L  is typically U-shaped in / .  Employment initially 
decreases, but may even report a net gain at /  =  f m a x . A couple of features of the simulation results 
are of particular note. First, high levels of a and (ag/ab) tend to exacerbate the effects of / ,  effectively 
deepening the ‘U’. Second, the potential falls in employment at intermediate levels of firing costs are 
potentially significant, up to 5% , while subsequent (net) increases are at most of the order of about 1%. 
Figure 5.6 highlights the interaction of a  and {ag/ab) .
Figures 5.7 to 5.10 repeat the procedure for a  =  0.5, implying r]x  = 2. The potential falls in 
employment axe considerably larger, now up to about 13%, and any subsequent increases smaller. This 
is consistent with the theoretical analysis, and the results of the previous simulations suggesting that 
firing costs tend, in practice, to increase the price of the composite intermediate good. Again, the 
interaction of a and (agab) is crucial, in this instance in obtaining large falls in employment. It seems
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then that the price effects of high substitutability and a large productivity differential (i.e.. to increase 
outweigh the labour reallocation effects (i.e.. to increase ^f - ) ,  at least for rjx  > 1 .
Finally, Figures 5.11 and 5.12 show how the employment implications of firing costs vary with a. W ith 
{a: =  0 .7 5 , cr =  6 ,ag = 1.75}, employment can be reduced by at least 25% by firing costs. Obviously, 
one could allow a  to approach unity, and thus rjx  to become arbitrarily large, and obtain even greater 
reductions in employment.
2.4 Extensions
2.4.1 Firm  entry
In all the foregoing analysis the number of intermediate varieties was taken as exogenously given. The 
entry of firms into the intermediate sector is now endogenised, and the effect of firing costs on such entry 
examined.
Some assumptions are necessary. First, potential entrants are unable to produce an intermediate
variety that is already on the market. Second, each entrant must sink one unit of capital into the new
business. This capital is then no longer fungible, and has no subsequent alternative use. This assumption
could be justified on grounds of asset-specificity. Third, it is assumed in this section that cr > 1 / ( 1 - a ) ;
this ensures that the entry of a new firm reduces rather than increases profits at existing firms31.
The non-fungibility assumption implies that, once a firm has entered the intermediate-good sector,
exit is not an option, as it will always be dominated by continuing to produce the intermediate good.
Now, consider the value of a firm at the end of a period, VT, where r  once more indexes the state of nature.
Denote by 7rT the per-period profit in state r , gross of any firing costs incurred; i.e. 7rr  =  (aTpT — w)lT.
The value of the firm is merely the expected discounted value of tomorrows’s profits plus tomorrow’s
31 Recall that Px  is, ceteris paribus, decreasing in the number of varieties. Should a  <  1 / ( 1  — a ), then an increase in n  
would increase profits thanks to the increase in final output.
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end-of-period value, less any firing costs that will have to be paid:
v> = ( j ^ : )  (!(*■» + v») + 5 ( * * - ( '» - '» ) /  + H ) )  (33)
=  ( r b )  { \ ( ^  + Vg) + \ { ^  + Vb) \ .  (34)
Note that Vg <  Vt,; a firm that has just experienced a low-productivity period has a higher value than 
one emerging from a period of high productivity, since it will under no circumstances have to incur firing 
costs in the immediate future. Solving, one has:
Vi =  + ( « . - « /  (35)
H  =  Yr +  Tt) ~  4r ( / +  r) (‘3 ~  h) f ' (36)
Let Ve  be the value of a new entrant at the start of a period. The no-entry condition is then
Vb =  i(®-, +  Ve) +  i ( ^  +  Vi) =  i  (37)
since the discounted present value of the firm must equal the (exogenous) discounted stream of returns 
from investing the unit of capital in alternative projects. Now, since profits are affected by the price of
the input portfolio P x , which in turn depends on the number of intermediate varieties available, (37)
allows one to solve for the number of firms:
where A; is a constant and P  is as defined in (22) above. Now, it is straightforward to show that the 
burden imposed by costly labour adjustment deters potential entrants.
P ro p o sitio n  3 |y  <  0; firing costs reduce the number of varieties of intermediate good supplied in the 
market.
Figure 6.1 shows how | j  depends on a, a  and (ag/ab). The number of varieties on the market can 
be reduced by nearly 20% for certain parameter combinations. With n now endogenous, the implications 
of costly dismissal for final output and employment may be re-examined. First, consider the price of the 
composite intermediate good. It follows from (21) that, ceteris paribus, a fall in the number of varieties 
increases Px- Indeed, the sensitivity of n  to /  removes the previous ambiguity regarding the sign of
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P ro p o sitio n  4 With firm entry endogenous, > 0; firing costs unambiguously increase the price of 
the input portfolio.
Figure 6.2 displays the effects on P x  of dismissal costs, allowing for the endogeneity of n. The 
potential increase in the price of the input portfolio now ranges up to 25%, over double the maximum 
obtained when the number of varieties was held constant. Note that, in another contrast, now 
depends on a. Figure 6.3 depicts final output Y  as a function of firing costs; Figure 6.4 does the same 
for the case where n is exogenous, to allow comparison. Figure 6.5, finally, shows the effect of firing costs 
on employment. As one would expect, their impact on firm creation leads to larger potential reductions 
in L ; for example, for the parameter combination {a = 2.1, ag = 1.25, a  =  0.5} there is a 3% fall in 
employment, compared to a negligible effect when n is taken as given.
2.4.2 T rade  in  in te rm ed ia tes
This section briefly examines the impact of international trade in intermediate inputs, and the associated 
implications for empirical work and the incentives for labour market reform. Consider a simple extension 
of the baseline model to a ‘continent’ of N  countries, indexed by j .  Each country contains a measure n of
monopolistic firms producing varieties of intermediate good, where n  is once again fixed and exogenous.
The intermediate varieties are distinct; no single variety is produced in more than one country. Each 
country also has a perfectly competitive final-good sector, with production function:
Y ( j )  = xur, (3 9 )
where
anxN \  a/(ax(’ - lV°di J (40)
is the composite intermediate good, consisting of inputs from all N  intermediate sectors. Transport 
costs are assumed nonexistent32. The familiar relative input demand function is obtained:
_ f  P i Y ’  (41)
X ( j ) J  \ P x
32There is also no price discrimination. All final-good firms pay the same for any input i, no matter their location.
36
where X{ (j) is the amount of input i demanded by the final sector in country j ,  and
a
n x N  \
v \~ ad i \  (42)
is the price of the intermediate input portfolio, common to all countries. Once again, a monetary 
authority sets the price of the final good Y  in each economy to unity33. However, labour market policies 
may differ; each final-good sector j  faces a unit firing cost / ( j ) .  As before, perfect competition in the 
final sector renders final output determinate, and we have:
X  (j) = a 1/(1- a) p “ 1/(1“ a) =  X .  (43)
The technology and stochastic environment facing each individual intermediate firm are as in the
baseline model. It is simple to show that the pricing schedule of an optimising such firm in the face of
firing costs is also unchanged34. The continent-wide price of the input portfolio is then:
*  =  5 ( 2 ) I/( ,- ' , P i (44)
where
i/(i-*)
P  = (45)
^ + ^ 1 (s£ l ( » - < W )1"')
Note that wages are, for convenience, assumed identical across economies. Employment in country 
j  is then:
. /» ,  j\r \  Q/ ( 1 _ <*)(*-!)
L ( j )  = a s - 1/ '1-*) ( — )  L\ ( j ) (46)
where
^  U) = U - 1 ( » + " + - r 1 ( » -  " 1  • (47)
33This could be the work of separate, national banks with a common inflation target, or of a single, supranational
authority such as the European Central Bank.
34The only difference is that the revenue function / i [ o T,/r ] is multiplied by JV; this washes out, leaving (19) and (20) as
the optimal pricing policy.
37
Consider now the effect of varying f ( j ) ,  from the point of view of a single national policymaker. 
Obviously the impact on the price P  of the input portfolio, and thus on final-sector output Y  (j) = X a , 
will be somewhat muted, given that P  reflects the labour market policies of all AT countries. This is 
confirmed in the chapter appendix. What, though, of the impact on domestic employment L (j)?
Proposition 5 The effect of any national labour market policy on employment, is altered by
the presence of trade in intermediates. In  particular, as the number of countries N  becomes large, it 
approaches 6s/(j^ ■
It should be intuitive that, since the presence of trade in intermediates dilutes the effect of any single, 
national employment protection policy on the price of the input portfolio, the impact of firing costs on 
employment will approach ~sfl(^)35- Of particular interest here is the potential for such trade to alter 
incentives for labour market reform. Consider for example Figure 7. This compares the employment 
effects of the national labour market policy of country j  when intermediates are internationally traded 
to those under autarky. The size of the continent is chosen as N  = 15. Employment protection policies 
of other countries are assumed invariant, and are fixed as follows: three countries each set /  =  0 .1 , four 
set /  =  0.2, four set /  =  0.3 and finally three set /  =  0.4. The (normalised) employment level of country 
j  under autarky is represented by L (j ) norm, that when there is trade in intermediates by L (j ) Tnorm. 
It is assumed that the elasticity of output to P x  is high - a  is set to equal 0.95. Note the potential 
differential impact of firing costs. For example, for the parameter combinations (cr =  2.1, ag = 1.75) 
and (cr =  6 , ag = 1.25) employment under autarky falls substantially with employment protection, while 
when there is trade in intermediates the labour market policy of country j  has relatively little effect on 
its own employment. When inputs are traded across many economies, it is the relative insensitivity of 
this portfolio price to changes in the price of inputs from any single country that muffles the effect of 
national labour market policies.
There are obvious implications for the incentive to reform labour markets. If labour market policy is
chosen in isolation, at the national level, then there may be little employment or output cost associated
35 Recall from Section 2.3.3 that this is merely the ‘direct’ impact of firing costs, holding constant aggregate price and 
output levels; it is the subject of Figure 5.
with employment protection. Firing costs may influence employment and output chiefly through the 
price of the input portfolio, which is composed chiefly of goods traded abroad and thus largely exogenous 
to the domestic policymaker. Taken together, though, the continent-wide impact of national labour 
market policies may be significant. This suggests, perhaps, that employment protection policies ought 
not to be chosen nationally, since inefficiently high levels of firing cost may result.
A second implication of trade in intermediates is with regard to empirical work. Suppose firing costs 
were indeed responsible for Europe’s low employment rates, via their effects on input prices. Figure 
7 suggests that, were a simple cross-country regression on the 15 countries performed, a researcher 
would be hard pressed to identify a robust link between EPL and employment. This is especially true 
given the problems associated with definition and measurement of employment protection, as well as the 
difficulty in controlling for other national labour market institutions. Of course, the level of economic 
interdependence assumed here may be unrealistic, as therefore would be the size of policy spillovers 
between countries. However, the analysis is at the very least suggestive.
2.4.3 Job turnover w ith labour in the final sector
The previous section argued that the theoretical results of the baseline model, which suggest firing costs 
may give rise to low employment, could be reconciled with the empirical failure to identify any such 
causation. The simple extension presented now aims to do the same for another apparent empirical 
anomaly, the cross-country job turnover pattern. Recall that Nickell (1997) and Bertola and Rogerson 
(1997), amongst others, have emphasised the similarity in rates of job turnover across countries with 
very different employment protection regimes. This is problematic for any model that emphasises the 
dynamic, optimising behaviour of rational firms,as do both the standard model reviewed in Section 2.2.2 
and the baseline model of this paper. Firing costs imply lower hiring in good times and lower firing in 
bad times, unambiguously depressing turnover. In the model of this paper, the job turnover rate p is
As Figure 8  illustrates, p is highly sensitive to firing costs; turnover is reduced by at least 30% when 
/  =  f m a x / 2 .
Consider a straightforward extension to the model of Section 2.3.1. Suppose final-sector technology 
is in fact Leontief, with labour as a complementary input in the production process. Each final-sector 
firm must combine q units of labour with each unit of the composite intermediate good X  to produce a 
second-stage input X .  The consumption good is then produced according to:
Y  =  X a. (50)
Labour is homogeneous: wages in the final sector are exogenous, and identical to those paid at 
intermediate-good firms. The remainder of the model structure is unchanged. The unit cost of X  is 
qw +  Px , rendering X  (and thus X )  determinate once more:
X  = a (Px + q w ) - 1/{1- a ) . (51)
It should be clear that the effect of costly dismissal on the pricing behaviour of intermediate-sector 
firms will be analogous to that found in the baseline model. They will have no bearing on that of final- 
sector firms, though, as their environment is deterministic; as a result, they neither hire nor fire. The
relationship between firing costs and total employment differs from the basic model, though. Suppose
q, the unit labour requirement in the final sector, is large. Aggregate employment will therefore depend 
chiefly on the output of final-good firms, and thus on the price of the original composite intermediate 
good X ,  w being exogenous. Employment in the intermediate sector could be arbitrarily small as a 
fraction of total employment, yet firing costs could continue to exert a large negative effect on total 
employment via their influence on Px  ■ At the same time, while firing costs would reduce job turnover at 
intermediate-good firms, this could be dwarfed by turnover at final-good firms (due to voluntary quits, 
say). Again, cross-country regressions of turnover on dismissal costs would find it hard to identify any 
robust relationship. The fact that, in this model, firing costs work chiefly through their effect on Px  
allows the fink between the turnover implications of such costs and their employment implications to be 
weakened.
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2.5 Concluding remarks
The principal channel through which employment protection might make itself felt is via the pricing 
behaviour of firms producing intermediate inputs. It is possible for firing costs to lead to a more efficient 
labour allocation in the intermediate sector, by working against existing market distortions. This is more 
likely to be the case when labour productivity differences across firms are small, and when the inputs 
these firms produce are not readily substitutable. This is intuitive; under such circumstances the costs 
associated with loss of flexibility are low. However, the other side of that coin is that, even in the absence 
of firing costs, the amount of labour reallocation is anyway small. The degree of freedom to increase 
efficiency afforded such costs is thus in practice rather limited.
The downside, in contrast, is potentially significant. When productivity differences are large and 
inputs close substitutes, the flexibility costs of employment protection, in terms of lowered employment 
and output, are substantial. This would suggest that one source of Europe’s low employment rates may 
indeed be the degree to which the jobs of incumbent workers are safeguarded, and that the repeal of the 
offending legislation could be in order. It was shown, though, that the presence of trade in intermediates 
dilutes national incentives to carry out such reforms, and that coordinated efforts on the part of individual 
governments would be needed.
The model presented is obviously a very highly abstracted version of a real economy. First, the 
process by which wages are formed is ignored. Given that some of the paper’s results rely on the 
uncoordinated behaviour of infinitesimally small firms, it would be interesting to introduce centralised 
wage-bargaining into the model. Second, the two-sector structure is a considerable simplification. This 
does not necessarily render the general conclusions reached here invalid. Matsuyama (1995), for example, 
shows that allowing for multi-stage production can amplify spillover effects found in a basic model such 
as this. Whether or not the pricing distortions focused upon here would be similarly exacerbated would 
be an interesting avenue to explore in future work.
41
2.6
2.6.1
1 .
Appendix
Proofs
Proposition 1:
P  =  (ag 1 (w + cf f  +  a 6 1 (w “  df f  *) (52)
where c =  1/ (2 (1 +  r)) and d = (1 +  2r) /  (2 (1 +  r)). We then have
J J  =  F *  1 (w  +  a f )  a  ~  da6 1 (w  “  bf ) a )  (53)
c2 nfrom which Remark 1 is readily derived. It is straightforward to show that jy? <  0:
w  -  ( S f )' ( S I ) * '  ( S I ) )  ■ <“>
Hence, setting /  =  0 in (53), we have da£ -1  > ca£ -1  as a sufficient condition for <  0 for all 
positive / .
Proposition 2: 6X6e/ ^ < 0;
X e f f  = (1/2) x - g ^ - o  v-— 2^  (55 )
and so
ag 1 (w + c f ) + a b 1 ( w -  df )
6 X e  f  f  P a~2
=  ^ ~ b { c { w ~ d f )  +  d { w  +  ° f ) )  A  ( / )  ’ ( 5 6 )
where
A  ( /)  = a l ( w -  df)* — ag (w + cf)* . (57)
Now, recall the implicit restriction in the model that lg > lb. Effectively this implies
ab~x (w -  df)* < aag~l (w +  cf )a . (58)
Since ag > ab, it is immediate that A  ( /)  < 0 and thus that <  0.
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q 6L, .
6f  ’
Li  = ag_ 1  (w +  cf )~a +  a£ -1  (w -  df )~a (59)
and so
I  =  T (  a j - ' d  a ^ c  \
6 f  \ ( w -  df ){1+a) {w +  c /) (1+<7) J  ’
8 2 L i , x (  a f - 1 ^2 \  , x
—  =  a { \ + a )  ^ (w _ d/)(2+<7) +  {w + c f ) i2+*) J  • (61)
(32) follows directly from (60).
4. ^ > 0 ;
Recall that L 2 = L \P a\ a little algebra shows that
§h.= 1 ( °r1°r1  ^(<nc+d)f c(c+d)f\
6 f  y (w + cf )~a { w - d f )  a J  \  w - d f  w + c f  ) '
c 6L .
<5/»
Focus on L = L1P cr-1/(1-Q:):
| j  =  -P2" ' ^ S ( / ) ,  (63)
where
B { f )  =  a __________ ar lc \  pi-<r
(w -  d /)-(1+<r) (to +  c /) -(1+<7) J
Collecting terms,
f d ( c  + d ) f  c(c + d ) f \
d
( 1 - a )
a)
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The first term in B  ( /)  is unambiguously positive. For |y  < 0, it must be the case that the terms 
in 1/  (1 — a) sum to a negative number, i.e..
? < 6 ) ' * '  ( £ f ) '  <«>
However, (6 6 ) is merely the condition for fy  > 0. So, a necessary (but not sufficient) condition for 
< 0 is that firing costs increase the price of the input portfolio. Note from (65) that the higher 
is a, the more weight placed on the price effect of firing costs.
6 . Proposition 3: | j  <  0;
From (38):
n = k { ( a -  I ) -1  P l ~° - { d -  c ) /a j_1 (w -  d /)_<r} p * " 1. (67)
A little algebra confirms that the sign of j j  is that of the following expression
* = ( * - <  s r 1 )* ) °  w  -  <* -  *> * «
where
™  t )  ( ( ^ r  *  ( ^ » n
D{ f )  =
(68)
+  ( g ~ 1fK ~ ! i? -~ C ) / , (69)(w -  df)
+  (70>
Now, recall again the implicit restriction that lg > lb- It follows from (58) and (6 8 ) that
4, < (d — c) (C ( /)  — D  ( /) )  (71)
/  /  \  <7 — 1 /  \  <7— 1 '
=  - ( < * - < 0 1  ( - T 1- ? )  +w + c f  J  \ w  — df  
< 0. (73)
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So, n is decreasing in /  over the whole range for which labour reallocation occurs.
7. Proposition 4: 6pxj-n) >  0;
From (21) we have
'71 \  !/(!—<y) ~_ _ /7 l\ 
px  = . y  p (74) 
• (75)(w -  df)a J
where A: is a  constant. Bearing in mind the restriction that a  > the sign of 6p*(n) can be 
shown to equal that of
aa^~1d(d — c) f*cr— 1 ,<7—1
" ^ (w +  o f f  (w -  d fY  J +  (w _  d f Y {(T+1) ' 
Again, (58) ensures that the first term is positive over the relevant range.
8 . Proposition 5: >
A calculation shows that the sign of is that of
&E ( /, N)
. 0 — 1 . a9 lc
(w — df)^a+1  ^ (w +  c /) (<7+1) ~ { a - T h ) F ( f )
where
E ( f , N )  =  P 1 — <7
/ O ' )
2(1 +  7-)
1—<7
,<7—1
F ( f )  =
,<7—1
+
(w -  df) (w +  cf)
a? '1d aan *c g
(w — df) °  (w + cf) '
(76)
(77)
(78)
(79)
(80)
As N  grows large, so does E  ( /, N),  and more weight is placed on the term in square brackets in 
(77). This is simply 7 )7+
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3 Central Bank Conservatism and th e Fragm entation o f W age-
Bargaining
3.1 Introduction
Much economic policy evaluation is informed by the institutional environment in which the policy-maker 
must work. The salient characteristics of this environment, be they the ways in which information is 
distributed across private agents or the relative bargaining powers of groups of such agents, are usually 
taken as given. Relatively little formal attention is paid to the role of economic policy, in particular 
macroeconomic policy, in determining such arrangements, except of course where the very object is to 
explicitly remould the institutional structure36.
That such indirect effects of policy are commonly ignored is perhaps surprising. While the nature 
of economic institutions may conceivably be affected by non-economic, ‘historical’ processes, as well as 
by explicit policy prescription, one would expect it to be in part the result of self-interested actions by 
individual agents; private information may be shared and restricted, private coalitions may arise and 
dissolve. Since, from the point of view of the individual agent, the optimal institutional structure will 
be sensitive to the policy regime, changes in policy will lead to changes in this structure37. Accordingly, 
any attempt to explain evolution in institutional structure should consider the potential influence of the 
policy regime. Any comprehensive evaluation of economic policy will do well to take such influence into 
account.
This paper applies such logic to the interaction between macroeconomic policy stance - specifically,
central bank conservatism - and corporatism in the labour market - specifically, the extent to which labour
unions coordinate when setting wages. The past twenty years have seen two broad trends in developed
economies: a shift towards greater decentralisation of wage-bargaining, and increasing policy emphasis
on price stability. It is argued here that these phenomena are linked, and that the fragmentation of
bargaining structures in the labour market has its roots in the more anti-inflationary monetary regimes
36 As is the case with much competition policy, for example.
37This is not a new insight, merely a particular statem ent of the Lucas Critique.
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in evidence.
Each of these topics has a substantial literature devoted to it in isolation. That on the effects of 
central bank preferences lies squarely within the neoclassical mainstream38, while the literature dealing 
with institutional arrangements in the labour market owes a little more to political scientists and scholars 
of industrial relations39. It is only recently that the two have been integrated; several papers40 augment 
the standard strategic monetary policy game with multiple, non-atomistic wage-setters, and find that 
doing so provides richer insights than afforded by the earlier, separate literatures. However, while these 
papers may focus on the interplay between policy stance and the structure of wage bargaining, they allow 
for no causal fink between the two; the degree of coordination on the part of wage-setters is immutable 
in the face of varying degrees of central bank conservatism. This paper extends this analysis.
First, it presents a monetary policy game where, given the preferences of the central bank, an increase 
in the number of wage-setting coalitions will lead to lower levels of employment. Also, given the structure 
of the labour market, a more conservative central bank will lead to higher aggregate employment. The 
monetary policy game has two stages. In the first, the (multiple) wage-setters simultaneously post wages. 
In the second, the central bank determines the level of inflation at its discretion.
The second, and more novel, aspect of the model is that it allows the basic structure of wage-setting 
to change with policy stance. The model adds an anterior stage to the standard, two-stage monetary 
policy game. Before wages are set, unions are allowed to form affiances with one another, with each 
alliance to set a single wage on behalf of all constituent workers. The labour unions are assumed to 
anticipate the behaviour of the monetary authority when forming these alliances. The overall model 
structure is thus as follows:
• Stage 1: labour unions organise themselves into coalitions;
• Stage 2: each coalition sets a single wage on behalf of its constituents;
38For example Barro & Gordon (1983).
39See for instance Schmitter (1974) and Crouch (1985).
40Notably in papers by Guzzo and Velasco (1999) and Cukierman and Lippi (1999a). See also Iversen (1999), Gruner 
and Hefeker (1999) and Bleaney (1996).
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•  Stage 3: the central bank chooses the rate of inflation.
Using the non-cooperative coalition-formation game proposed by Bloch (1996), the relationship be­
tween central bank preferences and equilibrium labour market structure is derived. It is found that, 
given the nature of the proposed game between the wage-setters and the central bank (Stages 2 and 3), 
increased conservatism leads to a more diffuse pattern of wage-setting, consistent with the observed insti­
tutional changes. A highly accommodating central bank results in fully centralised wage-bargaining, while 
one that is strongly averse to inflation leads to wage-setting being completely decentralised. Between 
these two extremes, the relationship is nonlinear; there is an upper bound to the number of independent 
wage-setting units, said upper bound increasing in the degree of conservatism. The robustness of this 
conclusion, that conservatism is associated with a diffuse labour market structure, is ascertained with 
reference to the cooperative concept of coalition stability. It is shown that decentralised structures are 
more likely to be stable under conservative monetary regimes, while centralised ones axe likely to be 
stable when the central bank cares about real variables.
The reason for such a relationship is as follows. A feature of the labour market in the model will 
be that demand for the labour of an individual union is decreasing in the economy-wide real wage 
- it is implicit that, at the level of aggregation considered, the labour inputs of different unions are 
complements in the production function of the representative firm. Now, small wage-setting coalitions 
have the advantage that they can demand high real wages without too deleterious an effect on the 
aggregate economy. There is thus an incentive for an individual labour union to join a relatively small 
coalition, or even to remain isolated. However, should all other labour unions do likewise, the aggregate 
real wage will be high, aggregate labour demand low, and all unions will suffer. This provides an incentive 
for groups of unions to form alliances, so that wage demands may be coordinated. Unions, therefore, face 
a trade-off between the ability of large coalitions to solve this coordination problem and the flexibility 
afforded small coalitions - that is, the ability to free-ride on the coordination efforts of others and obtain 
high wages to boot. The degree of central bank conservatism will determine the nature of this trade-off, 
and thus the number and sizes of coalitions formed in equilibrium.
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Having solved the coalition formation game, the implications of the monetary policy regime for 
employment are then re-examined, taking into account the endogeneity of the labour market structure. 
It is shown that the direct effect of greater conservatism, which is to increase employment, is eventually 
outweighed by the indirect effect, which is to lower employment via a decentralisation in wage-setting. 
A central bank with intermediate preferences may in fact maximise employment.
The likely effect of monetary union on the structure of European wage-bargaining is then addressed. 
It has been argued elsewhere41 that the introduction of a supranational European monetary authority 
will encourage consolidation among wage-setters, as they come to appreciate the increased costs of 
uncoordinated behaviour. It is pointed out here that this argument ignores the incentives facing the 
individual wage-setter. While monetary union does imply higher costs from coordination failure, it 
may also increase the payoff from acting alone while other wage-setters coordinate. It is shown that, 
in equilibrium, this may imply an unchanged or even a more diffuse coalition structure, post-EMU. 
Rather than ushering in an era of cross-border alliances of labour unions, the single currency may in fact 
accelerate the fragmentation of European wage-bargaining.
Section 3.2 reviews the literature on the macroeconomic consequences of corporatism and of central 
bank conservatism. Section 3.3 outlines the strategic monetary policy game, for a given labour market 
structure, and analyses the effect on welfare when the degrees of corporatism and conservatism are varied 
in isolation. Section 3.4 endogenises the labour market structure and solves the coalition-formation game. 
Section 3.5 considers the overall impact on the economy of different monetary policy stances. Section 
3.6 examines the implications of EMU within this framework. Section 3.7 concludes.
3.2 Corporatism and centred bank conservatism
The roles of both the structure of wage-setting and of central bank conservatism in determining national
economic performance have been extensively studied. The literature on the former will be surveyed first.
41 See for example Holden (2001).
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3.2.1 The coordination of wage-setting
Bruno and Sachs (1985) and Calmfors and Driffill (1988) argue that the aggregate wage (employment) 
level is hump-shaped (U-shaped) in the degree of decentralisation of wage-setting. The logic is as follows.
In highly decentralised labour markets, any single union has little monopoly power, and faces being 
undercut should it set wages too high; in highly centralised labour markets each union is large enough 
to internalise the effects of its actions, again restraining wage claims; with an intermediate degree of 
centralisation, neither of these forces is at hand to moderate wage demands, and wages are high. This 
‘hump-shaped’ hypothesis received much attention.
What of the actual pattern of wage-setting? For much of the post-war period, many developed 
economies, particularly those in Western Europe, have been characterised by coordinated wage-bargaining42. 
The extent of such coordination, and the precise form it has taken, have varied. From the 1950s to the 
early 1980s wage increases in Sweden were largely dictated by agreements made at national level, between 
the employers’ confederation (SAF) and the blue-collar union federation (LO). Germany, meanwhile, 
traditionally relied on ‘master labour agreements’, negotiated regionally and covering industrial sectors; 
union participation in this process was coordinated by central unions, principally the 16 national unions 
covering industrial sectors affiliated with the Deutscher Gewerkschaftsbund (DGB). In the UK, in con­
trast, what coordination there was tended to take the form of multi-employer, firm-wide and plant-level 
bargaining.
Whatever the historical, cross-country differences in wage-bargaining structure, the 1980s and 1990s
saw a gradual decentralisation of wage-setting in developed economies. In Sweden, for example, the
importance of the SAF-LO agreement gradually declined, and in 1988 was replaced by industry-level
negotiations. While the formal bargaining structure in Germany has remained largely intact, observers
have detected a significant move towards decentralisation, with informal bargaining by works councils at
42Eichengreen and Iversen (1999) argue that this helped the economies of Western Europe overcome three pressing 
economic difficulties faced after W W II, namely short-termism, collective-action problems and distributive conflict.
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plant and company level growing in importance43. Even the UK has seen a degree of decentralisation, 
starting though it was from a relatively decentralised base; there has been a decline in the number of 
multi-employer agreements, and the replacement of firm-wide agreements by those made at plant level. 
This fragmentation of bargaining systems is not confined to European countries. Both New Zealand and 
Australia have seen a bargaining structure based on industrial agreements eroded by growth in single­
employer bargaining. The experience in the US has been similar to that in the UK, with a movement 
from multi-employer to plant level bargaining, while Canada has also seen bargaining fragmentation. See 
Katz (1993) and Walsh (1995) for a general review.
Several suggestions have been made as to the causes of this apparent move towards less coordinated 
wage-setting structures. Katz (1993) identifies three in particular as worthy of consideration. The 
first is that there was a shift in bargaining power away from the workforce towards management, due to 
intensified international competition and declines in both unions’ membership and their political strength; 
employers have used this increased bargaining power to push for decentralisation, which they see as 
conducive to improved bargaining outcomes. Circumstantial evidence in favour of this ‘bargaining power 
shift’ hypothesis is that management have indeed tended to push for such decentralisation, while the 
central unions have opposed it. However, Katz points out that the constituent local unions were generally 
in favour of more devolved wage-setting, and argues that any decentralisation in Germany cannot have 
been due to weakness on the part of the unions, who retained significant bargaining power throughout44. 
A second possible cause is the diversification of corporate structure, with bargaining decentralisation a 
natural consequence of more independent business units. Katz favours a third suggested explanation, 
whereby workplace restructuring was necessitated by new technology; local bargaining was necessary for
the implementation of new, more flexible forms of workplace organisation45.
43 Note that the dimension of interest for this paper will be the degree of coordination of wage-bargaining, rather than
the extent to which it is formally centralised.
44 Union membership in Germany remained strong throughout the 1980s, and improvements in wages and working hours
were consistently obtained.
45Iversen (2000) also argues that new technology, in conjunction with com petition from newly industrialised countries, 
has led to growing pressure for wage flexibility.
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Walsh (1995) also emphasises reorganisation in the workplace. However, she argues it was a response 
to the productivity slowdown in the 1970s, after which firms were willing to experiment with new tech­
niques and workplace structures, again with local bargaining a natural consequence. Walsh stresses 
in turn the importance of increased workforce heterogeneity, and of increased international economic 
integration, with the rise of multinational corporations undermining domestic corporatist arrangements.
In each of the explanations considered hereto, there is little or no role for the labour unions themselves 
- the forces behind decentralisation are external, in the form of new technology, international competition 
or corporate restructuring. This is unsatisfactory. To quote Katz (1993, p. 17),
“...the evidence from the six countries suggests that unions can influence the nature of bar­
gaining structure and are not just passive recipients of a ‘decentralisation effect’.”
It is argued in this paper that the move to more diffuse wage-setting systems may be in part a result 
of changes in the perceived benefits, to labour unions, of coordinated wage bargaining. In response to 
such changes, which result in turn from changes in the macroeconomic environment, the unions have 
themselves prompted a decentralisation in wage-setting. It is suggested in Iversen (2000), though not 
formally modelled, that
“...capital market integration has constrained the capacity of governments to run deficits 
and pursue inflationary monetary policies, thus limiting the incentives for employers and 
better-paid workers to agree to centralised controls on wage increases.”
This argument, that the advent (for whatever reason) of more anti-inflationary monetary policies 
made wage coordination less appealing to workers, is close to that presented later.
3.2.2 Central bank conservatism
It was long the received wisdom, at least in academic circles, that greater conservatism brought lower 
inflation with no cost in terms of higher unemployment. The work of Kydland and Prescott (1977) and 
Barro and Gordon (1983) suggested that atomistic, forward-looking wage-setters will anticipate the dis­
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inflationary actions of a more conservative central bank, and moderate their wage demands accordingly; 
in the absence of shocks there will be no ‘real’ effects.
Perhaps partly as a result of this view, the status of which approached that of a folk-theorem in 
macroeconomics, many governments began to follow more anti-inflationary policies. In Western Europe 
a gradual movement towards ‘hard-currency’ regimes was observed in the 1980s, one manifest in the 
targeting of exchange rates within the European Monetary System (EMS). Bleaney (1996), along with 
many others, argues that the operation of the EMS, in which high-inflation countries allowed their 
currencies to steadily appreciate against the Deutschemark, allowed these countries to acquire some of 
the anti-inflationary credibility of the Bundesbank. There has also been a movement towards increased 
independence of central banks. Tavelli, Tullio and Spinefli (1998) found that, between 1990 and 1997, the 
‘functional’ and ‘political’ independence46 of a number of European central banks increased, in some cases 
markedly; meanwhile, the UK, one of the notable absentees from monetary union, has had a functionally 
independent, inflation-targetting central bank since 199747. This process reached what some would call 
its natural conclusion with the establishment, in advance of the adoption of the euro in 1999, of the 
European Central Bank (ECB), by most measures highly independent. Again, this move towards anti- 
inflationary macroeconomic policies was not confined to European countries. In, the US the 1980s began 
with the Volcker disinflation; The Reserve Bank of New Zealand was made functionally independent in 
1989; other banks to adopt explicit inflation targeting are the Bank of Canada and the Reserve Bank of 
Australia.
46 Defined respectively as the power to deploy the instruments and to set the targets of monetary policy.
47It is of course worth emphasising that the concepts of central bank conservatism and independence are com pletely dis­
tinct; one can have conservatism without independence, and vice versa. However, it is perhaps arguable that independence 
is a reasonable em pirical indicator of conservatism, although Forder (1996) argues forcefully against this approach. It is also 
arguable that increased independence is, if anything, a lagging indicator of increased conservatism, since presumably consti­
tutional amendments take longer to  implement than short-term monetary policy decisions. This increase in independence 
through the 1990s could be viewed in light of the tensions apparent in the EMS by the early part of that decade, brought on 
by differing economic policies across participating countries and by German reunification. Governments may have decided 
to swap one set of anti-inflationary institutions for another, or at least decided that complementary arrangements were 
required.
70
There seems to have been, then, an increased willingness on the part of governments to pursue 
anti-inflationary macroeconomic policies. This may be due to increased international capital mobility, 
as suggested in Iversen (2000). As alluded to above, it may also be a result of the (then) economic 
orthodoxy, that increased conservatism reduces inflation at no real cost. The empirical debate regarding 
the potential ‘neutrality’ of central bank preferences is, though, far from settled. Most early work 
found that economies with relatively independent central banks had relatively low inflation rates, and 
that there were indeed no associated costs in terms of growth and unemployment - see for example De 
Haan and Sturm (1992) or Alesina and Summers (1993). Again, interpretation of such results hinges 
on the confidence one places in the measures of central bank independence used, and whether or not 
‘independence’ is indeed a useful concept at all in the debate. While it would seem more legitimate to 
infer increases over time in conservatism from increased independence within countries, controlling as 
this does for any idiosyncratic constitutional and political features of an economy, interpretation of static 
cross-country regressions is more difficult. W hat is more, the empirical work largely omits other variables 
of interest, for example any relating to labour market structure. Even if independence is a perfect proxy 
for conservatism, one must control for any other institutional variables which vary with it.
Neither is the ‘neutrality’ view, that central bank behaviour has no real effects, easily reconciled with 
casual observation. As Solow and Taylor (1998) point out:
“...contrary to what many modern macroeconomic models suggest, central bank actions often 
affect both inflation and measures of real economic activity...but the nature and magnitude 
of these effects are not yet understood.”
Recent work, to be reviewed next, provides one possible theoretical basis for such effects, based on 
the interaction between central bank behaviour and the structure of the labour market.
3.2.3 In stitu tio n a l in te rac tion
The two strands of literature, on central bank preferences and on labour market structure, remained 
largely distinct until recently, with several papers augmenting the standard strategic monetary pol­
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icy game with non-atomistic wage-setters. Soskice and Iversen (2000) provide a model where non- 
accommodatory monetary policy deters such wage-setters from demanding large nominal wage increases. 
The intuition is as follows: if the central bank refuses to accommodate any wage increases and instead 
sets a nominal anchor, the aggregate demand implications of said wage increases are more severe; large 
wage-setters, interacting strategically with one another, will as a result moderate their wage demands. 
Highly conservative central banks will thus be associated with high levels of employment.
This is the opposite conclusion to those reached by two other recent papers. Both Cukierman and 
Lippi (1999a) and Guzzo and Velasco (1999) assume unions dislike inflation per se\ if unions also like 
higher real wages, then increased conservatism will result in higher wage demands (and thus lower 
employment), since the inflationary cost of a given nominal wage increase is smaller48. More interestingly, 
at least for the purposes of this paper, Cukierman and Lippi provide a second channel through which 
conservatism reduces employment. They assume that, in addition to being increasing in its real wage, 
the objective function of a single union j  is decreasing in (Wj/w), where w is the economy-wide nom inal 
wage level. This is justified on grounds of inter-union labour market competition, and leads to what 
they call a ‘competition-induced strategic non-neutrality’; a more conservative central bank means that, 
for a given increase in its real wage, a union incurs a smaller ‘relative wage cost’, and so in equilibrium 
real wages will be higher, employment lower. In models such as this, therefore, the results are highly 
sensitive to the specification of labour demand. Crucial is whether the labour demand facing a single 
union is increasing in the average wage across unions (as in Soskice and Iversen (2000)), or is decreasing 
therein (as in Cukierman and Lippi (1999a)). In the latter case the competition effect of an aggregate 
wage increase dominates; in the former, it is the aggregate demand effect which prevails.
The model presented below will follow Soskice and Iversen (2000) (and Guzzo and Velasco (1999))
in its implicit assumption that the labour varieties offered by different unions are complements in the
representative production function. Any competitive advantage conferred upon union j  by an increase
in the wages of ‘rival’ unions will be outweighed by the impact of the rise in the aggregate wage level on
48Gruner and Hefeker (1999) present a model, similar in spirit, which analyses the effect of a monetary union between 
m any countries, each with a single labour union that dislikes inflation.
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aggregate output and labour demand49. Such an assumption may be justified as follows. The paper is 
concerned with the formation of coalitions between unions, not with the initial formation of the unions 
themselves.The empirical motivation is the fragmentation of bargaining systems, starting in many cases 
from high levels of centralisation, particularly in western Europe. It should be emphasised that the 
model here will not encompass the case of an atomistic labour market, where the number of wage-setters 
is allowed to go to infinity. Given that the basic building block is the labour union, not the individual 
worker, an assumption of low substitutability is not so strong.
3.2.4 Institutional evolution - a causal link?
While the papers considered above explicitly model the interaction between monetary policy and labour 
market structure, the latter is taken as given. This may be appropriate over a short enough time 
horizon, for example over the course of a single-period monetary policy game; labour market institutions 
are presumably characterised by greater inertia than are monetary policy instruments. Such games are, 
though, repeated indefinitely, and one would expect the the wage-setting structure to gradually evolve 
in response to policy stance.
The model presented here necessarily abstracts from any inertia in the labour market structure and 
considers a single monetary policy game in isolation. Unions set wages and the central bank subsequently
chooses inflation; prior to this, the forward-looking unions may form coalitions with one another. The
preferences of the central bank will determine the equilibrium coalition structure.
The possibility that the pattern of wage-bargaining and the conduct of monetary policy are causally 
linked has been raised before. Eichengreen and Iversen (1999, p.133) suggest that the observed increase 
in conservatism was a response to the more diffuse wage-setting structure:
“Instead, where centralised bargaining and continuous consultation between the peak associ­
ations and government could no longer be relied on for wage restraint, there was a pressing
need to anchor inflationary expectations...by adopting an exchange-rate commitment and
49In this view, for example, an increase in the real wages of the engineers’ union will reduce demand for the labour of 
postal workers.
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giving the central bank the independence to pursue it.”
However, as they point out in the preceding paragraph:
“...decentralisation came first in those countries most committed to price and exchange-rate 
stability and integrated into international capital markets. Belgium and the Netherlands 
shifted to industry-based bargaining systems in the 1970s, followed by Denmark in the 1980s, 
and Sweden in the 1990s.”
Discerning which came first, decentralisation or increased conservatism, is not straightforward, since 
discerning changes in the effective degree of wage coordination or of central bank conservatism is itself not 
easy. Overt institutional changes are likely to lag changes in behaviour, especially with regard to monetary 
policy. However, the thesis of this paper is that the fragmentation of wage bargaining  was, at least in 
part, a result of more anti-inflationary macroeconomic regimes. This is consistent with recent work 
by Steinar Holden50, examining the incentives for wage-coordination under various monetary regimes 
in the presence of trigger strategies51. Holden’s model will be discussed in more detail below, when 
the implications of monetary union are exam ined. He also surveys the cross-country empirical evidence 
on monetary regime and the coordination of wage-setting. He argues that, if one omits countries with 
highly decentralised labour markets such as the UK and the US, there is evidence that countries with 
more accommodating monetary policies also have more centralised wage-bargaining systems. This is 
consistent with the current paper; it was argued above that the model here does not apply to countries 
with atomistic labour markets. However, the sample of countries in such work is always rather small, 
and any evidence they provide should be treated as no more than suggestive.
The next section introduces the monetary policy game between the central bank and the unions.
3.3 Many wage-setters and one central bank: a simple monetary policy game
The monetary policy game will now be presented and solved, assuming a given coalition structure.
50Holden (2001).
51 This author came across Holden’s model while preparing the final draft of this chapter for this thesis.
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3.3.1 The labour unions
There are n labour groups, referred to hereon as unions. Let Wj  denote the normalised, nominal wage 
set on behalf of union j:
WJ = w j - 6 (81)
where Wj is the simple nominal wage and 6 is a parameter. The normalisation is for technical purposes 
only. Now, the demand for the labour of union j  is assumed to be decreasing in the average wage across 
all unions; recall the discussion in Section 2.352. Purely for simplicity, this is the only argument in the 
labour demand function:
ii=/3°(p) ’ (82)
where w = £ Y^k-i wk, P is the price level and /?0 is a parameter. As noted before, the implication 
is that labour is not highly substitutable across different unions - a higher aggregate wage leads to a fall 
in demand for the labour of union j  via a fall in aggregate demand.
The objective function of each union, V j , is increasing in both its income and employment levels:
Vl " (y)''- '7’ m
■  l84>
Each union’s utility is thus increasing in its relative wage (^-), and decreasing in the aggregate real 
wage53. Unions may be thought of as wanting high wages, but not to the extent that this feeds into the
aggregate real wage and chokes off aggregate demand. We thus have that aggregate union welfare, as
52 The use of the normalised nominal wage in the labour demand function could be justified as follows. Think of the 
parameter 6 as the cost of leisure activity, fixed for the duration of the game. The labour demand function may then be 
thought of as resulting from a simple shirking model; the higher the cost of leisure, the greater the cost of shirking, and
the harder each employee will work.
53 A more ‘realistic’ labour demand function than (82) could have been used, for example by including the union’s own
wage Then, to obtain (84), which is convenient for the coalition formation game to come, one would merely have to 
tinker with the basic specification for the objective function, (83), a little.
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measured by averaging over their objective functions, is linearly decreasing in the aggregate real wage:
V  =  (85)
j = 1
=  P o - P o 1^ .  (86)
The unions are organised into N  wage-bargaining groups or coalitions, where N  > 2. These coalitions
may be of heterogeneous size. Each coalition i sets a single wage Wion behalf of all constituent unions,
with its aim to maximise the average of the constituents’ objective functions:
n . =  («7)
-  * > © - « ■ ( ; )  <“ >
where s; G [1, n  — 1] is the number of labour unions in coalition i.
3.3.2 T he c e n tra l ban k
The central bank has a loss function that is increasing in inflation and decreasing in the average utility
across unions:
L =  [log(/?0 (PQ -  V))]2 +  0[log7r]2, (89)
where tt = logp —logp_i is the rate of inflation and 9 G (0, oo) measures the degree of conservatism of 
the central bank. Setting the previous period’s price level, p _ i , equal to unity without loss of generality, 
the loss function may be rewritten:
L = [logw -  logp]2 +  0[logp]2. (90)
3.3.3 Solving th e  gam e
The game is in two stages - first, the labour coalitions set wages, then the central bank chooses inflation. 
To obtain a subgame-perfect equilibrium, the game is solved backwards.
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T he cen tra l b a n k ’s p rob lem  The central bank chooses inflation to minimise (90), taking wages as 
given. Analysis of the first-order condition leads to the following expression for inflation:
lo g p =  j ^ l o g w ,  (91)
If 0 = oo, then any increase in nominal wages will show up as an increase in real wages; should 0 =  0, 
then the real wage is fixed - all nominal wage increases are matched by increases in the price level. Note 
that (91) implies:
dp 1 p
dw 1 + 0 w (92)
T h e  w age-se tters’ p rob lem  Each coalition i sets a wage Wi to maximise Qi in (8 8 ). Consider the 
following first-order condition:
; ■ * ( £ - ? ? ) < “ >
a  ( 1  Ct iWi \  a _ x
— Po I -------- 2~ I ~~ A) ai'\ W  ) (1  + 0)p'
where a:* =  ^  denotes the proportion of all labour unions that are members of coalition z; thus, =  a*. 
Rearranging, we have an expression involving the aggregate wage:
* ( ■ - = ? ) -  ( + V
which may be summed over all coalitions to obtain an explicit solution for
g y ^ A T - D ^ ) .  (96)
Substituting this into the first-order condition (95), we can solve for the relative wage of each coali­
tion54 :
G £ ) * = 1 + ( £ - * ) •  <97>
54 And with this expression in hand the second-order condition to the wage-setting problem is easily obtained:
a? ( N - 1 Yd2ni r~ 2
d w ? ~ Po
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We see that if all coalitions are of the same size, i.e. a ; =  then they all set the same wage
Wi = w. With coalitions of heterogeneous size, the larger coalitions set lower wages; in effect, they are 
restrained in their wage demands by their disproportionate effect on aggregate labour demand.
3.3.4 Inflation and unem ployment
We see from (96) that the aggregate wage level is increasing in N , but, given the number of wage-setters, 
is decreasing in 055. The former result is due to a straightforward internalisation effect - the more wage- 
setters there are, the less each takes into account its effect on the average wage, and the higher each sets 
its own wage.
That wages are decreasing in conservatism is due to the particular reduced-form taken by the coalition 
objective function (8 8 ). It is increasing in the nominal wage ratio (W{/w) and decreasing in the aggregate 
wage (w /p ). For a given increase in its own wage w^, coalition i gains from an increase in its relative wage 
(Wi/w), but incurs an aggregate wage cost via the associated increase in (w/p). The more conservative 
the central bank, the higher will be this aggregate wage cost, as increases in the aggregate nominal wage w 
will be met by less accommodating increases in p ; wage-setters will moderate their actions accordingly56. 
Figure 9 shows how the aggregate real wage varies with conservatism and with decentralisation of wage- 
setting.
Average union welfare, as measured by (8 6 ), and employment are both therefore increasing in central 
bank conservatism and decreasing in the decentralisation of wage bargaining. The inflation rate is 
obtained as:
7r* =  i  [logu; — logp] (98)
=  7  log 32 / » r  -  \  /  1 + 0P U N - 1 )
2 log P0 +  log ( N - l )  +
(99)
1
( 1  +  0)J (100)
55Specifically, =  /?§ ( ^ )  >  0 and =  - 0 1  <  0 .
56This is similar to the ‘competition-induced strategic non-neutrality’ in Cukierman and Lippi (1999a), but one that
works in the opposite direction.
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Inflation is therefore decreasing in conservatism and increasing in decentralisation57; see Figure 10.
It seems, then, that central bank conservatism is unambiguously beneficial, given the structure of 
the labour market - greater conservatism results in lower inflation, lower aggregate wages and higher 
employment. A more decentralised wage-setting structure, on the other hand, leads to higher inflation, 
higher aggregate wages and lower employment58.
What about disaggregate union welfare? Using (97) and (96) to solve for the equilibrium value of the 
objective function for each coalition, we see that the welfare of each coalition is decreasing in its size:
n? = /?o ± - ( 2 + i )(*-!) (101)
A relatively small coalition is able to increase its own wage without too much effect on aggregate 
labour demand. However, each coalition’s welfare is also decreasing in the total number of coalitions. 
This is due to the internalisation effect: many coalitions means high aggregate wages, which means low 
aggregate demand. This tension between wanting to be as small a coalition as possible, but not wanting 
the number of coalitions to be too high, will be crucial in the next section, where the coalitional structure 
of wage-bargaining is endogenised.
3.4 Endogenous labour market structure
3.4.1 Stable coalition structures
Game theorists have thought about the endogenous formation of coalitions since the field’s inception. 
Much work, however, focuses not on the actual process of formation. Instead, it seeks to identify the 
classes of ‘stable’ coalition structures - those that, once formed, are immune to defection and will not 
disintegrate. This of course requires an operative concept of stability. In a game like the one here, the 
formation or disintegration of a coalition imposes externalities on members of other coalitions; agents’ 
payoffs are affected not just by the nature of the coalitions of which they are members, but by the
57 P r e c i s e l y , =  [0(./V — 1)] 1 >  0 , while
=  -<T2 [ lo g t f& N  -  J) ( i t s )) +  j l j ]  < 0.
58 Again, it should be emphasised that the model here does not capture any com petitive effects associated with extreme
decentralisation.
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entire coalition structure59. Consideration of stability thus necessitates a specification of the reaction of 
external players to any defections. Kurz (1988) delineates five concepts of stability applicable in games 
with externalities; these range from core stability, where external players act as if to maximise the payoffs 
of deviating players, to a  stability, where external players minimise the payoffs of any defectors. That 
used here is that 5-stability, in which coalitions untouched by defections remain intact, and members of 
coalitions from which others have defected remain together, forming smaller coalitions60,61.
Formally, a coalition structure C  is a partition of the player set P. Each player Pj will here correspond 
to a labour union. Each coalition C{ is a non-empty subset of players, with Ci fl Ch = 0 for i ^  h, and 
IJ^Lj Ci = P. The set of all coalition structures is \P. For any subset K  of P , the set of partitions on 
K  is denoted , with typical member Ck - Denote by Uj (C) the payoff obtained by player Pj if the 
coalition structure C  is formed.
D efin ition  6  A coalition structure C' is 6-stable if  there does not exist a group of players K  and a 
partition on K  such that, Vi E K , Uj ( c 'k U > uj (C1).
The classes of coalition structures that are stable under this stability concept, with payoffs according
to the monetary policy game above, will be presented below, after non-cooperative games of coalition
59Recall that each union’s payoff depends not only on the size of its coalition but also on the total number of coalitions.
60 As such, 5-stability assumes either that non-deviators will not react to  any deviations, or that they will and deviators are
myopic. This is obviously unattractive. However, the expected reactions of non-deviators implied by the other cooperative 
stability concepts are at least equally unsatisfactory. Myopia or inertia may be more acceptable than, say, assuming
non-deviators act to punish deviators, no matter the cost to themselves.
61 The other two stability criteria suggested by Hart and Kurz are as follows. Under 7  stability, coalitions which are left
by some members dissolve. Under (3 stability, a group K  of players deviates if, for any possible reaction of the external 
players, there exists a partition of K  such that all members of K  are better off in the new coalition structure. Note that this 
is different to a-stability, under which players deviate if there exists a partition of K  such that, for any possible reaction 
of the external players, all members of K  are better off. Denote, for any mapping u from coalition structures to  payoffs, 
the sets of core stable, 7  stable, 8 stable, /? stable and a  stable structures by A c(u) ,  Ar({u) ,  A 6(u) ,  A /?(it) and A a ( u )  
respectively. Bloch (1996) provides the following result:
Vu, A c (u ) C (A 7  (u ) U A 6 (u)) C A/3 (it) C A a  (u) .
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formation are reviewed.
3.4.2 N on-coopera tive  coalition  fo rm ation  w ith  ex te rn alitie s
Non-cooperative theories of coalition formation focus on the actual process by which coalitions are formed, 
rather than their subsequent stability. There has been considerable attention paid to such models in 
recent years, with particular focus on games where the formation of a coalition imposes externalities on 
non-members. Models presented by Bloch (1996), Ray and Vohra (1998) and Yi and Shin (1995) deal 
with such games, and share a common, two-stage structure62. In the first stage, agents form coalitions 
with one another, while in the second they play a non-cooperative game, with payoffs dependent on the 
coalition structure determined initially. The models differ in the rules they propose for the first-stage 
coalition formation process. Bloch requires that a coalition forms if and only if all potential members 
agree to form the coalition; Ray and Vohra consider an ‘equilibrium binding agreements’ rule, under 
the condition that coalitions may break up into smaller subcoalitions only; and Yi and Shin allow non- 
members to join a coalition without the permission of members. The model used here is that used in
Bloch (1996), as the unanimity rule seems most intuitive and appropriate.
The formal structure of the coalition formation game is laid out below.
C oalitional u nan im ity  w ith  infinite horizons The coalition formation process in Bloch’s game is
as follows. Formally, let there be q identical players. In the first stage of the game, these players form 
coalitions. In the second, they engage in a non-cooperative game of the type set out in this paper, 
given the coalition structure determined initially. The payoffs from this second-stage game are assumed 
to be shared equally among the members of each coalition - there are no side payments. The players 
are labelled P i,P 2 ,...,P q, according to an exogenous rule of order R; this rule of order determines the 
sequence in which players will move in the coalition formation game. Finally, it is assumed that players 
do not discount the future.
The coalition formation game proceeds as follows. Player Pq starts the game by proposing the
62 See Yi (1997) for a comparison of these three games.
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formation of a coalition to which she belongs, e.g {Pq, P2 4 , Pis,Pis}- Then, the player in the proposed 
coalition with the highest index, apart from Pq (here, P2 4 ), accepts or rejects the proposal. If P24  
accepts, it is then Pis’s turn to accept or reject, and the process goes on until either all potential 
members have accepted, or the first person rejects it. If a player rejects the proposed coalition, the 
proposal is immediately thrown out, and the player who rejects it starts the process again by proposing 
a coalition. If all potential members accept the coalition, then the coalition is formed and the process is 
repeated with the remaining players in P, again starting with the player with the highest index. Once a 
coalition is formed, it cannot dissolve, admit new members or merge with any other coalition.
Bloch (1996) focuses on stationaxy subgame perfect equilibrium strategies. He shows that, where play­
ers are ex ante identical, the infinite-horizon Coalition Unanimity game results in the same equilibrium 
coalition structure as the following “Size Announcement” game63.
D efin ition  7 The S ize  A n n o u n cem en t game. Again, the players move according to the exogenous 
rule of order R. Pq simply chooses the size of her coalition, s(q), and players {Pq, Pq~ \ , ..., Pq- a+1} form  
such a coalition. Then, player Pq_a(q) announces a coalition size s(q — s(q)), and the next s(q — s(q)) 
players form such a coalition. This continues until player P\ is reached. The equilibrium coalition 
structure of such a game is generically unique.
This Size Announcement game provides a relatively straightforward method for obtaining the subgame- 
perfect equilibrium coalition structure in the formal coalition unanimity game. Player Pq has first-mover 
advantage, and will choose her coalition size to maximise her payoff, given the strategies of the other 
players in the game. This technique will be used to solve for the equilibrium pattern of alliances between 
labour unions, prior to the monetary policy game.
3.4.3 E quilibrium  coalition  s tru c tu re  and  cen tra l b an k  conservatism
Before solving for the equilibrium coalition structure, the appropriate payoff function Uj (C) must be 
agreed upon. We saw in (101) that the equilibrium payoff for the members of a coalition C* from the
63 Strictly speaking, equivalence between the two games requires that, in the Size Announcement game, players’ payoffs 
are decreasing in the order that coalitions are formed. This will be true here.
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monetary policy game is decreasing in both the size of the coalition, a* =  and in the number of 
coalitions. All that is necessary for the coalition formation game is the relative weight placed upon these 
two arguments. Using (101), and in a slight abuse of notation, we may therefore write the payoff as 
follows:
u jiC ) = uj (ni-c ,N c ) = f a ' ( l ' i (102) 
=  + <103>
where n>'c  is the number of members in union jf’s coalition under coalition structure C, while N °  is 
the total number of coalitions under C.
Finally, since the monetary policy game is well-defined only if the number of coalitions N  >  2, the 
n  unions are split into v groups of equal size, and coalition formation will be restricted to within each 
group64. Within each group, the unions are labelled {P i,P 2 , ...,Pn}, and play the Size Announcement 
game as detailed above. Note that the fact that the payoff function (103) is linear in N  means each 
group may ignore the result of the Size Announcement game in its counterpart.
First, the equilibrium coalition structure using Bloch’s non-cooperative game.
P ro p o sitio n  8  In the equilibrium of each Size Announcement game, the coalition structure depends on 
both the number of unions n and the degree of central bank conservatism. Denote by m° the highest 
integer such that m° < — , and define m y = m y~1 +  ^ jrry -
•  I f  2 + j} > n'_])_2 , a sin9le ‘grand coalition’ consisting of all ^  unions will form.
•  I f  2 + < n-v - 2  > then multiple coalitions may emerge. The relationship between the number of
coalitions and conservatism is nonlinear, with the precise equilibrium structure characterised as
follows. Consider m z, where ^  — 2^+ r) ^  771,2 — w • players Pm where m  > m z will choose to
remain isolated, starting with P n ; then, Pm* will announce a single unifying coalition, consisting
64 This division is adm ittedly arbitrary, but allows for the formation of ‘grand coalitions’ consisting of all players in the 
respective Size Announcement games. Also, it could be thought of as accommodating a degree of institutional realism 
- there may indeed be unions that are unable to form coalitions with one another, for reasons external to  the model. 
Examples could be the services and manufacturing industries, or the public and private sectors.
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of the remaining m z players. I f  m z — t- , then P& will announce the grand coalition. The number 
of coalitions formed (including those players remaining isolated) will be equal to ^  — m z +  1 . The 
maximum possible number of coalitions will be equal to •
Proof: see chapter appendix.
Corollary 9 I f  the central bank is sufficiently conservative, then wage-bargaining is completely decen­
tralised.
Proof: i f  (2  +  | )  < then by the above proposition multiple coalitions will emerge, and m° = 1. All 
that remains is to ensure that > ■TV \ >  ?  — 1 : this is true i f  6 > — —r.(2+1+o) n v —2(n—v)
To see why conservatism tends to lead to decentralisation of wage-setting, examine (103). The weight 
attached to number of coalitions as opposed to coalition size in determining the payoff of each coalition 
member is increasing in , the degree to which the central bank accommodates nominal wage increases. 
To see in turn why this is the case, we must again go back to the objective function The first argument 
in (8 8 ) is the relative wage (~f)- We can see from (97) that, in equilibrium, the associated payoff to 
‘smallness’ is unaffected by the central bank’s preferences. However, the disutility caused by there being 
many wage-setting groups is decreasing in conservatism.
Intuitively, the existence of multiple wage-setters leads to a collective action problem, whereby in­
dividual wage-setters fail to internalise the aggregate effects of their actions, and are only partially 
restrained in their wage demands by the threat of a higher aggregate real wage. The less conservative 
the central bank, the less effective is even this restraint, as increasing the individual wage will have an 
even lower impact in the aggregate, and the higher will wages be set. Essentially, a more accommodating 
central bank exacerbates the internalisation problem65. When forming coalitions, the labour unions must 
trade off the gains from being small against the harm caused by there being many coalitions; the more 
accommodating the central bank, the greater such harm, and the fewer coalitions formed in equilibrium. 
In contrast, a more conservative central bank means that each union places more weight on being small,
and the number of coalitions formed will increase.
65Note that the internalisation problem remains even when the central bank is infinitely conservative.
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The strategies are summarised in Figure 11, for the case where many coalitions emerge. Figure 12 
shows the results of simulations of the coalition-formation game, for n =  60 and v = 3, G (0,1). We 
see that, while the relationship is not strictly monotonic, high levels of conservatism will tend to result 
in more wage-setters. Figure 13 shows how the aggregate real wage varies with conservatism, allowing 
for the endogeneity of the labour market structure; for comparison, also graphed is the wage when no 
coalition formation is allowed.
The non-monotonicity of the relationship between conservatism and the equilibrium number of coali­
tions stems from a particularity of the coalition formation game, namely the existence of an (ad hoc) 
order rule forcing players to move sequentially. Each player looks forward to the strategies of subsequent 
players, with the crucial statistic being the number of such players that will remain isolated before some 
future player chooses to unify with those remaining. From the point of view of the first player to move, 
greater conservatism has two effects. It will mean that she will tolerate a larger number of immediately 
subsequent players remaining isolated before she decides to announce the grand coalition - this will tend 
to lead to more coalitions (of isolated players) in equilibrium. However, increased conservatism also 
affects the number of subsequent players that choose to remain isolated; for exactly the same reason as 
above, increased conservatism may mean the first subsequent player to announce a unifying coalition 
comes earlier in the sequence. This would tend to lead to fewer coalitions in equilibrium.
That the order rule is ad hoc may be unappealing. Any non-cooperative coalition formation game 
must have rules of some sort, however, and given the symmetry of the players this is perhaps the least 
offensive; changing the order the players moved would not alter the basic equilibrium structure, nor the 
general conclusion that increased conservatism is associated with a more diffuse wage-setting structure. 
The following proposition confirms that a cooperative stability concept affords similar results66.
P ro p o sitio n  10 Given the payoffs described by the monetary policy game above, the only possible 8- 
stable coalition structures are the grand coalition, consisting of all ^  unions, the completely diffuse struc­
ture where all unions are isolated, and the coalition structure consisting of one isolated player and a
66Once more it is assumed that the unions are divided into v  separate groups, with coalitions formed within these groups. 
Potential deviations are similarly restricted.
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single coalition comprising the remaining 7  — 1 players. In particular:
• the grand coalition is 8-stable if  and only i f  9 < — .
• the coalition structure consisting of one isolated player and a single coalition of ^  — 1 players is 
6-stable i f  and only i f  < 9  <
• the diffuse structure is 8-stable if  and only i f  9 >
Proof: see Appendix.
This pattern of coalition structures is summarised in Figure 14. Note that for some values of 9 there 
is no ^-stable structure. This is a shortcoming of the cooperative concept, when compared with the 
non-cooperative game of Bloch.
3.5 The effects of monetary union
The analysis above has some bearing on the likely effects of European monetary union on labour market 
structure and unemployment in the eurozone. Cukierman and Lippi (1999b) consider explicitly the 
effect of a single European monetary authority, using their model examined above. They argue that 
transition to monetary union will tend to make labour unions more aggressive in their wage demands, 
increasing unemployment; in terms of the model of this paper, they see the introduction of the European 
Central Bank as analagous to an increase in N  in (96). Crucially in their analysis, the total number
of labour unions across constituent countries remains fixed. Given that monetary union constitutes a
major shift in the macroeconomic policy regime, one might think this a strong assumption. One may 
expect the architecture of wage coordination across these countries to evolve as a result, either via the 
re-organisation of unions within countries or via the development of alliances across national borders.
Holden (2001) develops this argument, using his model of wage-coordination enforced by trigger 
strategies. His model focuses on two wage-setting regimes: a non-cooperative one where each of his k 
industries (corresponding to the n labour unions here) sets wages in isolation, and one where the industries 
cooperate and each sets the wage that jointly maximises their payoff function. All industries are better
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off in the latter, cooperative regime. However, there is an incentive for an individual union to deviate 
and raise its wages while others are restrained. Should a single industry thus increase its wage demands, 
it will enjoy a one-period increase in its payoff; in subsequent periods the other (A: — 1) industries will do 
likewise, reverting to the non-cooperative equilibrium; this will continue until an exogenous shock shifts 
the economy back to the cooperative regime. Again, while the effect of central bank conservatism is 
ambiguous over certain parameter ranges, his simulations show that the discount rate needed to sustain 
cooperation tends to be lower when monetary policy is accommodating. This conclusion is in the spirit 
of this paper’s results. Holden goes on to argue informally that monetary union, since it increases the 
costs associated with the non-cooperative regime (c/. Cukierman and Lippi), will increase the incentive 
to cooperate67, and therefore that the coming years should see either the formation of cross-border wage- 
bargaining coalitions in the eurozone, or an increase in the degree of coordination within constituent 
countries.
This might seem intuitive. There is perhaps more to be said, though. While monetary union will 
undoubtedly, in Holden’s model, reduce the payoff associated with the non-cooperative equilibrium, it will 
also affect the one-period payoff from deviation; this is ignored in his argument68. His general conclusion 
may be robust to this consideration. However, it is does not necessarily carry over to alternative theories 
of wage coordination. In terms of the model of this paper, consider an increase in n, the number of 
labour unions, as a crude way to proxy the effect of a single currency area; say the number of unions 
rises to Qn, where Q is the number of eurozone countries, assumed of equal ‘size’. Suppose there is no 
change in 9. As for v, the number of arbitrarily distinct wage-setting groups, suppose it neither falls nor 
rises more than proportionately with n; denote by vb its value prior to monetary union (i.e. within each 
country) and va > vb the number following the introduction of the single currency (i.e. across the whole
eurozone)69. What will be the consequences for the equilibrium coalition structure?
67 More precisely, it will reduce the discount rate necessary to sustain cooperation.
68 Holden does not derive the optimal deviation strategy, but assumes that a defecting industry union raises wages by an
arbitrary amount, compared to the cooperative equilibrium.
69That v  will not rise more than proportionately with n  seems plausible, since two extremes may be reasonably considered.
Should idiosyncracies in local bargaining conditions rule out cross-border alliances, to and v  should rise proportionately,
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First consider Bloch’s non-cooperative model, with (2 +  | )  >  n  — vb. Prior to monetary union, in 
each Size Announcement game the grand coalition will be formed, and the total number of wage-setting 
coalitions across the Q countries will be equal to N EUb = Qvb. Under a single currency, should (2 +  >
Qn — va then the grand coalition will once again be announced in each of the va Size Announcement 
games, and the number of wage-setting coalitions across countries will be equal to N EUa = va, potentially 
less than the Qvb such coalitions before the single currency. Should (2 +  | )  < Qn — va, however, then 
there may be multiple coalitions announced in each of the va games. Suppose that in each of these games 
the maximum possible number of coalitions results: the total number of coalitions across the eurozone 
will then be equal to N EUa =  (2+1 ) ' conditi°n f°r monetary union to have actually increased the 
total number of wage-setters, i.e. for N EUa > N EUb, is then that (2+^) > con<^fi°n is consistent
with all the previous assumptions. Figure 15 shows the results of simulations of N EUa and N EUh, with 
n =  60, vb =  3, Q = 10 and va € {3,6,15}. Even when it is assumed that va = vb =  3, we see that the 
coalition structure under a single currency is almost identical to that with many monetary authorities; 
where the number of exogenous divisions is allowed to increase by reasonable amounts (bearing in mind 
that the number of countries has risen ten-fold), the structure is considerably more diffuse under a single 
currency, at least at lower levels of conservatism70.
That monetary union does not necessarily lead to an increase in coordination, and may even accelerate 
fragmentation of the wage-bargaining structure, is thanks to the increased payoff from being small. This 
is perhaps analagous to the incentive to deviate in Holden’s model. Examining (101), one sees that a 
coalition of a given size (that is, consisting of a given number of labour unions) receives a higher payoff, 
the more unions there are in the game overall, since this reduces ai = ^ .  Under the cooperative stability 
concept, this will lead to a greater incentive for a given labour union to defect, holding constant the 
number of coalitions in the structure. The intuition for the non-cooperative result is similar. From the 
perspective of a single labour group, while monetary union may increase the loss associated with nobody
and one would expect v a =  Q v b. If instead unions are divided along industry lines, and unions from the same industry but
different countries are able to bargain jointly, then one would expect v a — v b.
70Similar results obtain if the cooperative concept of 6-stability is used.
forming alliances, it increases the payoff associated with retaining wage-setting autonomy while other 
labour groups coordinate.
Of course, the models of coalition structure here are highly stylised, and to suggest their predictions for 
labour market structure following monetary union are robust would be egregious. It seems reasonable to 
conclude that there are forces working in each direction, towards either fragmentation or consolidation of 
wage-setting structures post-EMU. However, it is not enough to directly compare a regime with complete 
coordination to one where there is none at all. One must examine the incentives of individual unions to 
engage in such coordination, the effects of monetary union upon which are not a priori obvious.
3.6 Concluding remarks
In the model presented, for a given labour market structure, increasing central bank conservatism is 
unambiguously good for the economy, resulting as it does in lower inflation and higher employment. 
However, increasing conservatism tends to result in decentralisation of wage-setting, associated with 
lower employment. It was argued that the gradual decentralisation of wage bargaining in developed 
economies was a result of the concurrent shift towards more anti-inflationary macroeconomic policy 
regimes. It was also shown that, once the effect of monetary regime on labour market structure is taken 
into account, an employment-maximising central banker is one that indeed attaches some weight to real 
variables.
The work here is relevant for the debate on the macroeconomic implications of monetary union. 
One might expect the architecture of wage coordination across eurozone countries to evolve as a result. 
However, it was argued that the nature of any such evolution is not a priori clear, and that EMU could 
even accelerate the observed fragmentation of bargaining systems.
There are obvious extensions. The model is restrictive in its treatment of labour demand, in that the 
workforces of different unions are assumed not to be close substitutes. It would be interesting to see how 
the equilibrium coalition structure in the labour market varied with the substitutability of labour.
There was no direct role played here by the union federations, the umbrella organisations which are 
responsible for bargaining in highly centralised systems; in the model, they are chimeric entities, assumed
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to maximise the welfare of their constituent unions. In reality these federations are distinct bodies, 
with separate administrations, personnel and perhaps separate goals. It was noted that in Germany 
the federations were against decentralisation of wage-setting, despite their constituent unions being in 
favour. There are at least two competing explanations for this. The first is that the federations were 
simply trying to retain a degree of influence that would be diminished, were wage-setting responsibilities 
devolved to individual unions - they were not maximising the welfare of their constituents, but their 
own. While this is plausible, there is a second argument more in keeping with the spirit of this paper. 
In the language of the model laid out above, the incentive for the individual union to break away from 
the parent federation is that it will be able to free-ride on the wage restraint shown by the remaining 
unions. However, if a sufficient number do this, then little wage restraint will be shown and most will be 
worse off. Institutionalised coordination of wage-bargaining, for example via the establishment of a union 
federation, may be seen as an attempt to solve this collective action problem. The federation not only 
sets wages on behalf of its constituents, but actively tries to prevent individual ‘defections’ and keep the 
coalition intact. It monitors the behaviour of the member unions for wage increases over and above those 
agreed centrally, and punishes such deviations. This is in contrast to the procedure in this paper, whereby 
the individual unions are free to form what coalitions they choose, subject to the rule of order. The fact 
that Germany has managed to retain a relatively high degree of wage coordination and pursue anti- 
inflationary monetary policies is, in this light, testament to the success of the centralised institutions in 
maintaining consensus in the face of pressures for decentralisation from constituents (although, as noted, 
there has been some informal decentralisation of wage-bargaining). A richer model than that presented 
here would consider the interaction between the unions and their parent federations, in particular the 
ability of the latter to monitor the former for potential defection and subsequently enforce punishment, 
as in Holden (2001). The credibility of any threat of punishment is key here. The individual incentives 
to free-ride on the wage restraint of other unions were shown to be crucial in this paper; presumably 
similar incentives, namely to free-ride on any credible punishment commitments by others, would exist 
in this putative model.
The results here have a bearing on existing empirical work. The literature purporting to show the
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‘neutrality’ of increased conservatism, that lower inflation can be achieved at no real economic cost, tends 
not to include additional institutional variables. It may be that the neutrality result is in some sense 
spurious - greater central bank conservatism may indeed affect real output and unemployment, but this 
result may be offset by the indirect impact on labour market structure.
Finally, more empirical work needs to be done on the links between increased conservatism and 
the observed decentralisation in wage bargaining over the last twenty years. Did the former induce the 
latter, or vice versa? Alternatively, of course, they may share a  common cause. In truth, the relationship 
between macroeconomic policy and labour market structure is likely to be characterised by considerable 
feedback, with causality running in both directions. Separating these effects from notionally ‘external’ 
influences will not be easy. This paper constitutes a first attempt at formally modelling this causal 
relationship. This seems a topic that merits further attention, theoretical as well as empirical.
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3.7 Appendix
3.7.1 P roofs
P ro p o s itio n  8  The proof will be concerned with one of the v Size Announcement games, taking the 
result of the others as given. Denote by T  the total number of coalitions formed in the other games, 
and let 7  =  2 +  Also, assume that, if a player is indifferent between choices of coalition size, she will 
choose the smaller.
The proof consists of three stages:
(1) Consider the optimal strategy of player Pm, where m  > 2, given that it is her turn to announce a 
coalition size s(m). Bear in mind that there are m  players remaining in the game when it is Pm’s turn 
to move. Assume that the strategy of the next player according to the order rule R  is to form a single 
coalition with all the remaining players, i.e. s(m  — 1) =  m — 1. It is immediately clear that Pm will 
not announce any s(m) such that 1 <  s(m) < m; the best that could be hoped for then would be for 
the remaining players to coalesce into a single coalition, but even this is strictly dominated by remaining 
isolated and allowing Pm- i  to move. Player Pm will therefore choose either to remain isolated or to form
a single coalition consisting of all m  remaining players. The possible payoffs to player Pm are thus:
T(.,.) =  n — 'y(T + K  + 2) if s(m) — m  (104)
r ( ., .)  =  — - j ( T  + K  + l) if s(m) = m, (105)771
where K  is the number of coalitions formed so far in this game. It is straightforward to obtain the 
following condition, under which remaining isolated dominates uniting with the remaining players:
T(1,T + K  + 2) > F (m ,T  + K  + 1) (106)
> —----- . (107)
77 — 7
Note that both the number of coalitions formed in the other size announcement game and the number 
formed hereto in the current game are irrelevant for Pm’s decision. Assume (77—7 ) > v, and denote by 777° 
the highest integer such that m° < ^3 .^ By induction on 771 =  2, where by definition s(m  — 1) =  777 — 1,
we may use (107) to see that all players Pm such that m < m° will choose to unite with the remaining
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players; the optimal strategy of Pm°+i is to remain isolated. If (n — 7 ) < v, all ^  players will choose to 
unite with the remaining players, and the result will be a single grand coalition.
(2) Assume (n — 7 ) > v. Consider players Pm> and Pm, where ^3  ^ < m! +  1 < m. Assume the 
following:
• P m 's strategy is always to unite with all remaining players, i.e. s(ra') = m!\ as a result, player 
Pm'+i will remain isolated, by the previous step, since ^3  ^ < m! +  1 ;
•  if player Pm announces s(m) <  (m — m'), then the next (m — m ' — s(m)) players choose to remain 
isolated (i.e. s(.) =  1), and then player Pm> announces s(m ') =  m!.
W hat is player Pm’s optimal strategy? It cannot be optimal to announce s(m) such that m  > s(m) > 
(m — m/), by the same logic as in the first part of the proof. So, the optimal strategy must involve either 
s(m) = m  or s(m) < (m — m '). Consider the payoff from the latter, given the strategies of the remaining 
players as outlined above:
T (.,.) =  —7—t  — 1 (T  + K + 2 + [m — m ' — s(m)]) if s(m) < (m — m!). (108)s(m)
What is the optimal coalition size over this range? Differentiating (108) by the choice of coalition size, 
we have:
(109)os{m) s(m )z
(n °)os (m y  s(m )6
and so we see an internal choice cannot be optimal - player Pm will announce either s(m ) =  1 or 
s(m) = m'. There are thus three options overall:
r ( ., .)  =  n — 7  [T +  K  +  (m — m') +  1] if s(m) =  1 (H I)
r ( . , .)  -  . n - j [ T  + K  + 2] if s(m) =  (771- 771') (112)(m — m )
T(.,.) -  — - i l T  + K  + l] if s(tti) =  777. (113)771
It will now be shown that s(m) = (m  — m') cannot be optimal. First, observe that, for choosing a
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coalition of size 1 to be better than choosing one of size (m — m'), it must be the case that:
r(l,T  +  K  +  (m -  m!) +  1) > T((m - m ' ) , T  + K  + 2 ) (114)
71
n  -  7 (m -  m!) > — — —  -  7  (115)ym — m  )
((m — m') — l)(n  — 7(772 — m')) > 0  (116)
n
-7T ^ 7- (117)[m — m )
Similarly, for s(m) = (m — m!) to be a better choice than s(m) =  m, we must have:
r((m — m ') ,T  + K  + 2) > T (m ,T  + K  + \) (118)
, ^ > 1  +  - -  (H9)(m — m )  m
Comparing (117) and (119), we see that whenever the choice of (m  — m ') as coalition size dom inates
that of m, it must be the case that remaining isolated is still better. The optimal coalition strategy
is therefore either to remain isolated or to form a coalition with all the remaining players. Now, for 
s(m) = 1 to be optimal we must have that:
T(1 ,T  + K  + ( m - m ? )  + 1) > T (m ,T  + K  + l) (120)
n — — — 7  (m — m!) > 0  (121)m
—nr? +  ^m ' +  —^  m  — — =  Q(m) > 0. (122)
This quadratic Q(.) has a negative second derivative: =  —2m +(m / +  ^ L), 9 =  —2. The lowest
root of Q(.), immediately above which the function is positive, is lower than m!. We may thus confine
our attention to the higher root, for all m  below which it will be optimal for Pm to remain isolated. For
simplicity, and to avoid integer problems, assume that ^ is an integer. Then, given that:
Q ^m ' +  — — 1^ = m ! — 1 > 0 (123)
and
Q ( m ' + 7 ) =  “ 7 < ° ’ (124)
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it must be the case that Pm will remain isolated as long as m  <  m ' +  If m > m ' -f then Pm 
will announce s(m) = m  and form a single coalition with the remaining players. So, by induction on 
m  = m! +  2, we have the following: all players Pm such that m ' - f l  < m  < m ' + ^  — 1 will choose 
to remain isolated; player Pm,+^ will announce s(m ' + ^ )  = m ' + I f ^ < 2 ,  then player Pm/+2 will
announce s(m ' +  2 ) =  vn! + 2 .
(3) From the preceding steps we may construct the equilibrium coalition structure.
• From step 1 we have that, if (n — 7 ) <  v, it will entail a single grand coalition.
• Assume (n — 7 ) > v. Define m v = m v~l +  Consider player Pmo, whose strategy is to announce 
a single unifying coalition. From step 2, the preceding — 1) players will choose to remain 
isolated, and player Pm 1 will choose to unite with all those remaining. Again, the preceding — 1) 
players will choose to remain isolated, and Pm2 will announce a unifying coalition. This cycling 
will continue until player Pm*, where § — ^ < mZ <  She will announce s(m z) =  m z, while the 
preceding ^  — m z players will choose to remain isolated. The total number of coalitions formed 
will be equal to ^  — m z +  1. The maximum possible number of coalitions will be equal to
(4) In terms of 9, these strategies result in the coalition structures outlined in Proposition 8 .
QED.
P ro p o sitio n  10 The proof will be concerned with the class of coalition structures that are 6-stable. 
Recall that attention is confined, as above, to v distinct groups of players, with coalitions only possible 
within these groups71. Again, assume that, if a player is indifferent between choices of coalition size, she 
will choose the smaller.
(1) Consider a coalition structure C, comprising k > 2 coalitions. Consider further a defection by
all the members of two of these coalitions, of size s* and Sj, whereby a new coalition of size (s* +  Sj)
is formed. For none of the defectors to be better off, given the preference structure, it is necessary and
71 Also, it is assumed that defections within any particular group do not cause defections in other groups; this is consistent 
with the 5-stability concept.
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sufficient that defectors from the smaller of the two coalitions are no better off. Assuming s* > Sj, this 
requires:
— — 7 (T +  fc) > —   7 (T +  Jt-X) (125)Sj S{ “I- Sj
<£=>■ (si +  Sj) n — j ( s i  + sj) Sj > Sjn (126)
<=>2 > ;  + |  (127)
where T  is the number of coalitions formed in the other (v — 1) groups. From (127) it follows that 
there is only room for one coalition of size greater than n f  7  in any 6-stable structure.
(2) Consider a coalition of size Si in a coalition structure C. A possible defection is for the members 
of this coalition to form q smaller coalitions of equal size72. For such a defection to be unprofitable, one 
needs:
— —/y ( T  + k ) >  —  —^ ( T  + k + q —1) (128)S{ Si
< = * (0 -  1)7 >  (9 -  1 )— (129)Si
<=$>Si > (130)
7
In other words, any coalition (consisting of more than one player) of size Si < n / 7  cannot be part of 
a 6-stable structure.
(3) Combining steps (1) and (2), it is clear that there are only three possible types of core stable 
structure:
• the grand coalition comprising all n /v  players;
•  structures with one coalition of size greater than n /7 , and the rest of the players isolated;
•  the completely diffuse structure, with all players isolated.
These will be examined in turn.
!Integer problems are once again ignored.
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(i) The grand coalition is 5-stable if and only if it is immune to defection by a single player, since this 
is the most profitable deviation possible. This entails:
 7  (T +  1) > n — 7  (T +  2) (131)n /v
<=$■ 7  >  n — v. (132)
(ii) Consider now a coalition structure comprising one coalition of size with the remaining
(k — 1 ) players isolated. Consider a defection by a single player from the large coalition. For this not to 
be worthwhile:
— ~ ' y ( T  + k ) > n - - r ( T  + k  + l)  (133)
Sb
<=>• — > n — 7  (134)
Sb
«=> -  < 1 +  — < 2. (135)
7  sb — 1
But, from (127) above, if ^  < 2 the maximum number of isolated in any 5-stable coalition structure 
is one. So, the only possible 5-stable structure (of this type) is now that consisting of only one isolated 
player, with the remaining players forming a single coalition. This is stable if (135) is satisfied (since
if defection by a single player from the large coalition is unprofitable, so will be defection by multiple
players) and if the single isolated player is no better joining the larger coalition (if she were better off, 
so would be the original coalition members). This latter condition requires that:
7177
n — 7  (T +  2 ) >  7 CT +  1) (136)n
7  < n — v. (137)
So, combining (135) and (137), the coalition structure with one isolated and the rest in a single 
coalition is 5-stable if and only if:
i 1- — )\  n — v jn i l ----------- ) < 7  < n  — v. (138)
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(iii) Consider the completely diffuse coalition structure, with all players isolated. The ‘best’ defection 
is that by all players at once (thus eliminating as many coalitions as possible), where q larger coalitions 
of equal size axe formed (since it is the size of the largest coalition formed that provides the incentive 
compatibility constraint). The diffuse structure is therefore 6-stable if and only if:
n_ 7 (r + ^ ) > ^ _7(r+9) (139)\ v /  n
Tl<=^ n — 7 — > q (v — 7 ) (140)v
^  0 _ ? ) ( 1 _ v ) - °  (141)
**=> v > 7 , (142)
since necessarily ^  >  q.
(4) Cast in terms of 0, the conditions in (3) above provide Proposition 10.
QED.
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3.7.2 Figures
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Figure 9.1 - number of wage-setting coalitions, N , and the average real wage
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Figure 9.2 - central bank conservatism and the average real wage, given the labour market structure
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Figure 10.1 - number of wage-setting coalitions, N, and inflation
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Figure 10.2 - central bank conservatism and inflation, given the labour market structure
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Figure 11 - strategies in the Size Announcement Game
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Figure 12 - number of wage-setting coalitions: results of simulations of Size Announcement game;
n =  60, v =  3.
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Figure 13 - aggregate real wage, with and without coalition formation; n =  60, v =  3. The upper 
contour formed by the dashed line is the aggregate real wage in absence of any coalition formation, i.e. 
with N  =  n = 60. The solid line shows the wage with endogenous labour market structure.
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4 The N A IR U  and the Spatial Unem ploym ent D istribution
4.1 Introduction
A noted feature of the GB economy over the last few decades has been the apparent ‘North-South 
divide’, with much popular debate centred on the apparent imbalance between a low-unemployment, 
service-based economy in the South and a high-unemployment, manufacturing-based North. Despite 
such regional unemployment differentials, much macroeconomic policy must be formulated at a more 
aggregate level. Witness the statement in October 1998 by the Governor of the Bank of England, on the 
topic of unemployment in the North-East of England:
“In response to a journalist’s suggestion that regional unemployment was ‘an acceptable price 
to pay’, I made it clear - as I have very often before - that monetary policy can only target the 
situation in the economy as a whole, not particular regions or sectors, however uncomfortable 
that reality might be.”73
While it is true that the Bank of England can set only one interest rate for the aggregate economy, it 
does not necessarily follow that only aggregate information, such as the national level of unemployment, 
need be considered when choosing this rate. There are sound theoretical (and, it is argued below, perhaps 
empirical) grounds for believing that information on the spatial distribution of unemployment is pertinent 
when assessing the degree of inflationary pressure in the economy. Specifically, this paper investigates 
the effect of geographical unemployment dispersion on the aggregate NAIRU. As emphasised recently by 
James Tobin, the NAIRU should be distinguished from the natural rate of unemployment:
“NAIRU and NATURAL RATE are not synonymous. NAIRU is a macro outcome of an econ­
omy with many labour markets in diverse states of excess demand and excess supply. NAIRU 
represents an overall balance between the inflation-increasing pressures from excess-demand 
markets and the inflation-decreasing pressures from excess-supply markets. The natural rate,
as described by Friedman, is a feature of Walrasian market-clearing general equilibrium....The
73Taken from the Daily Telegraph, Thursday 22 October 1998.
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determinants of the two are theoretically different, and so are their implications for policy.” 
(Tobin (1997)).
So, the NAIRU, properly considered in a multiregional framework, is that aggregate level of un­
employment consistent with the absence of inflationary or deflationary pressure, given individual local 
labour markets in varying states of excess demand and supply74. As made more precise below, differ­
ent distributions of unemployment across these regions may lead to different aggregate NAIRU; one is 
aggregating over probably heterogeneous, possibly nonlinear regional Phillips curves. It may be that 
these are idiosyncratic across regions, with those in low-unemployment regions being relatively steep; 
any given increases in unemployment in these regions may be accompanied by greater unemployment 
reductions in regions with relatively shallow Phillips curves, with no increase in aggregate inflationary 
pressure. A situation where regions have identical, convex Phillips curves is also consistent with this 
‘Aggregation Hypothesis’. In both cases, a reduction in unemployment dispersion across regions would 
lessen inflationary pressure for a given aggregate unemployment rate; in other words, it would reduce 
the NAIRU.
This paper provides a simple model, based on a generalisation of the Shapiro-Stiglitz (1984) shirking 
model, which generates a convex Phillips curve for each region, the shape of which is dependent on 
the monitoring technology available to individual firms. Aggregate Phillips curve equations are then 
estimated, with statistics on the spatial unemployment distribution included.
Section 4.2 below reviews the basic facts concerning the evolution of the regional and subregional 
unemployment distributions since 1965, and briefly considers other work on the time path of the GB 
NAIRU. Section 4.3 considers the appropriate distributional statistics to include in aggregate Phiflips- 
curve equations. Section 4.4 outlines the theoretical model. Section 4.5 reviews the empirical literature 
on the relation between the unemployment distribution and aggregate inflationary pressure. Section 4.6
presents estimation results. Section 4.7 concludes.
74 In this paper an excess-demand (-supply) region will simply be one where the rate of unemployment is below (above) 
that region’s natural rate.
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4.2 GB unemployment, 1966-1996
4.2.1 (Sub)Regional unem ployment differentials
As detailed in Figure 15, using annualised data, significant disparities in regional unemployment rates 
have been present since at least the middle of the 1960s75. Scotland, Wales and the Northern region 
have experienced especially high unemployment all through the sample period, in particular at the start; 
the North-West, Yorkshire and Humberside and the South-West have also tended to have relatively high 
unemployment rates; East Anglia began the period with unemployment rates of nearly 150% of the 
national average, but has seen its fortunes improve since then; the two Midlands regions have remained 
close to the national average, with some evidence of a gradual increase in relative unemployment; and 
finally, the South-East76 consistently outperformed the rest of the country until the recession of the early 
1990s. Figure 16 shows the path of the GB unemployment rate.
W ithin this context of substantial, reasonably persistent relative regional unemployment differentials, 
the absolute level of unemployment dispersion across space has varied considerably over time. Figure 17 
graphs the evolution of the standard deviations of the regional and subregional unemployment distribu­
tions; it can be seen that these rose dramatically in the 1980s. In the 1990s, the standard deviation of the 
regional unemployment distribution settled down to a level around that attained in the 1960s and 1970s, 
while that of the subregional distribution remained somewhat higher. Finally, even within individual 
regions there is considerable variation in the unemployment rates of the constituent subregions, as shown 
in Figure 18.
4.2.2 The UK  N A IR U
Coulton and Cromb (1994) review eleven empirical studies of the UK NAIRU77. The range and average 
NAIRU estimate for these studies are detailed in Table 1. We see that, while there is considerable 
uncertainty as to its exact level, the NAIRU seems to have risen over the 1970s and much of the 1980s,
75 See the chapter appendix for details of all data sources.
76Note that this includes London.
77Note that Coulton and Cromb’s study refers to the UK NAIRU. Since no subregional unemployment data were available 
for Northern Ireland, this chapter focuses solely on Great Britain.
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with evidence of a decline towards the end of the decade. Coulton and Cromb conclude, from their 
review of the available evidence, that the reasons for this rise are not fully understood. They are likely, 
they say, to include increased union power, a more generous unemployment benefit system, real wage 
resistance arising from higher taxes and a deceleration in the productivity trend. The subsequent fall in 
the NAIRU is likely to be related to supply-side changes such as a reduction in union power, lower taxes 
and benefit system reforms, Coulton and Cromb argue. Hysteresis in the form of increased long-term 
unemployment also seems to be have played a role in the 1980s, they add.
4.3 The NAIRU and the spatial distribution of unemployment
The notion that unemployment dispersion may affect the degree of inflationary pressure in the aggregate 
was implicit in the earliest work on the Phillips curve. Following Lipsey (1960), several authors78 con­
sidered the impact of the unemployment distribution on the NAIRU, with particular attention paid to 
the appropriate distributional statistics to include in Phillips-curve-type regressions. One line of research 
focused on the implications of aggregating over many labour and/or product markets, each with its own 
(possibly idiosyncratic and nonlinear) Phillips curve. This strand of the literature is directly antecedent 
to the model of this paper; the theoretical rationale behind this ‘aggregation hypothesis’ is outlined 
immediately below, with a review of earlier empirical work deferred until Section 4.5.
An alternative hypothesis was also developed by these earlier authors. This concerns the existence of
a ‘wage transfer mechanism’, whereby workers in high-unemployment regions demand wages equivalent
to those paid to workers in low-unemployment areas. A reduction in unemployment dispersion would
therefore reduce the NAIRU, assuming it is associated with an increase in unemployment in the ‘leading’
region. The basic analytics of this argument are relegated to an appendix; suffice to say they provide no
dispersion measure that is obviously appropriate for use in estimated equations. Moreover, the plausibility
of this hypothesis is perhaps questionable. Local wage demands may conceivably be (directly) affected
by those in other regions if labour markets are not, geographically, entirely distinct. However, the UK
is noted more for its immobility of labour than the converse, and for the purposes of this paper its
78See for example Thirlwall (1969, 1970), Archibald (1970) and Thomas and Stoney (1971).
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labour market is treated as perfectly segmented79. As such, any wage-transfer mechanism is ignored; the 
possible existence of such a mechanism may be seen as a complementary justification for the empirical 
work later in the paper.
4.3.1 The aggregation hypothesis
In this section a simple model of the Phillips curve is outlined, using the framework set down in Layard, 
Nickell and Jackman (1991)80. Consider a system of n subregions, indexed by *; in each, a large number 
of identical firms face downward-sloping demand curves for their respective outputs and set prices as a 
mark-up on expected marginal costs:
P i  = wf  +  <f>i(ui)  </>'(•) X 0; i =  l , ...,n  (143)
where pi is the (log of the) price level set by each firm, iuf is the (log of the) expected wage paid, <^(.) is 
a  decreasing function and U{ is the subregional unemployment rate. The presence of the unemployment 
rate in the price-setting equation is typically justified by either a cyclically-varying mark-up81 or simply 
diminishing returns to labour. In the latter case, unemployment is proxying for aggregate demand; as 
demand and firms’ output rise, the marginal product of labour falls82.
The price-setting equation is accompanied by a wage equation of the form:
79 Low levels of observed migration are of course compatible with labour mobility. One could envision an efficiency-wage 
model of the type developed in Section 4.4, extended to allow for the interregional movement of workers, that contained 
a ‘no-m igration’ equilibrium with the sort of wage spillovers predicated under the wage-transfer hypothesis. However, the 
absence of significant labour migration in the UK is more likely to be due to  market failures associated with its housing 
market (Evans and McCormick (1994)). Moreover, Pissarides and Wadsworth (1989) find that migration decisions are not
driven by regional unemployment differentials.
80For a general review of the type of model outlined here, see Blanchard and Katz (1997).
81 Here procyclical.
82 Capital stock is held constant in this short-run analysis. In the model developed in Section 4.4 an alternative justification 
is given for the presence of the unemployment term in the price-setting equation, one that does not rely on diminishing 
returns to  labour in the conventional sense.
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™t = Pi + P i M  /*<(■) -< 0; i = l , . . . ,n  (144)
where pf is the (log of the) expected aggregate price level in subregion i and p {(.) is a decreasing 
function. Wage equations such as this may be derived from models of bargaining or shirking (see Layaxd 
et al. for an overview). In the latter case, each firm expects to have to pay its employees enough to 
prevent them from shirking; as unemployment increases, the penalty associated with being detected and 
subsequently fired also increases, as any fired worker faces more competition for jobs. The employer 
need not therefore pay the workers so much. The (expected) price level included is that prevailing in the 
subregion as a whole, as it is the workers’ real consumption wage that matters.
Combining (143) and (144) and aggregating over firms gives us a Phillips curve relationship for each 
subregion:
P i - P i  =  &(“i) + P i M  (145)
=  ffi(ui) «'(.)-< 0; i =  l ,...,n . (146)
The natural rate of unemployment in each subregion, u*, is given implicitly by 0i(u*) = 0. Assuming iden­
tical labour forces across subregions, the natural rate for the aggregate economy is then simply^ u*. 
As emphasised above, however, the concept of the natural rate is rather different from that of the NAIRU. 
To see this, aggregate over subregions to obtain a Phillips curve for the whole economy:
P - P e =  “ 5^0 i(« i) (147)n r—'
2 = 1
where p  is the aggregate price level83. Absence of inflationary or deflationary pressure obtains when 
]CiLi = It should already be clear that the distribution of disaggregate unemployment rates may
83Note that it is being implicitly assumed that subregions have equal weighting when aggregating over prices, and indeed 
expected prices. W ith regard to the latter, it may be sensible to set p? =  pe ,Vi; this is more appropriate if the real 
consumption wage in (144) is based on a bundle of goods drawn from all subregions.
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affect the NAIRU. To see this, take a Taylor Expansion of each 6i(ui) around the aggregate unemployment 
rate u :
P ~ pB ~  n +  ei ' ( u)(ui ~  u) +  \ e'l(u )(uit ~  u)2]- (148)
2 =  1
The precise effect of unemployment dispersion is sensitive to the form of the #*(.) It is instructive to 
consider two particular cases.
C A SE 1: Identical, convex Phillips curves Assume that 0,(.) =  #(.), Vi, where 9"{.) >  0. In that 
case, (6 ) reduces to:
p - p e »  0(u) +  i 0 " ( u ) i ^ ( u i - u )2 (149)
2 = 1
=  9(u) +  ^9"(u).s2 (150)
where s2 is the variance of the subregional unemployment rates. We see that the aggregate NAIRU is
minimised when unemployment dispersion is zero. Alternatively, for a given level of aggregate unem­
ployment, a rise in dispersion increases inflationary pressure (Figure 19). It is important to note that 
the appropriate unemployment dispersion measure to include in any aggregate equation depends on the 
exact form of nonlinearity assumed. Taking a general specification 6(u) =  a  — 7 ^ ,  where 6 -< 1, (8 ) 
becomes:
p - /  =  a - 7 j  +  :| ^ | . » 2 (151)
Under the hypothesis of identical, convex Phillips curves, appropriate dispersion measures will therefore 
consist of the simple variance of subregional unemployment rates, deflated by the aggregate level of 
unemployment raised to some power. Note also that there are joint restrictions implied for the coefficients 
on unemployment and the variance measure.
However, nonlinearity of the disaggregate wage curves is not necessary for the presence of a dispersion 
effect, as will be seen in Case 2.
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CASE 2: H eterogeneous Phillips lines Assume 9i(u{) = fl® — fl}ui, with fl\ < 0, Vi (6) then 
reduces to:
o i 1 n
p - p e ~  fl + 0 1u + - y 2 p 1i ( u i - u )  (152)n  z '  i=i
where fl° = fl° =  J2?=i $  and P* = E iL i Pi ■
So, the appropriate specification is then linear in the aggregate unemployment rate. The effect of 
the summation term on the right-hand-side, though, is ambiguous. Suppose, though, that subregions 
with relatively high unemployment (ie Ui >- u) have relatively flat Phillips curves (ie fl] is relatively 
small). The summation term is then positive and we have the familiar dispersion effect - the presence 
of unemployment dispersion increases wage pressure for a given aggregate unemployment rate84. This 
is seen graphically for the 2-region case in Figure 20. However, the precise form of the appropriate 
dispersion measure in such a case is not clear, in the absence of detailed knowledge of the underlying 
Phillips lines (ie the f lu ’s). If one were to assume, though, that regions retain the same ordering (with 
those with steepest Phillips curves having the lowest unemployment rates) over the economic cycle, then 
simple measures of dispersion such as the standard deviation may prove most useful. Note that, with 
idiosyncratic Phillips lines, a given pattern of unemployment dispersion has identical effects at low and 
high levels of aggregate unemployment. This is in contrast to Case 1 above, where a given degree of 
dispersion has smaller effects at higher aggregate unemployment levels. It is not necessarily true that 
Case 2 can be approximated by using (151) with some arbitrary nonlinear functional form.
In short, while there are theoretical reasons to believe that, given the aggregate unemployment rate, 
unemployment dispersion increases inflationary pressure, there is no clear candidate for the appropriate 
distributional statistic to include in empirical equations. If one believed in the ‘pure’ nonlinear aggre­
gation hypothesis, where subregions have identical, convex Phillips curves (ie Case 1 above), then it is 
possible to obtain such a statistic. However, this seems unlikely in light of the way industrial structures
vary across regions in the UK. Section 4.4 below presents a model where Phillips curves are not only
84Note that the situation is reversed should the high-unemployment region be that with the steeper wage curve - then, 
wage pressure is lower than would be the case with zero unemployment dispersion.
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nonlinear but are likely to be heterogeneous. It is then an empirical matter - are there distributional 
statistics, perhaps ad-hoc, which have predictive content in aggregate Phillips curve equations?
4.4 Shirking with endogenous monitoring intensity
It was shown above how convexity of disaggregate Phillips curves may lead spatial unemployment vari­
ation to affect the NAIRU. It was also argued that possible heterogeneity of these Phillips curves means 
the precise form of dispersion measure to be used in empirical work is unclear, quite apart from the ad­
ditional complications arising from any wage transfer mechanism. This section presents a simple model 
which generates nonlinear wage and price-setting equations, and which also locates a possible source of 
heterogeneity in the ability of firms in different industries to monitor their workers. It should of course 
be emphasised that there are many possible sources of variation in economic structure across regions. 
The aim here is partly to show how heterogeneity is likely to be the rule rather than the exception, partly 
to provide a plausible source for it.
The model is a variant of that of Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984), where workers decide whether or not 
to shirk in the face of imperfect monitoring by their employers. Firms then have an incentive to provide 
a real wage above the workers’ reservation levels, thereby reducing the workers’ incentive to shirk, given 
the increased cost of possible subsequent detection. High levels of unemployment also increase the cost 
of detection, and reduce the wages that firms need offer workers in a no-shirking equilibrium; this then 
generates a wage curve of the form of (144) above.
In the original Shapiro-Stiglitz model a minimum acceptable effort level is set by firms, and is exoge­
nously given. While this is true of much of the shirking literature, many variants of the model endogenise 
the effort choice of firms, so that firms trade off increased effort (and hence productivity) against higher 
wages (increased effort is costly to workers, who therefore require higher wages in order not to be tempted
to shirk)85. The model outlined here treats the minimum acceptable effort level as exogenous, as in the
85See for example Simmons (1991) and Carter (1998). A criticism of this type of model is that an efficient outcom e can 
be attained if workers are forced to post a bond, to  be forfeit if they are caught shirking. Incomplete capital markets are 
one reason this may not be possible.
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original paper, and instead endogenises the monitoring intensity of firms. A firm can increase its de­
tection rate by switching some of its workforce from the task of producing goods to that of monitoring 
fellow workers; however, this comes at the cost of reduced output per worker employed86. A simple and 
intuitive functional form is chosen to relate the probability of shirking workers being detected and fired 
to the proportion of the workforce engaged in monitoring. The firm’s choice of monitoring intensity is 
then shown to be related to the outside unemployment rate in such a way that nonlinearities emerge in 
both the pricing and wage equations.
4.4.1 The m odel
All workers are identical. No longer working in logs, and with subregional subscripts dropped, utility is 
a function of the real wage and effort expended:
WU = - - e  (153)
Let the (exogenous) minimum acceptable effort level of a worker, set by the firm, be denoted by e. If the
effort level of a worker is below e, that worker is detected and fired with probability q(r), where q'(.) >- 0 .
Probability of detection is thus a function of t ,  the proportion of the workforce engaged in monitoring87.
Workers will always choose an effort level equal either to zero or to the minimum acceptable level, ie
e G (0, e). Risk neutral workers maximise their expected lifetime utility, and make their shirking decision
accordingly. For simplicity, income when unemployed is here normalised to zero. It is straightforward to
obtain a no-shirking condition, under which the expected lifetime utility from not shirking exceeds that
86 Carter (1992) provides a model with endogenous monitoring costs with a quite different flavour. In his model, probability
of shirking workers being detected is invariant and exogenous, but effort levels are endogenous. The proportion of total
effort used in monitoring rather than production is then assumed to vary with effort levels in an unspecified manner.
87It is assumed that those workers engaged in monitoring report fellow workers they find to  be shirking, and that they do
not shirk themselves. A possible justification for this is as follows: each monitor is responsible for a team of workers whose
aggregate (although not individual) performance is readily ascertained from the final production statistics; employers are
thus able to costlessly gauge the performance of the monitors. Another way to avoid this problem is to follow Carter (1998)
and assume each member of a team monitors each other member; r  is then the proportion of each worker’s time spent
monitoring.
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from shirking (see, for example, Simmons (1991)):
where k(u) = r + c /u , r  being the discount rate, u the rate of unemployment in the surrounding 
labour market and c the probability of an employee being separated from employment for reasons not 
associated with shirking. Again, note that a high level of unemployment reduces the real wage necessary 
to induce workers not to shirk.
There are many firms, each facing elasticity of demand for their product of a. Each firm’s output is 
a linear function of the effective labour input into production:
y = ae(l — r)l  (155)
where a is a productivity parameter and I is the total amount of labour employed. Capital is sup­
pressed in this model. Firms maximise profit subject to the above technology, the wage bill and the no 
shirking condition. The ordering of events is as follows: at the beginning of the period, firms set prices, 
total employment and the proportion of monitors88; during the period, firms produce output and pay 
wages paid in accordance with the no-shirking condition, given the realised aggregate price level. The 
unemployment rate to which firms refer when paying wages is that prevailing at the start of the period;
it is assumed that the state of the labour market arising from the interaction of firm’s pricing decisions
and aggregate demand is not revealed to workers until the end of the period. The firm’s problem is then:
M axw*A T : Pide(l — t )1 — W el s.t. ^ = * ( 1 +  ^ ) ) -  (156)
From the resulting Lagrangean the following first-order conditions arise:
^  =  Pia e { l - T ) ( ^ P j - W e = 0 (157)
9 1  = - '  +  4 = 0  (158)d W e Pe
| £  =  -Piael  ( ^ — i . )  +  A e ^ 9 '( r )  =  0 (159)
88 Assumed irrevocable. Again, this is consistent with a situation where production is organised into teams, each having a 
single monitor associated with it; reorganisation during the period could then be too costly. This assumption is not central 
to the analysis.
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where A is the associated Lagrange multiplier. From (157) we get the usual result that firms set prices 
as a mark-up on (expected) marginal costs. Combining (158) and (159) we have:
<160>
The LHS represents the increase in revenue (per worker) from a rise in the proportion of workers 
employed in production rather than monitoring, the RHS the associated increase in the expected wage 
bill. Profit maximisation requires that the two be equal. Combining (157) and (160), and using the 
no-shirking condition, we have:
H u) (  t  // \ _  d ( l - r )  W e
q(r) \q (r )  )  d W e ‘( 1 - r )  '
This is the counterpart to the well-known Solow condition from the literature on endogenous effort 
choice, which stipulates that the wage elasticity of effort must equal unity in equilibrium; here it is the 
wage elasticity of (1 — r), the proportion of the workforce that is engaged in production, that must be 
equal to one.
To solve for r  explicitly it is necessary to be more specific with regard to its relation to the probability 
of detection. A simple functional form is chosen:
v(T) =  6 (162)
where 6 is a parameter governing the effectiveness of a firm’s monitoring technology. This could vary 
randomly, according to industrial type or size of workforce, or indeed with the productivity parameter 
a. The above formulation is intuitive: the probability of detection is simply proportional to the ratio of 
monitors to production workers. Using (161) to solve for optimal values of q(r) and therefore r , we have:
q(r*) = y/bk{u) (163)
T* =  =  ( 1 6 4 )
b +  q(r) y/b +  y/k(uj
Recalling that k'(u) -< 0, we see that the optimal proportion of workers engaged in monitoring is 
negatively related to the unemployment rate, as therefore is the probability of detection. Since unem­
ployment acts as a disincentive for workers to shirk, as it rises firms axe able to reallocate resources away
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from monitoring and towards more productive activity. Substituting the solution for r* into the pricing 
decision of the firm, (157) above, we have a price equation with unemployment on the RHS as in Section 
4.3.1:
P i  =  w e — log ae ( )^l +  log 1 + Vi (165)
Using the solution for q (r*) in the no-shirking condition, we also have a nonlinear wage curve:
we = p e +  log e +  log 1 + \ A M
Vb
(166)
P - P - lo g +  2 log 1 +
k(u)
Combining (165) and (166), and aggregating across firms, gives a convex Phillips curve:
•(^)W- lo g 'k(u)T ’
(167)
(168)
with the Taylor Approximation holding for b large enough89. As for the slope of the Phillips curve, 
that y/k(u) is convex is proven in an appendix. The price and wage curves are graphed in Figure 21. 
The intuition for the shape of the price curve is as follows - as unemployment rises, firms switch resources 
from monitoring to production (thereby increasing the marginal labour product), but at a decreasing 
rate. As for the wage curve, the dampening influence of increased outside unemployment upon wages 
remains; this dominates the effect of the substitution away from monitoring, which ceteris paribus means 
that workers require a higher wage in order to be induced not to shirk.
So, it is relatively simple to generate a nonlinear Phillips curve. Should all subregions have identical 
monitoring technologies, as measured by b, and should the productivity parameter a also be common 
across labour markets, the ‘pure’ Aggregation Hypothesis of Section 4.3.1 would apply. However, differ­
ences in economic structure across regions are likely to imply heterogeneous Phillips curves.
First, it seems reasonable that a firm’s monitoring technology be viewed as an integral part of the 
rest of the firm’s activities; b could then be expected to be correlated with a, the productivity parameter, 
although a priori it is not clear what sign such correlation should take. A positive correlation could arise
89It seems reasonable to assume, given the form of q(.),  that b is considerably greater than 1.
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from common management practices; a negative correlation could be a result of limited management 
resources being divided between overseeing the production and the monitoring processes.
Second, since it is probable that the monitoring process in capital-intensive manufacturing is quali­
tatively different from that in services, a stylised fact that merits consideration is the concentration of 
(relatively highly productive) service sector industries in the South of the UK. It is plausible that the 
contribution of an individual worker to a firm’s final output is less tangible in services than manufac­
turing; more precisely, that it is less easy in services to infer each worker’s input from the final firm 
output, assuming that this is all that is directly observed, and so monitoring in services is likely to be 
less ‘efficient’. Note that this conjecture has nothing to do with workers in service sector firms working 
more in teams, say. There is no reason for this to be the case; think of a production or assembly line in 
a manufacturing firm. The argument is more about the differing nature of team-work across sectors. It 
might be easier to examine final output a t the end of the proverbial production line and discern where 
any shirking has occurred90.
The UK economy could thus be caricatured as consisting of a high-value-added (high-a) service sector, 
with poor (low-6) monitoring technology, in the South, with its mirror image the manufacturing sector 
concentrated in the North91. This is all the more true if one accepts the notion that, ceteris paribus, a 
and b are anyway likely to be negatively correlated. Southern regions would therefore have steeper, more 
convex Phillips curves92, as will be confirmed by the data. Note that the pure version of the aggregation 
hypothesis will no longer be appropriate in such a situation. Figure 22 details two subregional Phillips
curves for the case where productivity and monitoring technology are negatively related.
90In fact, on a production or assembly line the individual worker inputs might be observable directly, making monitoring 
even more efficient.
91 Another stylised fact is the concentration of small or medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) in the South (see, for example, 
Keeble (1996)). It is possible that there are economies or diseconomies of scale in the monitoring process. For example, 
Ringuede (1998) has a model with endogenous effort where monitoring technology depends explicitly on firm size. More 
importantly, perhaps, workers in SMEs will probably feel their future is more bound up with that of the enterprise. Peer 
pressure may then be more likely to act as a disciplinary device, and the efficacy of monitoring in fact increased. I thank
Charles Bean for this last point.
92 Again, this is confirmed in the chapter appendix.
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4.5 Previous empirical work
This section briefly reviews the empirical literatures on the effect of unemployment dispersion on aggre­
gate inflationary pressure and on the shape of the aggregate unemployment-inflation trade-off.
4.5.1 The dispersion effect
Most early work uses regional data to estimate naive wage-inflation Phillips curves, with little or no role 
for expectations. Cowling and Metcalf (1967) examine the wage transfer hypothesis, and find earnings 
increases in six high unemployment regions to be correlated with those in London & the SE. They
conclude that some sort of ‘earnings spread’ is indeed at work. Thirlwall (1969) suggests that their
findings were a result of not considering earnings spread independently of aggregate demand, for which 
London & the SE may be a proxy. Thirlwall tests the effect of regional unemployment dispersion directly, 
using post-war data to estimate aggregate equations of the form:
w — w - i  =  cq +  ci(p — p_i) +  C2 U +  C3 S (169)
where s is the standard deviation of regional unemployment rates and u the aggregate unemploy­
ment rate. He found no role for regional dispersion, although a similar measure based on industrial 
disaggregates was significant.
Archibald (1969) carries out similar analysis, using the inverse of the unemployment rate instead 
of a simple linear function. In contrast to Thirlwall, he finds that the second moment of the regional 
unemployment distribution does have a positive effect on the rate of change of wages, again using post­
war data. However, he notes that there was a problem of multicollinearity, as the first and second 
moments were highly correlated.
Thirlwall (1970) examines regional (wage-inflation) Phillips curves directly, rather than working with 
aggregate data. He finds evidence that high-unemployment regions had Phillips curves that lay to the 
right of those for low-unemployment regions, and that they were flatter. He concludes there is indeed 
some support for the aggregation hypothesis, but doubts its quantitative significance.
Thomas and Stoney (1971) criticise the dispersion measures of Thirlwall and Archibald as ad hoc.
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Starting with disaggregate wage-inflation Phillips curves, they take Taylor expansions as in Section 4.3.1 
above, and test the aggregation hypothesis jointly with that of the wage transfer mechanism by estimating 
aggregate equations of the form:
w -  w - 1  «  k(p - p - i )  +  (1 -  h)[f(u) +  i s2. f ' { u )] +  hf(u).  (170)
where u is unemployment in the leading sector93. Using post-war regional data, they find that, for 
various choices of /( .) , all variables are significant and enter with the correct sign, and moreover that 
the implied restrictions on the coefficients cannot be rejected. They interpret their results as support 
for both the aggregation and wage transfer hypotheses. Indeed, they argue that regional unemployment 
dispersion is of quantitative importance in its effect on aggregate wage inflation - they estimate that, in 
the absence of such dispersion, the annual rate of wage inflation in the UK would have been over two 
percentage points lower (3.33% as opposed to 5.46% p.a.). However, there is a significant problem with 
their results - they retrieve estimates of h of around 2.5, whereas a priori one might expect h to be 
bounded between zero and one. They suggest data inadequacies may be responsible.
Brechling (1973) is the first to incorporate the neoclassical approach into a model of regional sub- 
markets. His model is a variant of that of Phelps (1970) where firms are assumed to adjust wages in 
relation to expected wage changes elsewhere, in an attempt to achieve and maintain their desired labour 
recruitment levels. Brechling also extends the earlier empirical work, and tests the nonlinear aggregation 
hypothesis while incorporating the concept of a natural rate of unemployment. He estimates a wage- 
inflation Phillips curve similar in form to that of Thomas and Stoney above, but includes terms for wage 
and price expectations on the RHS. Using state-level US data, quarterly 1950-1969, he fails to find a 
form of nonlinearity that substantially outperforms a simple linear specification. He concludes that there 
is little empirical support for the nonlinear aggregation hypothesis. Neither does he find any support for
the proposition that low-unemployment regions were ‘expectational leaders’ in any sense94.
93They define the leading sector that region with the lowest unemployment rate at any particular time; they also consider
an alternative specification where the leading sector is a group of three regions with low levels of unemployment historically.
94 However, he does find some empirical support for the proposition that regions with relatively high average earnings
(these were not those with low unemployment) influenced wage changes in other regions.
118
More recently, Jackman, Layard and Savouri (1990) consider whether increased subregional unem­
ployment dispersion could be responsible for the increase in the UK NAIRU, 1963-198795. They do not 
include a dispersion measure in any estimated equation. Rather, they derive the appropriate measure 
for the case of identical, logarithmic regional wage curves (ie s2/u 2), and note that this had in fact fallen 
over the sample period. They conclude that subregional unemployment dispersion played no role in the 
NAIRU increase.
Finally, Tootell (1994) includes the variance of unemployment rates in US states, quarterly 1960-1993, 
in an aggregate Phillips-type equation:
P - P - i  = a(L )(p_! — P - 2 ) +  b(L)(u — un)+  c(L)zt +  s2 (171)
where u — un is the deviation of unemployment from the NAIRU, zt is a vector of supply shock 
variables and a(L), b(L) and c(L) axe (linear) functions in the lag operator. Note that expected inflation 
is proxied by lagged values of actual inflation, typically with the coefficients on the lagged values are 
restricted to sum to one. As it is, Tootell finds the variance to be insignificant, and concludes that 
unemployment dispersion was not responsible for any variation in the US NAIRU.
In short, empirical work on the effect of unemployment dispersion on inflationary pressure in the 
aggregate has had mixed results. Note that the most recent Brechling (1973) and Tootell (1994) studies, 
neither of which found any role for unemployment dispersion, both used US data.
4.5.2 Phillips curves or Phillips lines?
In much recent empirical work on aggregate Phillips-type equations, the unemployment-inflation trade-off 
is assumed to be linear. This assumption has been questioned by work at the IMF; see for example Clark 
and Laxton (1997), Clark, Laxton and Rose (1996), Debelle and Laxton (1996) and Laxton, Meredith 
and Rose (1995). While the potential nonlinearity of the Phillips curve was explicit in the work of Phillips 
(1958) and Lipsey (1960), it tended to become implicit in later work. To quote Clark and Laxton (1997),
p.8 :
95 They call it the regional mismatch hypothesis.
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“The question of whether the Phillips relationship was a straight line or a curve was eclipsed 
in part because in the 1960s and 1970s the dominant issue was the extent to which the 
relationship was stable. First, the natural rate hypothesis propounded by Friedman (1968) 
and Phelps (1970) called into question the usefulness of the Phillips curve as an analytical 
construct. Moreover, attention shifted to the expectations-augmented Phillips curve and the 
determinants of the NAIRU, as well as the factors generating the apparent rise in the NAIRU 
during the 1970s and 1980s in many industrial countries. Second, the two oil price shocks and 
unstable monetary policies in the 1970s led to large shifts in inflation relative to the level of 
the unemployment rate, so that...the connection between these two variables was considerably 
obscured. Partly as a result of these developments, the important policy implications of the 
nonlinearity of the Phillips curve were never explored.”
W ith regard to the UK, Debelle and Laxton (1996) use the Kalman Filter to estimate a Phillips curve 
while allowing for a time-varying NAIRU96. After imposing restrictions on the variability of the NAIRU, 
they find that a convex Phillips curve provides a better fit than a linear alternative, with similar results 
for the US and Canada. In contrast, Stiglitz (1997) suggests that the curve for the US is mildly concave.
The issue is thus fax from settled, and is complicated by the tendency of certain variables, thought 
to have an impact on the NAIRU, to move with the aggregate unemployment rate. These include the 
amount of long-term unemployment, and indeed for the purposes of this paper the spatial dispersion 
of unemployment. The studies above do not allow for the effects of such variables, or for more general 
hysteresis effects. Next, results from linear and nonlinear Phillips curve estimations are reported, with
variables thought to influence inflationary pressure included.
96 They use an explicit measure of inflationary expectations incorporating information from bond markets. Of course, 
whether or not financial markets’ expectations regarding inflation are the same as those used by firms and workers to set 
wages and prices is unclear.
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4.6 Empirical results
In this section the possible implications of unemployment dispersion for the GB NAIRU are tested. First, 
aggregate (price-inflation) Phillips curves are estimated, with various dispersion measures included on 
the right-hand-side. Then wage curves are estimated for the individual regions; this is done both to check 
for possible regional heterogeneity and to see if wage inflation in any region is affected by the dispersion 
in unemployment of the constituent subregions.
4.6.1 A ggrega te  Ph illips curves 
Phillips curves of the form:
p  — p - 1  = (p — p - i )e +  f {u ) -f dispersion 4 - Z  (172)
were estimated using quarterly data, 1966:1-1996:4. As well as measures of unemployment disper­
sion, other variables (Z ) were included that are commonly thought to have influenced the inflation- 
unemployment trade-off, such as import-price inflation, long-term unemployment, union membership, 
the replacement ratio and productivity growth. Changes in the tax wedge were also allowed a short-run 
effect. Inflationary expectations were proxied by a distributed lag of prior inflation, with the coefficients 
restricted to sum to one.
Table 2 shows the estimation results for Phillips curves without unemployment dispersion measures. 
Columns I-III report results for a simple linear specification, and are quite representative of the search 
process across various specifications. Column I includes all variables (save an unemployment dispersion 
measure); the replacement ratio (rr) and the change in employment taxes (chtl) both enter with the 
wrong sign, while the unemployment-change term (chu) and the change in indirect taxes (chtS) are 
insignificant. These results obtained across all specifications (both loglinear and with added dispersion 
measures), and these variable were dropped from the regressions. Note that this leads to the union 
membership variable {union) being insignificant (column II); column III reports results with the union 
variable excluded. Both the percentage of the unemployed that have been without work for over a year 
(Itu) and the change in income taxes (cht2) are highly significant. The variable for import inflation
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(importinf)  is the correct sign but insignificant; however, it is included as it proved significant in some 
specifications with dispersion measures included. The term for productivity growth was consistently 
significant and of the right sign. Columns IV-VT report the identical procedure using a loglinear un­
employment term. The conclusions regarding the variables to be included are the same, but the fit is 
slightly worse. Other nonlinear specifications were tried, including one using the inverse of the aggregate 
unemployment rate, but these showed deteriorations in fit and are not reported.
Columns I-IV of Table 3 show the results when simple unemployment dispersion measures were added 
to the estimated equations. Various distributional statistics were tried, including the variance, various 
percentile ranges and the coefficient of variation. However, the best results were achieved using the 
simple standard deviation. Columns I and II report results for the linear and loglinear specifications 
with the standard deviation of regional unemployment rates (stdevreg) added; columns III and IV use 
the standard deviation of the subregional distribution (stdevsub). The 10 Standard Statistical Regions 
were used to obtain stdevreg, while the subregional distributional statistic was based on a variety of 
datasets, typically with more than 300 constituent subregions; details are in the data appendix. Again, 
the linear specification provides the best fit, while stdevsub outperforms stdevreg. Indeed, the linear 
specification, with the standard deviation of subregional unemployment rates included, proved to have 
the highest explanatory power of all specifications attempted. The timepath that this specification 
implies for the NAIRU is detailed in Figure 23, along with the GB unemployment rate. The rise in the 
NAIRU from the 1960s onwards is reproduced, as is the subsequent fall at the end of the 1980s. This is 
followed by a further cycle in the NAIRU at the start of the 1990s. Table 4 breaks down the increase in 
the NAIRU between 1977:1 and 1987:1, a rise of over 8%, by variables responsible. The results indicate 
that over half of the increase was due to the rise in subregional unemployment dispersion.
The pure version of the aggregation hypothesis was also tested. Table 3 reports estimation results 
for equations of the form (150), with and without the implied parameter restrictions imposed. The 
appropriate dispersion measure with a logarithmic unemployment term is > i e. the variance of the 
regional or subregional unemployment distribution, deflated by the square of the aggregate unemployment
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ra te97; the implied restriction is that the coefficient on this statistic is equal to (minus) half the coefficient 
on the log of the unemployment rate. Other forms of nonlinearity were tried, but none outperformed the 
simple loglinear specification. The results from the unrestricted regressions are reported in columns VII 
and VIII of Table 3. The coefficients on the deflated dispersion terms are insignificant and incorrectly 
signed, no m atter whether the regional or subregional unemployment distributions were used. With 
restrictions imposed (columns V and VI), the coefficient on the unemployment and dispersion terms is 
in  each case correctly signed and highly significant. This is perhaps unsurprising, given the significance 
of the unemployment term in all specifications. However, Wald tests indicate that both restrictions are 
rejected at the 5% level. Moreover, in both cases the fit is inferior to the simple linear specification with 
standard deviation included, and even to the logarithmic specification with no dispersion measure.
So, while it seems that spatial unemployment dispersion may help explain movements in the GB 
Phillips curve, this seems unlikely to arise from aggregation over identical, nonlinear disaggregate Phillips 
curves. Possible heterogeneity is investigated next.
4.6.2 Regional wage curves
In the absence of regional price data, any investigation of regional heterogeneity must focus on wage 
curves of the form (144) above. There are, however, associated difficulties. The timing of the wage- 
and price-setting described in Section 4.4.1 was ad hoc, and in practice it is not clear whether one is 
estimating a wage-setting equation or uncovering a firm’s pricing decision. Moreover, Manning (1992) 
and Bean (1992) point out that problems of identification arise when estimating wage curves. Manning 
also argues that such difficulties can be overcome, and that the correct form of the wage equation is 
similar to an old-fashioned Phillips curve, with variables in the form of rates of change rather than levels. 
The approach taken here is to estimate such equations in error-correction form:
(w — w - 1) =  on +  oc\{p — P -\)  — &2 (w —p)~ i +  f{u) +  dispersion +  Z  (173)
where c*2 =  1 would imply an equation in levels. This was done for the 10 Standard Statistical
97This is of course also the variance of the relative unemployment rates, and is the measure examined by Jackman, 
Layard and Savouri (1990).
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Regions using annual data98, 1970-1996. Wage data were based on average gross weekly earnings of all 
full-time adults. The lack of regional price data meant that the national RPI index was again used, 
while the unemployment variable used was the mean unemployment rate across a region’s constituent 
subregions. Again, variables such as the replacement ratio, union membership and the tax wedge were 
included; none of these was significant, not even that for long-term unemployment (Itu) or the change 
in indirect taxes (cht2). This may be an artefact of the rather smaller sample. These results axe not 
reported for the sake of brevity. A term for the change in unemployment was found to be significant, 
however, for all regions, as was a variable in the level of productivity99. Also striking was the fact 
that simple dispersion measures reflecting the variation in unemployment across a region’s constituent 
subregions, for example the standard deviation, were invariably wrongly signed and insignificant; again, 
these omitted for reasons of brevity.
Reported in Table 5 are the results for the 10 regions using a linear specification. The coefficient on the 
lagged real wage is invariably highly significant but with a value below one, suggesting consistent but less 
than complete error-correction. Tables 6  and 7 present results for logarithmic and inverse specifications 
of the regional wage curves, with and without allowing for dispersion effects. Again, the pure version of 
the aggregation hypothesis is tested, with associated restrictions imposed100, x 2 tests of the restrictions 
show they largely fail to be rejected.
Also reported, in Table 8a, are the results obtained by estimating the linear system as a Seemingly 
Unrelated Regressions (SUR) model; this is intended to account for omitted common variables across 
the regional equations101. The fitted residuals do indicate significant cross-regional error correlation, as 
shown in Table 8b. Table 9a reports results from a SUR model where each regional equation used the
98 No quarterly historical wage data were available at regional level.
" A g a in , regional productivity data were unavailable, and national data were used. These proved a better fit than a 
simple time trend.
100 The implied dispersion measure and associated restrictions for the logarithmic specification are as for the aggregate 
Phillips curve estimation. For the inverse specification, the appropriate dispersion measure is s 2/t i3, i.e. the variance of 
unemployment across the constituent subregions deflated by the cube of the region’s unemployment rate; the associated
restriction is that the coefficient on this measure is equal to  that on the inverse of unemployment.
101 Again, I thank Charles Bean for this suggestion.
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specification that provided the best fit in Tables 5-7. A Wald test of the three linear restrictions in the 
system (on the parameters of the dispersion terms included in the sel, era, and wm  equations) returned 
a x 2 statistic of 6.41, with a p-value of 0.093. Again, Table 9b provides the contemporaneous correlation 
matrix for the residuals.
Importantly for the purposes of this paper, there is considerable variation in the responsiveness 
of wages to unemployment. Moreover, regions where wages are more sensitive to unemployment also 
tend to have more convex wage curves; these results are broadly consistent with the shirking model 
outlined above. We see that for five out of the ten regions, predominantly southern, the best fit is 
provided by one of these nonlinear specifications, while for three of these it is that which incorporates a 
dispersion measure. This is summarised in Table 10, which also ranks regions according to the size of the 
coefficients on unemployment, using the SUR estimates for the linear model. Figure 24 is a scatter-plot of 
these regional wage curve slopes against the respective average unemployment rates over the sample. A 
situation where aggregate wage inflation is minimised would have relatively high levels of unemployment 
in regions with steeper wage curves. The opposite is true; unemployment seems to have been higher in 
regions where wages were less responsive to unemployment102. It is instructive to carry out a similar 
exercise, focusing this time on the relative unemployment rates in different sub-periods. Figures 25.1-25.5 
do this for the periods 1970-1975, 76-80, 81-85, 86-90 and 90-96. While the pattern is again of relatively 
high unemployment in regions with flatter wage curves, this disappears in the 1990s, suggesting that 
the advent of a more benign inflationary environment was in part due to a more favourable regional 
distribution of unemployment.
4 . 7  Concluding remarks
Most studies of the effect of unemployment dispersion on the aggregate NAIRU consider aggregation over
identical, convex disaggregate Phillips curves, here called the pure aggregation hypothesis. R was argued
above that such an homogeneity assumption is overly restrictive, and that the likely heterogeneity across
spatial units has implications both for the possible existence of a dispersion effect and for the correct
102 This echoes the results of Thirlwall (1970).
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statistics to include in aggregate Phillips curve equations. Using GB data, 1966-1996, the pure version 
of the aggregation hypothesis was rejected by the data. However, ad hoc measures of dispersion were 
found to explain a significant proportion of the inflationary pressure; this is consistent with a situation 
where regional Phillips curves are heterogeneous, with those in low-unemployment regions being steeper. 
This conjecture was supported by the results from estimating wage curves at regional level. Moreover, 
for some regions the pure aggregation hypothesis was not rejected when considering the impact on wage 
inflation of unemployment dispersion across constituent subregions; this is intuitive, since it is more 
likely to hold when aggregating over labour markets of similar economic structure, and perhaps explains 
why the subregional unemployment distribution was more successful in explaining aggregate inflationary 
pressure than the regional.
A simple shirking model was developed which generated nonlinear Phillips curves and located any 
possible heterogeneity in differences in monitoring technology across regions. Regions with less efficient 
monitoring processes were shown to have steeper, more convex wage and P hillips curves, consistent 
with the data. Of course, the model is highly specific, but the aim is in part didactic. A general 
conclusion is that differences in economic structure across regions are likely to lead to differences not 
only in disaggregate natural rates but also in the slopes of the inflation-unemployment trade-off.
As for further research, the wage-transfer mechanism is one candidate. This paper mentioned it as 
a possible justification for the use of ad hoc dispersion measures, but further investigation may be war­
ranted. Embedding the wage-transfer mechanism in a fully-specified migration model would perhaps be 
instructive. This brings one to another shortcoming of the analysis here, and of almost all previous work, 
namely that it is essentially spaceless and equally applicable to the analysis of a general multi-sector econ­
omy. Clark (1980) argued that wage changes in tight labour markets could spill over to contiguous labour 
markets, and future work could incorporate explicitly spatial measures of unemployment dispersion, such 
as Moran’s /-statistic103.
Finally, much attention has been paid in recent years to the role of increasing returns, path depen­
dence and agglomeration in regional economics. While models of this type focus more on long-term
103See Moran (1948).
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location decisions than short- and medium-run fluctuations, a reasonable hypothesis is that the 
recession experienced by some regions during the 1980s had a lasting effect. A fuller investigation 
link between regional path dependence and aggregate hysteresis, perhaps involving consideration 
differential regional effects of monetary policy, seems in order.
severe 
of the 
of the
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4.8 A ppendix
4.8.1 Nonlinear Phillips curves
The convexity of the Phillips curve in obtained in Section 4.4.1 is confirmed here. We have:
p — pe = const. + 2 \l  —7 -  ^ (174)
' V  +  —
=  const.+ 2 \ f — j—1-. (175)
It is straightforward to derive:
d i p - P ‘ ) =  _  C {rui + ^ r i  <  0 (176)
du y/b
and hence:
d2(p — pe) c 4rv? + 3cu2 > 0. (177)
du2 2y/b (rw4 +  cu? ) 2
Inspection of (42) and (43) also confirms that regions with less efficient monitoring technologies (i.e. 
those with low values of b) will have steeper, more convex Phillips curves.
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4.8.2 The wage transfer hypothesis
To see the aggregate effect of a wage-transfer mechanism, divide subregions into two distinct groups: 
leading subregions, indexed by Z, and lagging subregions indexed by m. In the former, unemployment is 
relatively low, and wages and prices are set as before, resulting in the familiar Phillips curves:
P i - p f  =  +  Pi(lIi) (178)
=  8i(ut) l = l ,. . . ,L .  (179)
In the latter, prices are set as before:
pm = +  <f>m(um) m =  1,..., M. (180)
Wages, though, are driven partly by those wages available to workers elsewhere. For each lagging 
subregion m, denote by (wfm —pfm) the expected real wage available in the leading labour market I used 
as a reference, and by the usual wage curve in that market. It is assumed that wages are partly
driven by local conditions, partly by wages in the low-unemployment reference labour market:
wm = Ptn + ( l-h m )V m (um) + hm(wfm - p t m) (181)
=  Pm d- (1 hrn) t^m('U77l) +  hTnfj,im(uirn) 0 X hn X 1; (182)
The extent to which wages in any lagging subregion are influenced by those elsewhere depend on the 
parameter hm. From (180) and (182) Phillips curves for these subregions are obtained:
Pm Pm ~  (f)miV'fn) d" (1 hm)//m(um) 4* hrnfiim(uim') (183)
~  ®m(^m) d- hm\PlmiPlm) P’m(V'Tn)\' (184)
Aggregating over both sets of subregions, we have an aggregate Phillips curve:
 ^ n  ^ M
P - P 6 = ~ ^ J 6i(Ui) +  Y L  bnlPlmiuim) ~  Pm(Um)\- (185)
i=1 7 71= 1
The second summation term is positive, since uim X um and the // (.) are decreasing functions. Once
again, a reduction in the dispersion of unemployment rates reduces inflationary pressure for a given
129
level of aggregate unemployment, as long as it is associated with an increase in unemployment in the 
leading labour markets. Note that, while we may have in addition the familiar aggregation hypothesis 
from the first term on the RHS in (185), this result obtains even with identical, linear </>(.) and /*.(.). 
Once again, absent knowledge of the disaggregate functional forms, the dispersion measure appropriate 
for empirical work is unclear. The matter is complicated further by the notion of leading and lagging 
labour markets. It seems implausible that nationwide wage demands are based on wages received in the 
South-East. It is at least as likely that any transfer mechanism operates at more local levels, given the 
extent of unemployment dispersion present even with the Standard Statistical Regions. It may be that 
the labour market which workers use as a basis for wage comparisons is the contiguous subregion with 
the lowest unemployment rate; or perhaps the subregion with the lowest unemployment within a 100 
mile radius.
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4.8.3 D ata |
Note that regional data refer to the 10 Standard Statistical Regions (abbreviations used in the paper 
in brackets): East Anglia (EA), East Midlands (EM), North (N), North-West (NW), Scotland (SCOT), 
South-East including London (SEL), South-West (SW), Wales (WAL), West Midlands (WM) and York­
shire and Humberside (YH).
Unem ploym ent The subregional unemployment data were drawn from three sources:
(a) a dataset collated by Martin Frost and Nigel Spence, covering unemployment rates in 428 sub- 
regions, 1963:2 - 1976:1 [the frequency of the dataset was every two months; these were converted 
into quarterly data as follows:Ql=Feb, Q2=Average(Apr,Jun), Q3=Aug, Q4=Average(Oct,Dec). The 
dataset is available at the ESRC Data Archive].
(b) 1976:2 - 1978:2: data were taken from issues of the Employment Gazette, based on 171 subregions.
(c) four separate NOMIS files, using the narrow base104 denominator for calculating unemployment 
rates; all data were monthly, and were converted into quarterly data by simple averaging:
(i) 1978:3 - 1982:3: file URPUB. The series is based on the information collected from individual 
Jobcentres, and was aggregated to the 380 ‘1978 travel-to-work areas [Jobcentre base]’ (ttwa78jc). The 
data are unrevised and match those published in the Employment Gazette; they are based on registrant 
counts105;
(ii) 1982:4 - 1983:2: file USJ. Again, these data are based on individual Jobcentres and were aggregated 
to ttwa78jc; they are derived using claimant counts;
(iii) 1983:3 - 1996:1: file USW81. These data are based on 1981 Wards base rather than Jobcentres, 
and were aggregated to the 322 ‘1984 travel-to-work areas’ (ttwa84)', again, they are derived from claimant 
counts;
(iv) 1996:2 - 1998:2: file USW91. These data are based on 1991 Wards, and were aggregated to the 
322 ‘1984 travel-to-work areas: 1991 Ward best fit’ (ttwa8491); as before, they are derived from claimant
104ie estimated employees in employment 4- unemployed.
105 Missing data for March and April, 1981.
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counts.
The national and regional unemployment data used in estimation were drawn from the above files.
The long-term unemployment share was drawn from historical issues of the Employment Gazette, 
and refer to the proportion of unemployed who had been unemployed for 12 months or more.
In fla tion  The RPI inflation series was supplied by the ONS, series FRAG. The import inflation series 
was from the same source, series B Q K S.
W ages Regional wage data were available annually from the New Earnings Survey, and were based on 
average gross weekly earnings of all full-time adults.
Taxes - chtl is the annual change in employment taxes. Quarterly index numbers for unit wage costs 
(series DJD O) and unit labour costs (series D JD P )  were obtained from the ONS. Then, log(D JD P/D JD O ) 
was used as a proxy for employment taxes.
- cht2 is the annual change in income taxes. The income tax series was computed as follows:
t2 =  (.D T  +  H S S )/(H C R  -  E SS)
where D T  is direct taxes on household income, S S  is households’ contributions to social security 
schemes, H C R  is household’s current receipts and E S S  is employer contributions to social security 
schemes. All series were taken from OECD National Accounts, and were available only annually.
- chtS is the annual change in the indirect tax rate. The series for indirect taxes was computed as 
£3 =  log(D JD T /D JC M ), where D JD T  is the GDP deflator at market prices and D JC M  is the GDP 
deflator at factor cost. Data were obtained from the ONS, and were available quarterly.
P ro d u c tiv ity  The productivity inflation term was based on a ratio of two index numbers, (C G C E /D Y D C I), 
where CGCE  is gross value added at basic prices (1995:2=100) and D Y D C I  is an index for the workforce 
in employment (1995:2=100). The latter was constructed from D YD C , a raw series for the workforce in 
employment. Both CGCE  and D Y D C  were available quarterly from the ONS.
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R ep lacem en t ra tio  rr was based on a married worker with 2 children claiming income support, with 
the denominator being average gross weekly earnings of full-time adults. Data were available annually.
U nions The union variable was an annual time series of trade union membership, taken from issues 
of Labour Market Trends.
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4.8.4 Tables
Periods within which 
estimates fall
1969-73 1974-80 1981-87 1988-90
NAIRU range 1.6% -5.6% 4.5% - 7.3% 5.2% - 9.9% 3.5% - 8.1%
Average NAIRU 2.9% 5.7% 7.0% 6.1%
Table 1 - NAIRU estimates for the UK (claimant count definition); taken from Coulton and Cromb
(1994)
Dependent variable is aggregate RPI inflation
I II III IV V VI
8 lags(rpiinf) 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000
u -0.3477 -0.2803 -0.2586 - - -
-(4.96) -(5.32) -(5.30) - - -
log(u) - - -1.5231 -1.3827 -1.3441
- - - -(3.76) -(4.67) -(4.77)
importinf 0.0091 -0.0010 0.0072 0.0118 0.0087 0.0118
(0.57) -(0.07) (0.57) (0.70) (0.59) (0.93)
constant -0.4161 -1.8815 -0.6004 3.4665 -0.3092 0.1841
-(0.15) -(151) -(1-49) (1.20) -(0.26) (0.44)
oil1 1.6516 1.3993 1.5579 1.6033 1.8148 1.8738
(2.19) (2.01) (2.29) (2.03) (2.48) (2.62)
oil2 2.9821 3.8318 3.9121 2.9182 3.7549 3.7946
(3.05) (4.17) (4.27) (2.86) (3.99) (4.07)
prodinf -0.0919 -0.0998 -0.1058 -0.1149 -0.1148 -0.1167
-(1.59) -(1.75) -(1.86) -(1.92) -(1.97) -(2.02)
union 4.8372 2.5714 - 2.9358 1.0384 -
(1.91) (1.09) - (1.14) (0.44) -
cht1 -15.3373 - - -0.5168 - -
-(0.32) - - -(0.01) - -
cht2 48.4401 61.3429 53.4939 30.6674 35.6812 33.1546
(2.39) (3.46) (3.30) (1.48) (2.04) (2.01)
cht3 26.5440 - - 21.0718 - -
(1.09) - - (0.83) - -
rr -3.8426 - - -7.0459 - -
-(0.94) - - -(1.53) - -
Itu 0.1003 0.1029 0.0866 0.0534 0.0855 0.0795
(2.81) (4.44) (4.89) (1.59) (3.80) (4.45)
u-u(-1) 0.1797 - - -0.1378 - -
(0.60) - - -(0.47) - -
R-sq 0.9727 0.9682 0.9678 0.9700 0.9666 0.9665
Adjusted R-sq 0.9671 0.9638 0.9637 0.963972 0.9619 0.9622
DW statistic 1.9278 1.9958 1.9814 1.9236 1.9806 1.9786
t-statistics are in brackets
Sample(adjusted): 1966:1 1996:4
Included observations: 124 after adjusting endpoints
Table 2 - aggregate Phillips curves, linear and logarithmic specifications
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Dependent variable is aggregate RPI inflation
I II III IV V VI VII VIII
8 lags(rpiinf) 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000
u -0.2660 - -0.3995 - - - - -
-(5.32) - -(5.22) - - - - -
log(u) -1.3536 -1.6373 - - -2.0600 -1.7744
- -4.7400 - -(4.10) - - -(4.57) -(3.84)
log(u) - - - - -1.2011 -
(varreg/u*u)/2 - - - - -(4.61) - - -
log(u) - - - - - - -0.9699 - -
(varsub/u*u)/2 - - - - - -(4.45) - -
(varreg/u*u)/2 - - - - - - -8.3242 -
- - - - - - -(2.01) -
(varsub/u*u)/2 - - - - - - -0.7443
- - - - - - - -(1.17)
importinf 0.0084 0.0123 0.0237 0.0195 0.0137 0.0178 -0.0015 0.0024
(0.66) (0.95) (1.68) (1.32) (1.07) (1.37) -(0.10) (0.16)
constant -0.7708 0.1302 -1.7515 -0.1108 -0.0602 -0.5233 1.7774 1.2178
-(1.64) (0.28) -(2.79) -(0.22) -(0.15) -(1.26) (1.99) (1.25)
oih 1.5656 1.8765 1.8475 2.0580 1.8863 1.9469 1.5655 1.6457
(2.29) (2.61) (2.72) (2.79) (2.61) (2.65) (2.17) (2.22)
oil2 3.9373 3.8005 3.9661 3.7888 3.7586 3.6978 3.9134 3.8747
(4.29) (4.06) (4.42) (4.07) (4.01) (3.93) (4.25) (4.15)
prodinf -0.1011 -0.1152 -0.0954 -0.1150 -0.1148 -0.1134 -0.1327 -0.1233
-(1.76) -(1.97) -(1.71) -(1.99) -(1.97) -(1.94) -(2.30) -(2.12)
stdevreg 0.1782 0.0632 - - -
(0.72) (0.25) - - - - - -
stdevsub - - 0.7416 0.3008 - - - -
- - (2.35) (1.04) - - - -
cht2 54.8780 33.4662 49.5169 27.0721 31.6221 27.6658 45.6348 42.5523
(3.36) (2.02) (3.10) (1.55) (1.90) (1.64) (2.62) (2.32)
Itu 0.0847 0.0785 0.0724 0.0720 0.0766 0.0728 0.0863 0.0827
(4.72) (4.29) (3.94) (3.74) (4.31) (4.15) (4.81) (4.59)
R-sq 0.9680 0.9665 0.9694 0.9669 0.9661 0.9658 0.9677 0.9669
Adjusted R-sq 0.963532 0.961901 0.965147 0.962255 0.961798 0.961369 0.96326 0.962359
DW statistic 1.9794 1.9765 1.9927 1.9708 1.9696 1.9605 2.0237 2.0019
Chi-sq statistic 
on restriction*
5.3361
0.0209
3.8680
0.0492
* p-values in italics
t-statistics are in brackets
Sample(adjusted): 1966:1 1996:4
Included observations: 124 after adjusting endpoints
Table 3 - aggregate Phillips curves with dispersion measures
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variable change in 
variable
effect on 
NAIRU
stdevsub +2.75 +5.11
Itu +20 +3.62
prodinf -.46 +0.13
cht2 +0.0065 +0.81
importinf -17.41 -1.03
total change
in NAIRU +8.64
Table 4 - relative effects of explanatory variables on the NAIRU, 1977:1 - 1987:1
Dependent variable is nominal wage inflation in each region
region rpiinf constant u u-u(-1) log(prod) log(w-p)(-1) R-sq Adjusted
R-sq
DW
statistic
ea 0.9397
(6.15)
3.2783
(3.73)
-0.0037
-(1.81)
0.0103
(3.36)
0.6617
(3.37)
-0.6134
-(3.66)
0.882 0.852 1.999
em 0.9843
(7.65)
3.5997
(4.46)
-0.0062
-(3.19)
0.0123
(3.57)
0.7293
(4.38)
-0.6729
-(4.38)
0.894 0.867 2.063
n* 1.1306
(6.94)
3.8127
(4.40)
-0.0044
-(2.18)
0.0115
(2.94)
0.7158
(4.08)
-0.7174
-(4.34)
0.868 0.835 1.899
nw* 0.9629
(8.15)
4.1927
(4.91)
-0.0050
-(3.37)
0.0105
(3.64)
0.8438
(4.81)
-0.7822
-(4.85)
0.898 0.873 2.032
scot* 1.1549
(7.53)
4.3173
(4.61)
-0.0026
-(1.41)
0.0102
(2.64)
0.8646
(4.37)
-0.8128
-(4.56)
0.882 0.852 2.181
sel 0.8517
(6.70)
2.7926
(3.61)
-0.0061
-(2.55)
0.0097
(2.77)
0.7088
(3.58)
-0.4949
-(3.54)
0.830 0.788 2.091
sw 0.8988
(5.75)
2.9858
(3.05)
-0.0044
-(1.67)
0.0066
(1.71)
0.6122
(2.86)
-0.5551
-(3.01)
0.823 0.779 2.083
wal* 0.9515
(7.00)
3.4979
(3.68)
-0.0038
-(2.43)
0.0061
(2.07)
0.5439
(3.39)
-0.6607
-(3.63)
0.869 0.836 2.043
wm 0.7131
(6.11)
2.7507
(3.43)
-0.0060
-(3.00)
0.0075
(2.67)
0.4632
(3.21)
-0.5096
-(3.36)
0.862 0.828 2.012
yh* 1.0758
(7.43)
4.0282
(4.51)
-0.0037
-(1.98)
0.0090
(2.73)
0.7688
(4.24)
-0.7600
-(4.45)
0.888 0.860 2.054
* particular specification provided the best fit for the region.
t-statistics are in brackets
Sample(adjusted): 1971 1996
Included observations: 26 after adjusting endpoints
Table 5 - regional wage curves, linear specification
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Dependent variable is nominal wage inflation in each region
region rpiinf constant log(u) log(u)-
(var/u*u)/2
u-u(-1) log(prod) log(w-p)(-1) R-sq Adjusted
R-sq
DW
statistic
Chi-sq statistic 
on restriction**
ea 0.9502 3.3600 -0.0296 - 0.0109 0.6913 -0.6228 0.888 0.860 2.051
(6.56) (3.92) -(2.14) - (3.59) (3.60) -(3.81)
ea 0.9472 3.3313 - -0.0298 0.0111 0.6889 -0.6174 0.890 0.863 2.077 2.870
(6.60) (3.92) - -(2.24) (3.67) (3.62) -(3.82) 0.0902
em 1.0141 3.5646 -0.0455 0.0126 0.7477 -0.6578 0.894 0.868 2.182
(8.00) (4.45) -(3.21) - (3.63) (4.44) -(4.35)
em* 1.0126 3.5461 -0.0441 0.0129 0.7471 -0.6553 0.895 0.869 2.222 0.014
(8.00) (4.45) - -(3.23) (3.67) (4.45) -(4.35) 0.9056
n 1.1347 3.7433 -0.0427 - 0.0118 0.7113 -0.6936 0.867 0.834 1.946
(6.96) (4.34) -(2.15) - (2.96) (4.05) -(4.23)
n 1.1352 3.6538 - -0.0398 0.0119 0.6924 -0.6786 0.865 0.831 1.943 2.320
(6.89) (4.23) - -(2.04) (2.91) (3.95) -(4.12) 0.1442
nw 1.0063 4.1518 -0.0410 0.0108 0.8650 -0.7660 0.896 0.869 2.151
(8.48) (4.80) -(3.24) - (3.62) (4.73) -(4.72)
nw 0.9988 4.1140 - -0.0393 0.0109 0.8557 -0.7599 0.895 0.869 2.162 0.255
(8.39) (4.77) - -(3.22) (3.62) (4.71) -(4.69) 0.6133
scot 1.1488 4.2934 -0.0266 - 0.0105 0.8612 -0.8015 0.882 0.852 2.208
(7.41) (4.59) -(1.40) - (2.66) (4.36) -(4.49)
scot 1.1537 4.2424 - -0.0242 0.0105 0.8546 -0.7932 0.881 0.852 2.237 0.198
(7.47) (4.53) - -(1.37) (2.65) (4.32) -(4.43) 0.6564
sei 0.8866 3.1598 -0.0437 - 0.0107 0.8215 -0.5546 0.845 0.806 2.168
(6.48) (3.57) -(2.48) - (2.71) (3.53) -(3.49)
sel* 0.9040 3.1514 -0.0401 0.0109 0.8238 -0.5551 0.847 0.808 2.215 0.375
(6.70) (3.61) - -(2.55) (2.77) (3.58) -(3.54) 0.5405
sw 0.9280 3.1219 -0.0380 0.0070 0.6517 -0.5729 0.828 0.786 2.125
(6.16) (3.19) -(1.87) - (1.84) (3.01) -(3.14)
sw 0.9300 3.0693 -0.0355 0.0071 0.6456 -0.5644 0.828 0.785 2.181 0.053
(6.17) (3.17) - -(1.85) (1.84) (2.99) -(3.11) 0.8181
wal 0.9802 3.4538 -0.0376 0.0062 0.5513 -0.6429 0.866 0.833 2.088
(7.18) (3.60) -(2.32) - (2.06) (3.35) -(3.53)
wal 0.9815 3.4497 - -0.0363 0.0062 0.5518 -0.6430 0.867 0.833 2.094 0.206
(7.20) (3.61) - -(2.35) (2.06) (3.37) -(3.54) 0.6498
wm* 0.7588 2.9813 -0.0463 - 0.0082 0.5354 -0.5445 0.868 0.835 2.084
(0.00) (0.82) (0.01) - (0.00) (0.15) (0.15)
wm 0.7561 2.9226 -0.0449 0.0082 0.5237 -0.5342 0.866 0.833 2.078 2.699
(6.70) (3.58) - -(3.15) (2.86) (3.42) -(3.50) 0.1004
yh 1.0787 3.9516 -0.0297 - 0.0092 0.7637 -0.7392 0.887 0.859 2.105
(7.42) (4.43) -(1.93) - (2.73) (4.20) -(4.34)
yh 1.0846 3.9064 -0.0277 0.0093 0.7586 -0.7318 0.888 0.859 2.129 0.007
(7.52) (4.40) - -(1.94) (2.75) (4.19) -(4.31) 0.9342
* particular specification provided the best fit for the region.
** p-values in italics
t-statistics are in brackets
Sample(adjusted): 1971 1996
Included observations: 26 after adjusting endpoints
Table 6 - regional wage curves, logarithmic specification (with and without dispersion effects)
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Dependent variable is nominal wage inflation in each region
region rpiinf constant ' J ) 1/u + 
(var/u*u*u)
log(prod) log(w-p)(-1) R-sq Adjusted
R-sq
DW
statistic
Chi-sq statistic 
on restriction**
ea 0.9884
H M
3.3654
(3.98)
0.1703
JZ 31)
0.0109
(3.69)
0.7230
(3.78)
-0.6400
-(3.97)
0.891 0.864 2.119
ea* 0.9915
JL321
3.3241
(401)
0.1476
(2-51)
0.0111 0.7202
(3.85)
-0.6318
-(4.00)
0.895 0.869 2.176 2.485
0.1149
em 1.0610
(8.10)
3.2280
(4.01)
0.2241
(2.80)
0.0117
(3.29)
0.7139
(4.10)
-0.6180
-(3.98)
0.885 0.856 2.221
em 1.0679
(8.09)
3.1762
(3.93)
0.1724
(2-73)
0.0118
J1251
0.7016
(403)
-0.6076
,.-(3-91)
0.883 0.854 2.273 0.357
0.5500
1.1495 
H 041
3.4766
(4.07)
0.3434
(204)
0.0118
(2.90)
0.6986
(3.97)
-0.6683
-(4.07)
0.865 0.831 1.985
1.1545
16,971
3.3662
(3.89)
0.2588
(1-87)
0.0118
(2.82)
0.6702
(3.81)
-0.6467
-(3.89)
0.861 0.826 1.971 1.902
0.1679
nw 1.0548
(8.32)
3.7584
J±261
0.2209
(2 .66)
0.0101
13J91
0.8235
.11241
-0.7138
-(4-23)
0.882 0.853 2.211
nw 1.0415 
11161
3.6712
(4.16)
0.1741
(2-55)
0.0100
(3.13)
0.7973
(4.14)
-0.6968
-(4.13)
0.880 0.850 2.212 1.195
0.2743
scot 1.1482
(7.35)
4.1602
(4.43)
0.2300
(1-36)
0.0106
(2.65)
0.8567
(4.33)
-0.7923
-(4.42)
0.881 0.851 2.240
scot 1.1623
11521
4.0950
.£311
0.1549
(1-27)
0.0105
(2.61)
0.8451
(4.25)
-0.7790
-(4.30)
0.880 0.850 2.292 0.364
0.5461
sel 0.9552
(6.96)
2.9799
(3.39)
0.1700
J I M
0.0094
11481
0.8038
(3.38)
-0.5432
-(3.36)
0.839 0.799 2.242
sel 0.9894
i m
2.9166
(3.36)
0.1054
...(2,27)
0.0092
H441
0.7840
(3.35)
-0.5309
-(3.32)
0.838 0.798 2.298 0.088
0.7662
sw* 0.9699
(6.52)
3.0195
(3.19)
0.2462
J I M
0.0068
a m
0.6654
(3.05)
-0.5751
-(3.17)
0.830 0.788 0.830
sw
wal
0.9807
(6.56)
2.9533
(3-14)
0.1713
(1.89)
0.0066
J I M
0.6519
(3.02)
-0.5615
-(3-12)
0.829 0.786 2.270 0.123
0.7263
1.0161
11291
3.2214
j i m
0.3099
(2-14)
0.0061
H9Z1
0.5498
J1251
-0.6213
-(3.39)
0.862 0.827 2.123
wal
wm
wm
yh“
yh“
1.0206
(7.33)
3.2012
(3.41)
0.2573
(2.17)
0.0060
0-96)
0.5476
(3.26)
-0.6169
-(3.39)
0.863 0.828 2.136 0.053
0.8182
0.8222
(6.92)
2.5633
(3.13)
0.2049
J2^61
0.0072
(2.47)
0.4969
(3.03)
-0.4889
-(3.10)
0.852 0.815 2.172
0.8157
J1Z91
2.4644
(3.02)
0.1743
(2.52)
0.0071
(2.39)
0.4725
(2.90)
-0.4697
-(2.98)
0.848 0.810 2.162 4.319
0.0377
1.0949
(7.49)
3.7564
(4.19)
0.1830
J1Z41
0.0090
(2.62)
0.7500
(4.08)
-0.7186
(4J.7)
0.884 0.855 2.150
1.1150
JIZ H
3.6948
(410)
0.1224
d-67)
0.0089
J1581
0.7377
(402)
-0.7061
-(4.08)
0.883 0.853 2.172 0.214
0.6433
* particular specification provided the best fit for the region.
** p-values in italics
t-statistics are in brackets
Sample(adjusted): 1971 1996
Included observations: 26 after adjusting endpoints
Table 7 - regional wage curves, inverse specification (with and without dispersion effects)
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Dependent variable is nominal w age inflation in each region
region rpiinf constant u u-u(-1) log(prod) log(w-p)(-1) R-sq Adjusted
R-sq
DW
statistic
ea 0.9039
(8.19)
3.0951
(8.42)
-0.0045
-(4.32)
0.0099
(7.57)
0.6249
(6.96)
-0.5769
-(8.20)
0.880 0.850 2.013
em 0.9798
(10.07)
3.6278
(12.64)
-0.0065
-(7.68)
0.0129
(9.98)
0.7376
(10.65)
-0.6777
-(12.39)
0.894 0.867 2.059
nw 1.1191
(9.43)
3.6211
(12.37)
-0.0040
-(3.90)
0.0107
(7.47)
0.6767
(9.21)
-0.6815
-(12.15)
0.868 0.834 1.943
nw 0.9397
(10.28)
3.5579
(13.38)
-0.0043
-(6.97)
0.0089
(9.55)
0.7133
(10.99)
-0.6631
-(13.16)
0.895 0.869 2.218
scot 1.1029
(9.83)
3.7362
(9.68)
-0.0026
-(2.87)
0.0101
(6.50)
0.7484
(8.28)
-0.7018
-(9.54)
0.879 0.849 2.326
sel 0.8209
(6.99)
2.5405
(7.86)
-0.0067
-(5.38)
0.0097
(6.14)
0.6544
(6.98)
-0.4475
-(7.63)
0.829 0.786 2.190
sw 0.8293
(6.67)
2.1285
(4.86)
-0.0046
-(3.49)
0.0066
(3.77)
0.4407
(4.20)
-0.3908
-(4.73)
0.814 0.768 2.349
wal 0.9303
(8.98)
3.1316
(9.18)
-0.0034
-(4.69)
0.0062
(5.70)
0.4850
(7.00)
-0.5909
-(9.03)
0.868 0.835 2.136
wm 0.7144
(7.56)
2.7632
(9.93)
-0.0060
-(7.58)
0.0071
(6.75)
0.4644
(7.60)
-0.5120
-(9.69)
0.862 0.828 2.002
yh 1.0257
(9.92)
3.5210
(11.14)
-0.0037
-(3.96)
0.0084
(7.14)
0.6700
(9.04)
-0.6627
-(10.95)
0.886 0.858 2.174
t-statistics are in brackets 
Sample(adjusted): 1971 1996 
Included observations: 26 after adjusting endpoints 
Total system observations: 260
Table 8a - SUR results (using linear specifications)
ea em n nw scot sel sw wal wm yh
ea 1.000 0.830 0.866 0.909 0.899 0.851 0.883 0.861 0.874 0.875
em 0.830 1.000 0.893 0.922 0.886 0.922 0.774 0.891 0.883 0.911
n 0.866 0.893 1.000 0.924 0.873 0.787 0.741 0.907 0.888 0.966
nw 0.909 0.922 0.924 1.000 0.919 0.923 0.896 0.954 0.962 0.936
scot 0.899 0.886 0.873 0.919 1.000 0.868 0.821 0.859 0.846 0.921
sel 0.851 0.922 0.787 0.923 0.868 1.000 0.901 0.880 0.899 0.823
sw 0.883 0.774 0.741 0.896 0.821 0.901 1.000 0.855 0.876 0.759
wal 0.861 0.891 0.907 0.954 0.859 0.880 0.855 1.000 0.938 0.918
wm 0.874 0.883 0.888 0.962 0.846 0.899 0.876 0.938 1.000 0.868
0.875 0.911 0.966 0.936 0.921 0.823 0.759 0.918 0.868 1.000
Table 8b - contemporaneous correlation matrix for residuals
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Dependent variable is nominal wage inflation in each region
region (specification) rpiinf constant f(u) u-u(-1) log(prod) log(w-p)(-1) R-sq Adjusted
R-sq
DW
statistic
ea (inverse plus 
dispersion measure)
1.0008
(10.07)
3.3240
(9.98)
0.1327
(5.06)
0.0100
(8.59)
0.7127
(8.55)
-0.6317
-(9.94)
0.894 0.868 2.140
em (logarithmic plus 
dispersion measure)
1.0262
(10.73)
3.6601
(12.87)
-0.0428
-(7.95)
0.0136
(10.28)
0.7681
(10.97)
-0.6778
-(12.59)
0.894 0.868 2.173
n (linear) 1.1661
(9.93)
3.8186
(12.86)
-0.0032
-(3.59)
0.0104
(7.25)
0.7090
(9.55)
-0.7217
-(12.71)
0.866 0.832 1.875
nw (linear) 0.9655
(10.62)
3.7417
(13.89)
-0.0039
-(7.24)
0.0088
(9.42)
0.7462
(11.39)
-0.6991
-(13.71)
0.895 0.869 2.141
scot (linear) 1.1173
(9.95)
3.7238
(9.54)
-0.0207
-(2.43)
0.0100
(6.21)
0.7445
(8.17)
-0.6958
-(9.34)
0.879 0.849 2.348
sel (logarithmic plus 
dispersion measure)
0.8992
(8.23)
2.8224
(9.42)
-0.0338
-(5.72)
0.0102
(7.14)
0.7337
(8.16)
-0.4975
-(9.25)
0.845 0.806 2.294
sw (inverse) 0.9143
(7.65)
2.2244
(5.30)
0.2043
(3.40)
0.0066
(3.88)
0.4921
(4.65)
-0.4226
*(5.25)
0.824 0.780 2.423
wal (linear) 0.9563
(9.29)
3.2642
(9.81)
-0.0028
-(4.55)
0.0062
(5.77)
0.5027
(7.37)
-0.6181
-(9.69)
0.866 0.833 2.064
wm (logarithmic) 0.7818
(8.59)
3.2045
(11.34)
-0.0446
-(8.35)
0.0078
(7.58)
0.5682
(8.96)
-0.5883
-(11.12)
0.867 0.833 1.953
yh (linear) 1.0523
(10.25)
3.4839
(11.03)
-0.0238
-(3.61)
0.0081
(6.78)
0.6661
(8.97)
-0.6525
-(10.78)
0.885 0.856 2.207
Chi-square statistic on 3 linear restrictions: 6.41 (p=0.093)
t-statistics are in brackets
Sample(adjusted): 1971 1996
Included observations: 26 after adjusting endpoints
Total system observations: 260
Table 9a - SUR results (using best fits)
ea em n nw scot sel sw wal wm yh
ea 1.000 0.837 0.861 0.901 0.893 0.855 0.882 0.869 0.850 0.889
em 0.837 1.000 0.865 0.898 0.868 0.925 0.777 0.876 0.878 0.906
n 0.861 0.865 1.000 0.923 0.866 0.756 0.719 0.908 0.897 0.960
nw 0.901 0.898 0.923 1.000 0.909 0.901 0.876 0.957 0.963 0.931
scot 0.893 0.868 0.866 0.909 1.000 0.854 0.810 0.853 0.835 0.920
sel 0.855 0.925 0.756 0.901 0.854 1.000 0.905 0.866 0.876 0.824
sw 0.882 0.777 0.719 0.876 0.810 0.905 1.000 0.848 0.857 0.766
wal 0.869 0.876 0.908 0.957 0.853 0.866 0.848 1.000 0.956 0.917
wm 0.850 0.878 0.897 0.963 0.835 0.876 0.857 0.956 1.000 0.878
yh 0.889 0.906 0.960 0.931 0.920 0.824 0.766 0.917 0.878 1.000
Table 9b - contemporaneous correlation matrix of residuals
region I - coefficient on unemployment 
(linear SUR estimates)
II - Specification with best fit
sel -0.0067 logarithmic, with dispersion measure
em -0.0065 logarithmic, with dispersion measure
wm -0.0060 logarithmic
sw -0.0046 inverse
ea -0.0045 inverse
nw -0.0043 linear
n -0.0040 linear
yh -0.0037 linear
wal -0.0034 linear
scot -0.0026 linear
Table 10 - wage curve slopes and best fits
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Figure 15 - regional unemployment rates, relative to GB average, 1966-1996
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Figure 16 - GB unemployment rate, 1966-1996
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Figure 17.1 - standard deviation, regional unemployment, 1966-1996
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Figure 17.2 - standard deviation, subregional unemployment, 1966-1996
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Figure 18 - standard deviations of subreional unemployment rates, by region, 1966-1996
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Figure 19 - dispersion effect: 2 regions (a and b) with identical, nonlinear Phillips curves
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Figure 20 - dispersion effect: 2 regions (a and b) with linear, heterogeneous Phillips curves 
w-p
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u*
Figure 21 - nonlinear wage and price equations
144
P-P(e)
p-p(e)=0
High b , low a region N
u
u(S)* u(N)* High a , low b region S
Figure 22 - differences in productivity and monitoring technology across regions
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Figure 23 - the implied GB NAIRU, 1966-1996
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Figure 24 - wage curve slope versus relative unemployment, 1970-1996
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Figure 25.1 - wage curve slope versus relative unemployment, 1970-1975
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Figure 25.2 - wage curve slope versus relative unemployment, 1976-1980
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Figure 25.3 - wage curve slope versus relative unemployment, 1981-1985
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Figure 25.4 - wage curve slope versus relative unemployment, 1986-1990
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Figure 25.5 - wage curve slope versus relative unemployment, 1991-1996
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